I 


PRINCETON.   N.   J. 

€)  Hart  of  the 

J'       ADDISON  ALEXANDER  LIBRAI^r 

l\  which  was  ]>res<.'nted  by 

\l  MKS3KS.    U.    I..    AND    A.   StUAFT, 


I 


Shelf. 
Booh\ 


"  •■  -  <^^g  "-^' "- •^' <^^^-£  V- 


Divisir 

Section. 

47^' 


i 


.t-;/)3 


1  'l'- 


ELEMENTS  OF  INTERPRETATION 

TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  LATIN  OF 


J.  ArERNESTI 


AND 


ACCOMPANIED  BY  NOTES 


WITH  AN  APPENDIX  CONTAINING  EXTRACTS  FROM  MORUS 
BECK  AND  KEIL 


By  MOSES  STUART 

Associate  Prof,  of  Sac.  Lit.  in  the  Theol.  Seminary  at  Andover. 


THIRD    EDITIOIf. 


ANDOVER : 

PUBLISHED  BY  MARK  NEWMAN. 

Plagg  and  Gould,  printers. 
1827. 


PREFACE. 


X  HE  publication  of  the  following-  work,  in  its  present  form, 
originated  from  the  want  of  a  text-book,  in  our  country,  on  the 
science  of  interpretation.  But  few  copies  of  Ernesti's /n^^iVw/zo 
Interpretis  have  yet  been  imported  ;  and  the  library  of  the  The- 
ological Seminary,  with  which  the  translator  is  connected,  con- 
tains by  far  too  few  for  classic  use  among  the  students. 

The  importance  of  regular  scientific  instruction  in  the  princi- 
ples of  interpretation,  has  been  long  acknowledged  by  the  best 
biblical  and  classical  scholars  in  Europe.  A  multitude  of  books 
within  a  few  years  have  been  published,  with  a  view  to  present 
a  regular  digest  of  the  principles  and  rules  of  Hermeneutics.  Of 
these,  some  are  much  too  copious  to  admit  of  publication  in  our 
country.  Others  are  mere  text  books  of  particular  lecturers,  and 
formed  upon  a  plan  not  adapted  to  our  circumstances.  The 
work  of  Ernesti,  now  re-published,  has  been  through  several  edi- 
tions in  Europe,  and  has  been  more  extensively  used  as  a  class- 
book  than  any  publication  of  this  nature. 

It  may  be  asked  why  it  is  not  now  republished  in  the  original 
form.  My  reasons  for  making  an  English  translation  are,  (1) 
That  the  original  Latin,  though  sufficiently  pure  in  respect  to  the 
choice  of  words,  is  arranged  very  much  according  to  the  idiom  of 
the  German  language,  the  vernacular  tongue  of  Ernesti.  It  is 
therefore  difficult  to  be  understood  by  any  young-  man,  who  has 
read  Latin  only  in  the  Roman  classics.  (2)  Repeated  trials,  by 
using  the  work  as  printed  in  Latin  for  a  class  book,  have  satisfied 
me  that  comparatively  little  profit  is  gained  in  reading  it,  by  most 
who  are  entering  upon  their  theological  studies.  For  the  work  is 
not  only  difficult,  but  from  its  brevity  and  technical  form,  it  soon 
becomes  dry  and  uninteresting  to  a  beginner.  (3)  I  wished  to  add 
some  explanations  for  the  sake  of  perspicuity,  and  if  possible  of 
creating  additional  interest  in  the  study  of  interpretation.  (4)  An 
edition  in  Latin,  with  the  mere  text,  would  hardly  meet  with 
sale  enough  to  defray  the  necessary  expenses  of  publication. 

The  edition  from  which  I  have  made  the  translation,  is  that 
published  at  Leipsic  in  1809,  and  edited  by  Dr.  Ammon,  who  has 
interspersed  many  notes  of  his  own.  Of  these  I  have  made  but 
little  use.  My  reason  for  this  is,  that  I  did  not  regard  them  as 
being  of  much  value.  Besides,  they  not  unfrequently  partake  of 
the  extravagancies  of  the  author  ;  who  in  his  preface,  among  va- 
rious improvements  recounted  by  him  as  introduced  since  the 
time  of  Ernesti,  mentions  one  which  may  serve  as  a  specimen  of 
many  others ;  viz.  that  when  Jesus  is  said  by  the  Evangelist  to 


IV  PREFACE. 

have  walked  upon  the  sea^  the  interpreter  can  now  give  the  real 
meaning',  which  is,  that  he  wadi!.d  as  far  as  the  shoal  water  would 
permit^  and  after  that  began  /o  swi.vi. 

I  do  not  deny  that  Dr.  Aramon  is  learned  ;  but  that  sobriety 
and  discretion  which  are  the  first  characteristics  of  a  good  inter- 
preter, I  ara  unable  to  find  in  him  ;  at  least  to  such  a  degree  as 
to  make  his  opinions  worthy  of  special  consideration. 

Beside?,  I  have  found  a  much  better  commentator  on  Ernesti, 
from  whose  labours  I  have  reaped  great  advantage.  1  reftr  to 
Morus,  whose  Hermeneutica  is  a  system  of  lectures  on  interpre- 
tation, of  which  Ernesti's  Institulio  is  the  basis  or  text-book.  This 
work  of  Morus  I  prize  so  highly,  that  I  have  at  the  close  of  al- 
most every  section  of  Ernesti,  referred  to  the  corresponding  part 
in  his  commentator.  The  notes  which  I  have  added  to  the  work 
contain,  for  the  most  part,  a  summary  of  what  Morus  has  said. 
For  the  fidelity  of  this  summary,  and  for  the  matter  of  some  of  the 
notes,  specially  of  the  longer  ones,  I  am  responsible.  The  notes 
are  distinguished  from  the  text,  by  being  printed  in  smaller  type. 
Any  more  distinction  was  thought  unnecessary. 

Morus  is  an  author  too  copious  for  republication  in  our  coun- 
try, but  may  easily  be  imported.  The  student  cannot  fail  to  read 
him  with  great  profit.  The  Latin  is  uncommonly  easy  ;  and, 
if  I  may  judge  from  my  own  feelings,  very  pure  and  classical.  I 
would  earnestly  recommend  it  to  every  student,  to  compare  Mo- 
rus with  Ernesti,  in  all  the  places  where  reference  in  the  follow- 
ing work  is  made  to  him. 

The  works  of  Keil,  Beck,  and  Seiler,  to  which  reference  ia 
made  at  the  head  of  most  of  the  chapters,  are  very  useful  manu- 
als of  the  science  of  interpretation,  and  can  be  procured  at  a  very 
modt-rate  expense.  In  point  of  arrangement,  and  in  the  exclu- 
sion of  matter  which  does  not  belong  to  the  proper  province  of 
Herraeneutics,  they  have  some  advantages  over  Ernesti.  1  be- 
lieve, however,  that  Ernesti  has  exhibited  the  essential  part  of 
the  science  in  question,  more  fundamentally,  and  in  a  more  con- 
vincing and  instructive  way,  than  either  of  these  authors.  Still, 
as  they  are  more  recent,  and  have  been  much  used  by  those  who 
study  interpretation,  I  thought  it  might  be  acceptable  to  refer  to 
them. 

Other  books  are  occasionally  referred  to,  but  not  often,  with 
the  exception  of  Morus.  It  would  have  been  easy  to  add  a  mul- 
titude of  references  to  books,  on  every  subject,  and  every  ramifi- 
cation of  subjects,  throughout  the  work.  But  I  am  not  persuad- 
ed of  the  utility  of  this  method,  with  beginners.  The  mind  is 
overwhelmed  with  the  endless  task,  which  the  reading  of  so  ma- 
ny writers  would  occasion.  There  may  be  a  shew  of  learning  in 
a  writer,  who  makes  his  references  so  copious,  but  the  real  profit 
to  the  stud(;iit  is  comparatively  small.  \  reference  to  a  i^v/  of 
the  best  books  is  of  more  importance  than  to  accumulate  au  un- 


PREFACE.  V 

disting-uished  mass,  which  presents  a  mere  catalogue  of  what  has 
been  published.  Beck  is  not  free  from  this  fault ;  and  even  Keil 
has  not  made  his  ''  select  literature"  sufficiently  select. 

My  reasons  for  omitting  some  parts  of  the  original  work  of  Er- 
nesti,  are  stated  at  the  end  of  the  introduction.  It  is  sufficient 
merely  to  say  here,  that  as  Eirnesti's  work  was  one  of  ihe  Jirst  re- 
spectable efforts  to  reduce  the  principles  of  interpretation  to  a 
science,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  any  surprise,  that  he  has  included  in 
it  much  more  than  appropriately  belongs  to  this  subject.  Subse- 
quent writers  have  marked  out  the  limits  of  the  science  with 
more  accuracy.  I  have  omitted  what  is  now  commonly  omitted, 
in  works  of  this  nature. 

There  are  some  topics  belonging  to  Hermeneutics,  on  which 
the  work  of  Ernesti  has  not  touched.  I  have  omitted  them  in  this 
work,  because  it  is  not  my  object  to  appear  as  an  original  writer 
here  on  these  subjects.  It  is  proper  however  to  say,  that  the  top- 
ics omitted  are  much  less  the  subject  of  precept  or  rule,  than 
those  inserted  ;  and  that  the  principles  of  several  of  them  are  very 
far  from  being  settled,  to  the  satisfaction  of  critics.  What  is  most 
useful  will  be  found  in  Ernesti.  The  rest  experience  will  sup- 
ply ;  or  the  instructer,  who  uses  Ernesti,  and  consults  the  books 
referred  to,  will  be  able  to  give  the  student  some  adequate  views 
of  them.  As  my  duty  leads  me  to  read  lectures,  in  this  depart- 
ment of  science,  to  those  whom  I  am  called  to  instruct,  it  will  be 
my  aim,  so  far  as  I  am  able,  to  supply  deficiencies  of  this  nature  ; 
in  order  that  no  topic  may  be  neglected,  which  may  be  useful  to 
those  who  are  beginning  the  study  of  interpretation. 

To  the  third  division  of  this  work,  which  treats  of  translating 
from  one  language  into  another,  F  have  added  the  greater  part  of 
an  excellent  dissertation  of  Morus,  which  comprises  this  topic.  la 
order  to  do  this,  I  have  omitted  a  part  of  the  chapter  in  Ernesti, 
pertaining  to  this  subject  ;  as  I  thought  it  far  less  useful  thaa 
what  is  inserted  from  Morus. 

Part  fourth  contains  a  summary  of  the  laws  of  criticism,  which 
are  to  regulate  the  judgment  of  those,  who  form  opinions  about 
the  genuine  text  of  the  Scriptures.  Exceptions  might  be  made 
to  some  of  these  laws  ;  but  I  have  not  thought  them  of  sufficient 
importance  to  be  urged  here,  where  every  thing  is  designed  to  be 
a  mere  summary  of  general  maxims.  Beck  has  given  a  more 
brief  view  of  the  subject  of  criticism,  than  I  have  been  able  else- 
where to  find  ;  and  the  Biblical  student  should  not  be  altogether 
ignorant  of  it,  as  cases  of  controversy  may  arise  about  the  text, 
where  ignorance  of  this  nature  would  subject  him  to  serious  dis- 
advantages. 

Part  fffth  consists  of  a  chapter  from  Keil,  on  the  qualifications 
of  an  interpreter.  It  is  so  much  more  brief  and  comprehensive 
than  the  corresponding  chapter  in  Ernesti,  that  i  could  not  hesi- 


VI  PREFACE. 

tate  to  prefer  it.  A  list  of  some  of  the  best  books,  on  the  topics 
to  which  the  chapter  adverts,  will  be  found  at  the  close  of  the 
respective  sections. 

In  reofard  to  the  manner  of  the  following-  translation,  it  may  be 
proper  to  state  here,  that  my  first  attempt  was  to  make  a  close 
version  of  Ernesti,  and  publish  it  in  this  simple  form.  1  proceed- 
ed throug-h  the  work  of  translating^,  with  this  desig'n  in  view. 
When  I  begfan  to  review  my  labour  I  found  that  there  was  so 
much  of  Latinism  in  it ;  the  sentences  were  so  long  and  involv- 
ed ;  the  connecting'  particles  and  words  of  this  nature  so  few  and 
indefinite  ;  and  the  form  in  general  so  technical  and  uninviting^, 
that  I  abandoned  the  desig'n  of  publishing  it  in  this  way  ;  renew- 
ed my  work  of  translating  ;  broke  up  sentences,  or  sections,  as 
became  necessary  for  the  sake  of  perspicuity  ;  supplied  connect- 
ing' words  where  they  seemed  to  be  wanting  ;  added  parts  of  sen- 
tences for  the  sake  of  explanation,  and  in  a  few  ca^^es,  whole  sen- 
tences and  even  parag^raphs  have  been  added  for  the  sake  of  ex- 
planation or  connexion.  I  have  not  wittingly  changed  or  per- 
verted the  sentiment^  in  any  case ;  but  I  have  taken  the  liberties 
of  a  free  translator,  who  is  more  concerned  to  make  his  book  per- 
spicuous and  useful,  than  to  represent  the  exact  style  and  man- 
ner of  his  orig^inal. 

Instead  of  the  subdivision  of  sections  under  each  chapter  in  Er- 
nesti, they  are  here  numbered  continuously  through  the  work; 
which  is  by  far  the  most  convenient  method.  The  titles  of  the 
parts  and  chapters  have  also  received  some  alteration. 

After  all,  such  is  the  excebsive  difficulty  of  putting  English  cos- 
tume upon  Ernesti,  that  I  cannot  flatter  myself  that  the  book 
does  not  still  contain  many  Latinisms,  which  may  be  unpleasant 
to  a  reader,  who  is  not  acquainted  with  the  original.  Quod  pet- 
ui^feci.  Without  absolutely  abandoning  the  idea  of  being  a  trans- 
lator, and  making  a  new  book,  I  could  not  in  general  well  do 
more  than  I  have  done. 

At  the  commencement  of  each  section  of  the  text,  I  have  pla- 
ced a  very  brief  notice  of  the  contents  ;  which,  for  convenience 
to  the  reader,  in  order  to  find  easily  any  subject  after  which  he  is 
seeking,  has  been  printed  in  Italics.  These  summaries  belong 
not  to  the  original  work  ;   I  am  responsible  for  them. 

If  the  manual  shall  prove  to  be  intelligible  and  useful  to  the 
student  who  is  entering  upon  the  regular  study  of  the  sacred  re- 
cords, my  wishes  and  highest  expectations  will  be  gratified. 

The  second  edition  of  this  work  being  exhausted,  and  a  third 
called  for,  I  have  been  obliged  by  my  duties  to  abandon  the  idea 
of  any  augmentation  of  it  at  present,  and  have  merely  reprint- 
ed it  with  small  corrections. 

M.  STUART. 
Andovtr^  jlug.  1827. 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 
Introduction 1 

Part  I.  general  principles  of  language. 
Chap.  I.  Of  the  meaning  of  words       ...         7 
Chap  II.  Of  the  kinds  of  words,  and  their  vari- 
ous use         .......       21 

Part  II.  rules  of  interpretation. 
Chap.  I.  Introductory  remarks      ....       32 
Chap.  II.  On  finding  the  usus  loquendi  in  the  dead 

languages     .......       34 

Chap.  III.  Subsidiary  means  of  finding  the  usus  lo' 

quendi  .......       45 

Chap.  IV.  On  finding  the  usus  loquendi  of  the  New 

Testament 56 

Chap.  V.  Rules  in  respect  to  tropical  language  71 

Chap.  VI.  Rules  respecting  emphasis  .         .       83 

Chap.  VII.  On  reconciling  apparent  discrepancies       89 

Part  III.  on  translating. 
Maxims  to  be  observed  by  a  translator  .         .      97 

appendix. 

Morus,  on  the  general  principles  of  translating  100 

Beck,  on  the  general  principles  of  criticism  .     Ill 

iiCciV,  on  the  qualifications  of  an  interpreter  .     119 


INTRODUCTION. 


OF  INTERPRETATION  IN  GENERAL, 


•»►©#*< 


[With  this  introductory  chapter,  may  he  compared  Keil, 
Hermeneutica,  pp.  I  — 14.  Bt  ck,  Monogratnm.  Heim.  pp.  1  — 
22.     Seiler,  Hernaeneutik,  H  9 — M.] 

§  1.  Necessity  and  utility  of  it.  The  interpretation 
of  the  sacred  books  is  the  highest  and  most  difficult  task 
of  the  theologian.  This  may  be  shown  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  from  experience,  and  also  from  the  consent 
of  all  enlightened  periods.  All  solid  knowledge  and  ju- 
dicious defence  of  divine  truth,  must  originate  from  a 
right  understanding  and   accurate  interpretation  of  the  * 

Scriptures.  The  purity  of  the  Christian  religion  has  lpA<OV\J 
shone  brighter  or  been  obscured,  in  proportion  as  theT^.  c^(>J 
study  of  sacred  interpretation  has  flourished  or  decayed. "^'W.  t/vv.' 

Finally,  those  have  always  been  reckoned  as  the  most^^l^  *<''^ 
distinguished    theologians,    who   have   excelled    in    this 
kind  of  learning.     (Compare  Morus,  Hermeneutica,  p. 
3.1.)  .       . 

As  Christian  doctrine  is  preserved  only  in  written  records,  the  (M-AJIX 
int(  rpretation  of  these  is  absolutely  essential  to  a  knowledg-e  of..     <Ty 
it;  and   unless  we   know   what  Christianity  is,  we  can   neither '.vVvA^Afc 
maintain  its  purity  nor  defend  its  principles  to  the   best  advan- 
tage. 

§  2.  Dijficulties  attending  interpretation.  The  sci-. 
ence  of  interpretation  in  general  is  difficult ;  because  it 
requires  much  learning,  judgment,  and  diligence.  Not 
unfrequently  a  felicity  of  talent,  or  a  more  than  usual 
degree  of  understanding,  is  requisite  to  manage  an  exe- 
getical  inquiry  with  success.  But  the  interpretation  of 
1 


k4^ 


»  INTRODUCTION. 

the  sacred  books  is,  from  various  causes,  (a)  still  more 
4'ti(    difficult ;  as  the  general  consent  of  the  learned,  and  the 
wonderful  paucity  (6)  of  good  interpreters  fully  evince. 
(Morus,  p.  4.  II.) 

a)  These  causes  are,  their  antiquity;  the   peculiar  dialect  of 

the   Scriptures,  which  greatly  differs  from   that  of  the  western 

ji,lt*''  /languages ;  the  manners,  customs,  education,  style,  modes  of 

^«,J,f  thinking  and  expression,  situation,  government,  climate,  &c.  of 

^  ^,         the  authors,  in   many   respects  so  very  dissimilar  to  ours;  the 

Wj^^      fewness  of  the  books  wiitten  in  the   Scriptural  dialect ;  and  the 

^r/^* ,'    want  of  commentators  and  lexicographers  to  whom  the  language 

^^K^"'    V/^s  vernacular.     To  these  causes  maybe  added,  the  authority 

/vvjC<^'    and   influence  which  many  erroneous  commentaries  of  distin- 

er"'       guished  men  have  had  over  the  Christian  world. 

4  6)  The  paucity  of  good  interpreters,  who,  unbiassed  by  party 

yf^  "  '    sentiments,  have  pursued  the  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures  in 

a  simple  philological  manner,  and  been  consistent  throughout  in 

.L'-i    '    the  application  of  principles  purely  exegetical,  is  much  greater 

^        than   any  one  will  be  disposed  to  believe,   until  experience  ac- 

I        quired  by  consulting  commentaries  shall  have  convinced  him. 

^,  A  <t  ^•<  '■  ^^  -•  -    - 

',    ;.   §  3.    Definitions.     The  art  of  interpretation  is  the  art 
^';^'  "^  '/of  teaching  what  is  the  meaning  of  another's  language  ; 
or  that  faculty,  which  enables  us  to  attach  to  another's 
language  the  same  meaning  that  the  author  himself  at-    , 
tached  to  it.     (Morus,  p.  6.  III.)  .    -.     ,.^-v,f ,  /.  -  s    *      ' 
It  is  better  to  define  interpretation  as  an  act  than  as  an  art. 
To  interpret  a  passage,  is  to  shew  or  declare  the  sense  of  it,  or 
simply  to  explain  the  meaning.^  i.  e.  the  meaning  which  the  au- 
,^        thor  himself  of  the  passage  attached  to  it.     Any  other  meaning 
?i^       than  this  can  never  be  called,  with  propriety,  the  meaning  of 
^^  'J ,  the  author. 
'*»    'r*<      Interpretation,  strictly  speaking,  may  be  called  grammatical^ 

?*1  U^  "when  the  meaning  of  words,  phrases,  and  sentences,  is  made  out 
..vi.--  <•    from  the  usus  loquendi  and  context ;  historical.,  when  the  mean- 
jA  »_  '    ing  is  illustrated  and  confirmed   by  historical  arguments,  which 
,     serve  to  evince  that  no  other  sense  can  be  put  upon  the  passage, 
^A^  »■  *  whether  you  regard  the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  the  genius  and 
manner  of  the  writer,     .  ,  \        l.     ^^    ^>.  { ; 

.    . '  ■  -      ■    •  i.^  tr^'^t-l-v^  VV-'-'^  =>()  ""^ 
i  1^   .  ^  4.    Requisites  of  a  good  interpreter.     The  act  of  in- 

*^^'^  \  .  terpretation  implies  two  things  ;  viz,  a  right  perception 
t^.  ^'     of  the  meaning  of  words,  and  a  proper  explanation  erf 


/,f\j^i^    ^'Tt\.%..  d* 


INTRODUCTION.  J 

that  meaning,  (a)  Hence  a  good  interpreter  must  pos- 
sess a  sound  understanding,  and  be  skilful  in  explana- 
tion.    (Morus,  p.  8.  IV.) 

a)  The  words  of  Ernesti  are,  suhtilitas  intelligendi  el  explican- 
di  ;  a  phrase  which  would  convey  a  meaning'  quite  foreign  to  his 
intention,  if  literally  translated  into  English,  or  at  most  convey 
his  idea  very  imperfectly.  His  meaning  is,  that  the  interpre- 
ter, who  exercises  a  sound  understanding,  or  possesses  subtilitas 
intdligf.ndi^  must  demand  satisfactory  reasons  for  believing  in 
any  particular  exegesis,  and  build  his  opinion  in  respect  to  the 
meaning  of  any  passage  on  such  reasons.  These  reasons  are 
founded  on  the  usus  loquendi,  the  context,  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject, the  design  of  the  writer,  «&:c.  An  interpretation  supported, 
by  none  of  these,  cannot  be  admitted  by  a  sound  understanding. 

The  subtilitas  explicandi^  which  I  have  translated  skill  in  ex- 
planation^ consists  generally  in  the  accuracy  of  explanation.  To 
constitute  such  accuracy^  in  its  proper  sense,  a  right  use  must  be 
made  of  ail  the  means  of  interpretation,  so  as  to  gain  precise 
and  definite  views  of  the  author's  meaning ;  then  every  thing 
should  be  so  defined  and  expressed  as  to  exclude  all  ambiguity 
and  uncertainty  ;  and  lastly,  the  whole  should  be  exhibited  in 
the  proper  order  which  the  nature  of  language  and  of  reasoning 
demands. 

<5>  5.  Subtilitas  intelligendi.  A  sound  understanding 
is  exhibited  in  two  ways  ;  first,  in  discerning  whether  we 
really  understand  a  passage  or  not,  and,  provided  we  do 
not,  in  discovering  the  difficulties  that  lie  in  the  way  of 
rightly  understanding  it,  and  the  grounds  of  those  diffi- 
culties ;  secondly,  in  finding  out,  by  a  proper  method  of 
investigation,  the  sense  of  those  passages  which  are  dif- 
ficult.    (Morus,  p.  10.  V.) 

§  6.  Means  hy  wJiich  difficulties  and  their  causes  are 
detected.  A  good  degree  of  talent  or  capacity  is  requisite 
for  this  ;  for  men  of  small  capacity  frequently  assent  to 
things  which  seem  to  be  taught,  without  any  good  rea- 
sons for  so  doing  ;  and  often  believe  themselves  to  un- 
derstand what  they  do  not  understand.  To  a  good  de- 
gree of  talent  must  be  joined  a  careful  habit  of  distin- 
guishing ideas  of  things  from  mere  words  or  sounds  ; 
{a)  for  we  ought  always  to  inquire,  in  respect  to  any 
word,    whether  we   have  a  distinct  perception   of  the 


*  INTRODUCTION. 

thing  or  idea,  which  it  is  meant  to  designate,  and  not  to 
regard  merely  the  sound  of  the  word.  (Morus,  p.  10. 
VL) 

a)  Specially  should  this  be  done,  where  languag:e  is  employed 
io  designate  any  thing  that  is  not  the  object  of  our  senses,  but  is 
of  an  intellectual  or  metaphysical  nature.  Habit  as  well  as  care 
will  do  much  in  these  cases.  Translating  from  one  lan- 
guage INTO  another,  is  AN  EXCELLENT  EXERCISE  TO  FORM  A 

HABIT  OF  NICE  DISTINCTION  ;  for  when  we  come  to  express?  the 
ideas  of  an  author  in  another  language,  we  often  find  that  we  had 
only  an  indefinite  perception  of  them.  The  employment  of  teach- 
ing, also,  is  well  adapted  to  promote  the  same  purpose  ;  as  is  the 
study  of  logic,  or  any  science  which  leads  to  nice  discrimination. 

§  7.  Means  of  removing  these  difficulties.  The  first 
means  is  a  just  and  accurate  knowledge  of  languages. 
{a)  The  next,  an  acquaintance  with  the  principles  of 
interpretation.  Not  that  no  one  can  interpret  at  all, 
without  a  scientific  knowledge  of  these  principles  ;  but 
because  they  assist  men  of  moderate  talents,  and  guide 
them  as  it  were  in  the  right  way,  so  that  they  are  not 
\eh  to  depend  on  chance  rather  than  reason.  Besides, 
they  are,  in  this  way,  supplied  with  a  common  rule  for 
judging  in  controverted  cases,  (h)  Finally,  as  in  detect- 
ing difficulties  exercise  and  habit  are  important,  so  here, 
they  are  of  so  much  consequence  that  all  other  advanta- 
ges will  be  of  little  use  without  them.  (Morus,  p.  12 — 
19.  VII.  Nos.  I.  II.  III.) 

a)  An  accurate  knowledge  of  grammatical  principles  and  of 
the  usus  loqutndi  is  here  intended  ;  for  what  authority  can  an 
interpretation  have,  which  violates  rules  of  grammar  and  the 
usages  of  speech  ? 

b)  Precepts  for  interpretation,  well  grounded,  clearly  under- 
stood, and  judiciously  applied,  very  much  facilitate  the  (ask  of 
the  interpreter,  and  render  the  result  of  his  labours  more  worthy 
of  confidence.  He  who  acts  by  well  established  rules  is  more 
certain  that  be  acts  right,  than  if  he  followed  his  own  opinion 
merely,  in  all  cases  of  difficulty  and  doubt.  And  in  controver- 
sies of  an  exegetical  or  doctrinal  nature,  to  what  can  the  appeal 
be  made,  in  the  ultimate  resort,  but  to  the  principles  of  inter- 
pretation, i.  e.  the  precepts  or  rules  which  it  prescribes  ?  Nor 
are  these  principles  useful  only  to  men  of  moderate  talents,  (as 
Ernesti  would  seem  to  intimate,)  but  to  men  of  the  highest  tal- 


JJf^ 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

ents  and  best  acquisitions.     Men  may,  indeed,  learn  them  by  '^^■ 
usag;e   in  the   interpretation   of  authors,  without  the  scientific 
study  of  them  ;    but  the  latter  is  the  easier  method,  and  g-uards 
most  effectually  against  mistakes.  ^    • 

In  addition  to  these  helps  for  removing  difficulties,  a  knowl-  ^  * 

edge   of  history,  geography,  chronology,  antiquities,  &c,  is  of 
high  importance. 

^  8.  Exorcises  mid  habits  adapted  to  overcome  the  diji' 
culties  of  interpretation.  First,  we  should  attend  the  in- 
structions of  a  good  interpreter  ;  next,  we  shotild  read  iw 
those  works  where  exegetical  knowledge  is  displayed  in  '  ; 
the  best  manner,  and  reflect  much  upon  them,  for  in 
this  way  we  may  be  led  to  the  imitation  of  them ;  and 
lastly,  those  books  which  we  desire  to  interpret  must 
be  assiduously  and. constantly  perused.  (Morus,  p.  19. 
IV.) 

In  the  two  first  exercises,  example  serves  both  to  excite  and 
to  guide  our  efforts.  The  habit  of  reading,  often  and  assiduous- 
ly, the  book  which  we  desire  to  interpret,  is  of  more  importance  ;^\A:'~'  ' 
than  any,  (or  perhaps  than  all,)  other  means  within  our  power.  S  CvOu 
Every  new  perusal  will  suggest  to  an  intelligent  and  inquisitive 
mind  many  ideas,  frequently  very  important  ones,  which  he  had 
not  before  entertained.  This  practice  cannot,  therefore,  be  too 
strongly  recommended  to  the  student.  -.j^v-- 

§  9.  SuhtiJitas  explicandi  i.  e.  slcill  in  explanation.  This 
is  exhibited  by  expressing  the  sense  of  an  author,  either 
in  words  of  the  same  language  which  are  more  perspicu- 
ous than  his,  or  by  translating  into  another  language,  and 
explaining  by  argument  and  illustration,  [rt)  In  addition 
to  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  language  which  we 
translate,  skill  in  explaining  requires  that  we  should  ex- 
hibit purity  of  diction ;  still  preserving,  so  far  as  may  be, 
the  features  of  the  original,  lest  the  inode  of  reasoning 
should  be  obscured,  which  sometimes  depends  on  the 
form  of  the  words.     (Morus,  p.  20.  VIII.) 

a)  We  explain  by  argument.,  when  we  exhibit  reasons  drawn 
from  the  grammar  and  idiom  of  the  language,  the  context,  and 
the  design  of  the  writer.  We  illustrate,,  when  we  cast  light  up- 
on the  meaning  of  an  author,  v/hich  is  borrowed  from  history, 
chronology,  antiquities,  &c.  Purity  and  brevity  of  style  should 
characterise  both  these  modes  of  explanation.  U-Xv>«'<J«« 

1*  ^      / 


6 


INTRODUCTION. 


§10.  Definition  of  Hermeneutics.  (a)  Hermeneutics  is 
ihe  science  which  teaches  to  find,  in  an  accurate  and  ju- 
dicious manner,  the  meaning  of  an  author,  and  appro- 
priately to  explain  it  to  others.     (Morus,  p.  21.  IX.) 

(a)  Modern  usage  distinguishes  between  Hermeneutics  and 
Exegesis.  Hermeneutics  is  the  theory  or  science  of  interpreta- 
tion ;  it  comprises  and  exhibits  the  principles  and  rules  of  this 
art.  Exegesis  is  the  practical  application  of  these  rules ;  the 
act  of  carrying  them  into  execution.  The  etymology  of  the  two 
words  would  lead  to  the  conclusion,  that  both  are  of  the  same 
meaning ;  but  usage  has  assigned  a  diflferent  signification  to 
them. 

§  11.  Division  of  Hermeneutics.  Hermeneutics,  con- 
sidered as  the  art  of  finding  the  sense  of  words,  (so  far 
as  it  is  an  art,  and  is  the  proper  subject  of  precepts,)  con- 
sists of  two  parts,  viz.  the  theoretical  and  preceptive,  (a) 
The  first  comprises  general  principles,  in  respect  to  the 
meaning  of  words  and  the  various  kinds  of  them.  On 
these  principles,  the  rules  of  interpretation  and  the  rea- 
sons of  them  are  grounded.  The  second  consists  of  rules, 
which  are  to  guide  us  in  investigating  the  sense  of  an 
author's  words.  Both  of  these  parts  are  essential ;  for 
on  the  one  hand,  principles  without  any  rules  deduced 
from  them  would  be  inadequate  to  guide  our  philological 
inquiries ;  and  on  the  other,  rides  can  neither  be  per- 
spicuous nor  well  grounded,  which  are  not  established 
u^on  principles.     (Morus,  p.  22.  X.) 

(a)  Exegesis  differs  from  the  preceptive  part  of  Hermeneutics, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  the  act  of  carrying  the  precepts  into  execution, 
and  not  the  precepts  themselves. 

§  12.  Division  of  the  loork.  It  may  be  divided  into 
three  parts ;  the  first  contains  the  principles  and  pre- 
cepts of  Hermeneutics ;  the  second  has  respect  to  the 
making  of  translations  and  commentaries  ;  and  the  third 
treats  of  the  various  kinds  of  hermeneutical  apparatus, 
and  of  its  proper  use  in  the  interpretation  of  the  New 
Testament. 

Of  these  three  parts,  the  first  is  translated  throughout,  and  so 
much  of  the  second  as  seemed  to  be  particularly  useful.  The 
third  part  is  essentially  comprised  in  the  first,  so  far  as  it  prop- 


OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS.  7 

erly  belong^s  to  the  province  of  Hermeneutics ;  and  therefore  may 
well  be  dispensed  with,  in  an  elementary  treatise  like  this.  So 
far  as  the  third  part  contains  any  thing^  not  substantially  com- 
prised in  the  first,  it  properly  belongfs  to  the  province  of  sacred 
literature,  and  specially  to  literary  history,  or  introductions  (as 
they  are  called)  which  are  designed  to  give  the  student  a  special 
view  of  the  various  authors,  books,  versions,  &c.  of  the  Scrip- 
tures. 


PART  I. 

CHAPTER   I. 

[Compare  with  this  chapter,  Keil,  fj  5 — 8.     Seiler,  f  J  41 — AQ.'\ 
OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

§  13.  Design  of  this  chapter.  The  design  of  the  fol- 
lowing remarks  upon  the  meaning  of  words,  is  to  ex- 
hibit the  ground  or  principles,  whence  all  certainty  in 
the  interpretation  of  language  arises.  If  from  the  na- 
ture and  use  of  language,  certain  principles  may  be 
clearly  deduced,  which  will  serve  as  a  guide  to  explain 
it,  then,  it  is  evident,  the  essential  part  of  the  theory  of 
Hermeneutics  consists  of  these  principles.  (Morus,  p. 
27.  I.) 

§  14.  Every  word  must  have  some  meaning.  To  every 
word  there  ought  to  be  assigned,  and  in  the  Scriptures 
there  is  unquestionably  assigned,  some  idea  or  notion  of 
a  thing  ;  which  we  call  the  meaning  or  sense  of  the  word. 
(a)  (Morus,  p.  28.  II.) 

a)  Otherwise  words  are  useless,  and  have  no  more  significa- 
tion than  the  inarticulate  sounds  of  animals.  ,^ 

§  15.  Dejinitions.  The  literal  sense  of  words,  is  the 
sense  which  is  so  connected  with  them,  that  it  is  first 


8  OF  THE    MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

in  order  and  is  spontaneously  presented  to  the  mind,  as 
soon  as  the  sound  of  the  word  is  heard,  (a)  The  literal 
sense  does  not  differ,  among  the  older  and  valuable  wri- 
ters, from  the  sense  of  the  letter ;  although  some  ignorant 
persons,  in  later  times,  have  very  erroneously  made  a 
distinction.  Erasmus  and  his  cotemporaries  use  both 
phrases  promiscuously.  Literal  means  the  same  as  the 
Greek  to  yeyga^ifxevov,  or  the  Latin  scriptwn;  whence 
the  phrases  scriptum  sequi,  and  scriptum  interpretari. 

a)  The  literal  sense  is  the  same  as  the  primilive  or  original 
sense  ;  or,  at  least,  it  is  equivalent  to  that  sense  which  has  usurp- 
ed the  place  of  the  original  one,  e.  g.  the  original  sense  of  the 
word  tragedy  has  lonof  ceased  to  be  current,  and  the  literal  sense 
of  this  word,  now,  is  that  which  has  taken  the  place  of  the  origi- 
nal one. 

§  16.  The  meaning  oftvords  conventional.  Words,  con- 
sidered simply  as  sounds,  have  no  meaning ;  for  they 
are  not  natural  and  necessary  signs  of  things,  but  con- 
ventional ones,  (a)  Usage  or  custom  has  constituted  a 
connexion  between  words  and  ideas.  (Morus,  p.  28.  III.) 

a)  Interjections  or  exclamations  may,  perhaps,  be  considered 
as  a  kind  of  exception  to  this  remark.  Words  also  which  the 
Greeks  call  6voi.i(x.TOninOLrj^itvaf  i.  e.  words  the  sounds  of 
which  imitate  the  sense,  are  also  considered  by  many  as  an  ex- 
ception. But  there  is  so  much  of  fancy  in  the  construction  of 
these  words,  and  they  are  so  differently  formed  in  different  lan- 
guages, that  no  solid  proof  of  their  being  an  exception  can  fairly 
be  made  out.  Great  efforts  have  been  made,  in  former  times,  to 
shew  that  every  syllable  and  even  letter  of  a  word,  in  the  He- 
brew language,  had  a  special  significancy  attached  to  it.  F.  M. 
Helmont  published  a  work  entitled  Jllphabetuin  JN'alurale^  the  ob- 
ject of  which  was  to  show, that  every  different  opening  of  the  mouth 
in  order  to  pronounce  diflerent  letters,  was  significant  of  some  idea. 
To  illustrate  this,  he  caused  a  great  number  of  plates  to  be  en- 
<yraved,  which  he  inserted  in  the  work  ;  so  that  his  book,  as  Mo- 
rus says,  is  mira  capitum  humanorum  collectio,  quae  admodum 
distorta  ora  ostcndat.  Caspar  Neumann,  in  his  Exodus  Linguae 
Sanctae^  followed  much  the  same  path,  but  with  more  modera- 
tion ;  and  V.  E.  Loescher,  in  his  De  caussis  Ling.  Heb.^  exhibits 
the  same  principles.  E.  g.  in  the  word  y"^.iSf,  M  indicates  mo- 
tion^ he  says,  ^  eruption^  22  violence.  The  whole  word  y^.J* 
then,  signifies  something  in  which  motion  bursts  forth  with  v'io- 


er  THE  meaning  of  words.  9 

lence.  The  student  may  smile  at  this  eg^regious  trifling;  •,  but  the 
time  lias  been,  when  the  word  of  God  was  explained  by  leading; 
men  in  the  churches,  in  connexion  with  such  wretched  puerili- 
ties.    (Morus,  p.  31.  IV.) 

§  17.  The  connexion  between  ivords  and  ideas  now  ren- 
dered necessary  by  usage.  Such  is  the  fact,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  case  at  first.  This  does  not  mean,  how- 
ever, that  a  word  is  susceptible  of  only  one  meaning  ; 
for  usage  contradicts  this.  But  from  this  principle,  we 
learn  (1)  That  neither  in  using  or  interpreting  a  word, 
are  we  at  liberty  to  affix  to  it  an  arbitrary  sense,  (a) 
(2)  That  the  sense  of  a  word  cannot  be  diverse  or  multi- 
farious, at  the  same  time,  and  in  the  same  passage  or  ex- 
pression. (6)     (Morus,  p.  33,  V.  VI.  VII.) 

a)  The  fact  that  usa§;e  has  attached  any  particular  meaning; 
to  a  word,  like  any  other  historical  fact,  is  to  be  proved  by  ade- 
quate testimony.  This  testimony  may  be  drawn  from  books  in 
which  the  word  is  employed,  or  from  daily  use  in  conversation. 
But  the  fact  of  a  particular  meaning-  being  attached  to  a  word, 
when  once  established,  can  no  more  be  changed  or  denied,  than 
any  historical  event  whatever.  Of  course,  an  arbitrary  sense  can 
never,  with  propriety,  be  substituted  for  a  real  one. 

6)  All  men,  in  their  daily  conversation  and  writings,  attach  but 
one  sense  to  a  word,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  passage  ; 
unless  they  design  to  sptak  in  enigmas.  Of  course,  it  would  be 
in  opposition  to  the  universal  custom  of  language,  if  more  than 
one  meaning  should  be  attached  to  any  word  of  Scripture,  in  such 
a  case.     Yet  many  have  done  so.     See  }J  21,  22. 

§  18.  Signif,  cation  of  ivords  multiplied  in  process  of 
time.  Although  a  word  can  have  but  one  meaning  at 
the  same  time  and  in  the  same  place,  usage  has  gradu- 
ally assigned  many  meanings  to  the  same  word,  («)  lest 
words  should  be  indefinitely  multiplied,  and  the  difficul- 
ty of  learning  a  language  become  too  great.  (Morus,  p. 
39.  VIII.) 

a)  The  question  then  for  an  interpreter  is  simply  this  ;  which 
one  of  the  significations  that  a  word  has,  is  connected  with  its 
use  in  any  particular  instance  ? 

§  19.  How  can  the  meaning  in  each  case  be  found  1  (1 ) 
From  the  general   manner   of   speaking   i.  e.  common 


10  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

usage.    (2)  From  the  proximate  words  or  context.     (Mo- 
ras, p.  41.  I.  II.) 

That  is,  the  usual  and  obvious  meaning'  is  attached  to  the 
word  ;  or  else  one  which  the  context  renders  necessary.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  aid  drawn  from  these  sources,  an  interpreter  may 
sometimes  obtain  assistance  from  the  scope  or  desig^n  of  the  wri- 
ter, or  from  history,  antiquities,  the  nature  of  the  subject,  &c. 
(Morus,  p.  42.  III.  IV.) 

§  20.  Ambiguity  of  words  arises  from  various  causes. 
(1)  from  the  fault  of  writers,  (a)  (2)  From  neglect  in 
the  construction  and  necessary  connexions  of  words  and 
sentences  ;  proper  care  not  having  been  taken  to  guard 
the  reader  against  uncertainty,  and  to  afford  him  the 
best  means  for  finding  the  true  sense,  (b)  (8)  From  the 
manner  in  which  common  usage  often  forms  language  ; 
which,  not  being  guided  by  philosophy  or  refined  knowl- 
edge, is  frequently  deficient  in  respect  to  accuracy/,  (c) 
(Morus,  p.  44.  X.  I— V.) 

a)  When  they  are  ig-norant  of  the  rules  for  writing  with  accu- 
racy and  perspicuity.  6)  E.  g.  the  answer  of  the  Delphic  oracle, 
%Aio  te  Romanos  vinctre  posse^  which  may  be  rendered,  with  equal 
probability,  that  the  Romans  would  conquer  Pyrrhus,  or  Pyrrhus 
the  Romans,  c)  No  other  proof  of  this  is  needed,  than  what  the 
perusal  of  a  composition  by  an  illiterate  person  will  afford. 

Besides  the  causes  of  ambiguity  above  enumerated,  we  may 
reckon,  ignorance  of  the  usus  loquendi.  If  the  interpreter  is  not 
acquainted  with  this,  (and  in  respect  to  words  which  are  «7Ta| 
Xiyo^tVU  he  must  of  course  be  ignorant  of  it)  he  is  left  in  doubt, 
unless  the  context  decides  for  him.  As  this  is  not  always  the 
case,  there  is  room  here  for  ambiguity. 

§  21.  Conclusions  from  what  has  been  said.  From  what 
has  already  been  said,  in  this  chapter,  about  the  use  of 
words,  we  may  discover  the  ground  of  all  the  certainty 
which  attends  the  interpretation  of  language.  («)  For 
there  can  be  no  certainty  at  all,  in  respect  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  any  passage,  unless  a  kind  of  necessity  com- 
pel us  to  affix  a  particular  sense  to  a  word  ;  which  sense, 
as  I  have  said  before,  must  be  one;  and,  unless  there 
are  special  reasons  for  a  tropical  meaning,  it  must  be 
the  literal  sense,  (b)   (Morus,  p.  47.  XL) 


.^  ^l^., 


OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS.  11 

a)  If  any  one  should  deny  that  the  above  principles  lead  to 
certainty,  when  strictly  observed,  he  would  deny  the  possibility 
of  finding  the  meaning;  of  language  with  certainty,  b)  The  sec- 
ondary or  figurative  sense  of  words  is  as  often  necessary,  as  the 
literal  sense.  IVIany  words  have  even  ceased  to  convey  a  literal 
meaning.  The  obvious  sense  of  a  word,  therefore,  in  any  partic- 
ular connexion,  is  the  necessary  one  ;  and  a  conviction  that  the 
sense  in  any  case  is  necessary,  will  be  in  exact  proportion  to  the 
degree  in  which  it  is  felt  to  be  obvious.  By  obvious  here,  is  not 
meant  what  is  obvious  to  an  illiterate  or  hasty  interpreter  ;  but 
to  one  who  has  learning  and  good  judgment,  and  makes  use  of 
all  the  proper  means  of  interpretation. 

§  22.  Error  of  tJiose  ivJio  assign  many  meanings  to  a 
vwrd^  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  place.  Such  an 
opinion  is  to  be  rejected  ;  although  the  practice  is  very 
old,  as  Augustine  testifies,  Confess.  XII.  30,  31.  The 
opinion  probably  originated  from  the  variety  of  inter- 
pretations given  to  ambiguous  passages ;  several  of 
which  appeared  probable,  and  were  recommended  by  a 
sentiment  of  reverence  towards  the  authors  of  them.  A 
principle  of  this  nature,  however,  must  introduce  very 
great  uncertainty  into  exegesis ;  than  which  nothing 
can  be  more  pernicious.     (Morus,  p.  35.  VII.) 

§  23.  Error  of  those  who  affirm  that  the  words  of  Scrips 
ture  mean  all  that  they  possibly  can  mean.  This  sprung 
from  the  Rabbinical  schools,  and  passed  from  them,  in 
early  times,  to  Christians.  The  transition  is  very  easy 
from  this  error,  to  every  kind  of  license  in  the  intro- 
duction of  allegory,  prophecy,  and  mystery  into  every 
part  of  the  Bible  ;  as  the  experience  of  the  Jews,  of  the 
ancient  fathers,  the  scholastic  divines,  and  the  follow- 
ers of  Cocceius  demonstrates. 

The  Rabbinic  maxim  is  ;  On  every  point  of  the  Scripture,  hang 
suspended  mountams  of  sense.  The  Talmud  says,  God  so  gave 
the  Law  to  Moses,  that  a  thing  can  be  shewn  to  be  clean  and 
unclean  in  49  dilTerent  ways.  Most  of  the  fathers,  and  a  multi- 
tude of  commentators  in  later  times,  were  infected  with  these 
principles.  Little  more  than  a  century  ago,  the  celebrated  Coc- 
ceius of  Leyden  maintained  the  sentiment,  that  all  the  possible 
meanings  of  a  word  in  the  Scripture  are  to  be  united.  By  his 
learning  and  influence  a  powerful  party  were  raised  up,  in  the 


1*2  0F  THE  MEANIN*  OF  WORDS. 

Protestant  church,  in  favour  of  such  a  principle.     The  mischiefs 
resulting- from  it  have  not  yet  ceased  to  operate. 

§  24.  The  sense  of  words  properly  considered  is  not  al- 
legorical. Allegory  is  rather  an  accommodation  of  tJie 
sense  of  words,  or  an  accommodation  of  things,  to  the  il- 
lustration of  some  doctrine.  Moderately  used,  and  well 
adapted,  it  may  be  of  some  profit  which  is  entitled  to 
regard.  But  when  resorted  to  by  the  unlearned  and 
those  of  an  uncultivated  taste,  it  commonly  degenerates 
into  empty  and  ridiculous  trifling.  (Comp.  Morus,  Dis- 
sertt.  Tom.  I.  p.  370,  &c.) 

It  is  impossible  adequately  to  describe  the  excesses  and  ab- 
surdities, which  have  been  committed  in  consequence  of  the 
alleg^orizin^  spirit.  From  the  time  of  Origen,  who  converted  into 
alleg^ory  the  account  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  creatiou 
and  fall  of  man,  and  multitudes  of  other  simple  facts  related  in 
the  Bible,  down  to  the  Jesuit,  who  makes  the  account  of  the  cre- 
ation of  the  g^reater  light  to  rule  the  day  to  mean  the  Pope,  and 
the  creation  of  the  lesser  lig;ht  and  the  stars  to  mean  the  subjec- 
tion of  kings  and  princes  to  the  Pope,  ther*'  have  been  multitudes 
in  and  out  of  the  catholic  church,  who  have  pursued  the  same 
path.  The  most  sacred  doctrines  of  religion  have  often  been  de- 
fended and  assailed,  by  arguments  of  equal  validity  and  of  the 
sanie  nature  as  the  exposition  of  the  Jesuit  just  mentioned.  The 
spirit  which  prompts  to  this  may,  in  some  cases,  be  commenda- 
ble ;  but  as  it  is  a  mere  business  of  fancy,  connected  with  no  prin- 
ciples of  philology,  and  supported  by  no  reasons  drawn  from  the 
nature  of  language,  so  it  is,  for  the  most  part,  not  only  worthless 
but  dangerous.  And  of  what  possible  use,  in  the  end,  can  a  prin- 
ciple be,  which  can  prove  the  most  important  doctrine,  either  of 
Judaism  or  Christianity,  as  well  from  the  first  verse  of  the  first 
chapter  of  Chronicles,  as  from  any  part  of  the  Bible  ?  Or  rather, 
of  what  use  can  the  Bible  be,  if  it  may  be  interpreted  by  such 
principles  ? 

§  25.  Properly  speahing,  tliere  is  no  typical  sense  of 
ivords.  Types  are  not  words  but  things,  which  God  has 
designated  as  signs  of  future  events.  Nor  is  any  special 
pains  necessary  for  the  interpretation  of  them.  The 
explanation  of  them,  which  the  Holy  Spirit  himself  has 
given,  renders  them  intelliixible.  Beyond  his  instructions 
on  this  subject,  we  should  be  very  careful  never  to  pro- 
ceed.    As  for  those  who  maintain  a  typical  design  in  all 


OP  THE  MEANING  OP  WORDS.  13 

parts  of  the  Scripture,  they  certainly  display  very  little 
judgment  or  consideration  ;  for  they  lay  open  the  way 
for  the  mere  arbitrary  introduction  of  types  into  every 
part  of  the  Bible.  The  design  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the 
mention  of  this  or  that  thing  in  the  Scriptures,  can  be 
understood  only  so  far  as  he  himself  has  explained  it,  or 
afforded  obvious  grounds  of  explanation. 

If  it  be  asked,  How  far  are  we  to  consider  the  Old  Testament 
as  iyijical  ?  I  should  answer  without  any  hesitation  ;  Just  so 
much  of  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  typical,  as  the  New  Testament  af- 
firms to  be  so  ;  and  jvo  moke.  The  fact,  that  any  thing  or  event 
under  the  Old  Testament  dispensation  was  designed  to  prefigure 
something  under  the  new,  can  be  known  to  us  only  by  revela- 
tion ;  and,  of  course,  all  that  is  not  designated  by  divine  author- 
ity as  typical,  can  never  be  made  so,  by  any  authority  less  thaa 
that  which  guided  the  writers  of  the  Scriptures. 

§  26.  Danger  resulting  from  the  spirit  ofmvltiplying  al- 
legories and  types.  That  sentiment,  which  through  im- 
prudence or  want  of  knowledge  fell  from  some  of  the 
ancient  fathers,  and  was  echoed  by  many  of  the  Romish 
doctors,  viz.  that  so7tie  passages  of  Scripture  have  no  lite- 
ral sense,  (a)  is  dangerous  beyond  description.  I  pre- 
sume they  meant  to  affirm  this  of  those  passages  which 
they  did  not  understand.  Such  a  sentiment  has  been  re- 
cently defended  by  Wittius  on  the  Proverbs  of  Solomon  ; 
and  Thomas  Woolston,  taking  advantage  of  this,  has 
converted  the  narrations  of  our  Saviour's  miracles  into 
mere  allegories,  {b) 

a)  By  literal  sense  here,  Ernesti  means  a  sense  not  allegorical 
or  mystical  ;  for  to  these  literal  is  here  opposed,  and  not  to  trop- 
ical^ as  it  commonly  is.  There  are  a  multitude  of  passages  in 
Scripture,  which  have  only  a  tropical  meaning,  and  which,  nev- 
ertheless, are  neither  allegorical  nor  mystical. 

b)  This  shows  how  dangerous  it  is,  to  set  the  adversaries  of  re- 
ligion an  example  of  perverting  the  interpretation  of  the  Scrip- 
tures. 

§  27.  The  sense  of  words  depends  on  the  usus  loquendi. 
This  must  be  the  case,  because  the  sense  of  words  is 
conventional  and  regulated  wholly  by  usage.  Usage 
then  being  understood,  the  sense  of  words  is  of  course 
understood. 

2 


14  OP  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

§  28.  Usus  loqiiendi  determined  in  a  variety  oficays.  To 
determine  it,  respect  must  be  had  to  time,  {a)  religion, 
(h)  sect,  education,  common  life,  (r)  and  civil  affairs  ;  (e) 
all  of  which  have  influence  on  an  author's  language,  and 
characterize  it.  For  the  same  word  is  employed  in  one 
sense  respecting  the  things  of  common  life ;  in  another, 
respecting  the  things  of  religion  ;  in  another  still,  in  the 
schools  of  Philosophy,  and  even  these  are  not  always 
agreed  in  the  use  of  words.  (Morus,  p.  48.  XII — XIII.) 

a)  The  ancient  and  modern  sense  of  many  words  differs.  &) 
Victim^  sacrifice^  law,  &c,  in  the  Old  Testament,  are  often  em- 
ployed in  a  sense,  which  differs  from  that  of  the  same  words  in 
the  New  Testament,  c)  Thus  to  perceive^  in  common  life  is  to  * 
feel  or  experience  ;  in  philosophy,  to  form  an  idea  in  the  mind  ;  ^^f^ 
among  the  Academic  sect,  it  means  to  know  a  thing  with  certain- 
ty, in  opposition  to  mere  conjecture.  So  aaOagiaf^iog,  OUq'^^ 
&,c.  differ  in  meanin*,  when  employed  by  a  heathen,  a  Jew,  or  a 
Christian,  e)  The  technical  and  peculiar  sense  of  law-language, 
is  too  well  known  to  need  illustration. 

To  these  causes,  which  operate  upon  the  usus  loquendi,  maybe 
added  the  style  of  a  ivriier.  We  must  inquire  whether  he  writes 
poetry  or  prose  ;  and  whether  the  writer  himself  is  fervid  or  cool, 
turgid  or  dry,  accurate  and  polished  or  the  reverse.  Every  wri- 
ter has  his  own  particular  usus  loquendi ;  and  most  writers,  pro- 
vincialisms ;  and  every  one  is  influenced  by  his  own  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances. What  writers  can  be  more  unlike,  in  respect  to 
style,  than  Isaiah  and  Jeremiah,  Paul  and  John?  An  interpre- 
ter must  make  himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  all  these  va- 
rious circumstances. 

§  29.  Grammatical  and  historical  sense.  The  observ- 
ance of  all  these  matters  belongs  in  a  special  manner 
to  grammarians,  whose  business  it  is  to  investigate  the 
sense  of  words.  Hence  the  litercd  sense  is  also  called 
the  grammatical ;  literalis  and  grammaticus  having  the 
same  meaning.  It  is  also  called  the  historic  sense  ;  be- 
cause, like  other  matters  of  fact,  it  is  supported  by  his- 
toric testimony.  (Morus,  p.  66.  XVII.  Comp.  §  3,  note, 
supra.) 

The  grammatical  sense  is  made  out  by  aid  of  the  principles  of 
grammar,  libf  rally  and  philosophically,  (not  technically)  consider- 
ed.    The  historical  sense,  is  that  which  is  built  on  the  grammati- 


OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS.  15 

aal  one,  but  modified  by  bistorical  circumstances.  Interpreters 
now  sp«-ak  of  the  true  sense  of  a  passage,  by  calling  it  the  gram- 
matico-hislorical  sense  ;  and  ex<^gesis  founded  on  the  nature  of 
language,  is  called  grammatico-historical.  The  object  in  using 
this  compound  name,  is  to  shew  that  both  grammatical  and  his- 
torical considerations  are  employed,  in  making  out  the  sense  of  a 
word  or  passage. 

§  30.    Tlie  grammatical  sense  the  only  triie  one.     Those 
who  make  one  sense  grammatical,   and   another   logical, 
do  not   comprehend    the    full   meaning  of  grammatical 
sense.     We  are  not  to  look,   therefore,   for   a  sense  of        ,^.  flrv 
words,  which  varies   (in  its  nature  or   simply  consider-  ^,  ^v^ 
ed  as  the  sense)  with  every  department  of  learning,  or  ;^  •<*=  "•"'^ 
with  every  diverse  object.     For  if  this   were  the  case,  K^  ^ 
words  would  have   as  many  kinds  of  senses,   as  objects  CXC^^hnr 
are  multifarious.     (Morus,  p.  67.  XVIII.) 

In  regard  to  the  term  grammatical^  see  the  note  above.  The 
meaning  of  Ernesti,  in  this  section,  is,  that  the  laws  of  language 
are  the  same,  in  whatever  department  of  writing  or  speaking  it  is 
employed  ;  i.  e.  the  meaning  of  it  is  to  be  investigattd  by  the 
usus  loquendi  &c,  and  not  that  logic,  or  philosophy  can  deter- 
mine what  the  sense  of  v/ords  must  be,  in  such  a  way  that  the 
sense  may  be  called  logical.^  'philosophical  &c. 

But  when  he  says,  as  in  i  29,  that  the  literal  and  grammatical 
sense  are  the  same  ;  and  in  }  30,  that  the  grammatical  sense  is 
the  only  true  one  ;  he  does  not  mean  by  literal.,  that  which  is  op- 
posed to  tropical  (for  the  tropical  meaning  in  thousands  of  cases 
is  the  grammatical  one)  but  he  means  by  it  the  same  as  the 
grammatico-historical  sense  above  described. 

§  31.  The  principles  of  interpretation  are  common  to  sa- 
cred  and  prof  ane  writings.  Of  course,  the  Scriptures  are 
to  be  investigated  by  the  same  rules  as  other  books. 
Those  fanatics,  therefore,  are  not  to  be  regarded,  who, 
despising  literature  and  the  study  of  the  languages,  re- 
fer every  thing  merely  to  the  influence  of  the  Spirit. 
Not  that  we  doubt  the  influence  of  the  Spirit ;  or  that 
men  truly  pious  and  desirous  of  knowing  the  truth,  are 
assisted  by  it  in  their  researches,  specially  in  those 
things  that  pertain  to  faith  and  practice.  (Morus,  p.  69. 
XIX.) 

If  the  Scriptures  be  l  revelation  to  men,  then  are  they  to  be 


16  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

read  and  understand  by  men.  If  the  same  laws  of  lang:ua*e  are 
not  observed  in  this  revelation^  as  are  common  to  men,  then  they 
have  no  guide  to  the  right  understanding  of  the  Scriptures  :  and 
B.n  i7iterpreter  needs  inspiration  a.s  much  as  the  original  writer. 
It  follows,  of  course,  that  the  Scriptures  would  be  no  revelation 
in  themselves  ;  nor  of  any  use,  except  to  those  who  are  inspired. 
But  such  a  book  the  Scriptures  are  not  ;  and  nothing  is  more 
evident  than  that  ''  when  God  has  spoken  fo  men^  he  has  spoken 
in  the  language  of  men^for  he  has  spoken,  bymen^  and  for  men. '^^ 

§  32.  Language  can  he  properly  interpreted  only  in  a 
philological  way.  Not  much  unlike  these  fanatics,  and 
not  less  hurtful,  are  those  who,  from  a  similar  contempt 
of  the  languages  and  from  that  ignorance  of  them  which 
breeds  contempt,  depend,  in  their  interpretations,  rath- 
er on  things  than  on  words. («)  In  this  way,  interpreta- 
tion becomes  uncertain ;  and  truth  is  made  to  depend 
merely  on  the  judgment  of  men,  as  soon  as  we  depart 
from  the  words,  and  endeavour  to  decide  upon  the  sense, 
by  the  use  of  means  not  connected  with  them.  Nor  will 
this  mode  of  exegesis  at  all  avail  to  convince  gainsay- 
ers  ;  who  themselves  boast  of  interpreting  in  like  man- 
ner by  things,  i.  e.  either  by  their  own  principles  and 
opinions  before  formed,  or  by  the  sentiments  of  philoso- 
phers. Hence  arises  the  abuse  of  reason,  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  Scriptures. 

a)  The  meaning  is,  that  they  decide  from  that  knowledge  of 
things  which  they  suppose  themselves  already  to  possess,  rather 
than  from  the  words  of  the  author ;  they  decide  by  what  they 
suppose  he  ought  to  mean,  rather  than  by  what  he  says. 

<5)  33.  Any  method  of  interpretation  not  philological,  is 
fallacious.  Moreover,  the  method  of  gathering  the  sense 
of  words  from  things  is  altogether  deceptive  and  falla- 
cious ;  since  things  are  rather  to  be  known  from  point- 
ing out  the  sense  of  words  in  a  proper  way.  It  is  by  the 
words  of  the  Holy  Spirit  only,  that  we  are  led  to  un- 
derstand what  we  ought  to  think  respecting  things. 
Said  Melancthon  very  truly  ;  The  Scripture  cannot  be 
understood  theologically^  until  it  is  understood  grammat^ 


OP  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 


17 


ically.  Luther  also  avers,  that  a  certain  knowledge  of 
the  sense  of  Scripture,  depends  solely  on  a  knowledge 
of  the  words. 

This  section  repeats,  in  another  form,  the  idea  of  the  preceding 
one.  In  both,  Ernesti  means  to  deny  the  possibility  of  truly  in- 
terpreting- any  book,  by  other  means  than  those  which  are  philo- 
logical. By  things.,  he  means  the  application  of  our  previous 
views  of  things  to  the  words  of  an  author,  in  order  to  elicit  his 
meaning  ;  instead  of  proceeding-  to  our  inquiries,  in  the  way  of 
grammatico-historical  exegesis.  Not  that  our  previous  knowl- 
edge of  things  can  never  aid  us  ;  for  it  often  does  so  ;  but  that 
this  can  serve  for  nothing  more  than  an  assistant  to  our  philolog- 
ical efforts,  as  the  following  section  shows. 

§  34.  The  analog?/  of  faith  or  doctrine  not  to  guide 
our  interpretation.  Things,  therefore,  and  the  analogy 
of  faith,  or  doctrine,  (as  they  call  it,)  assist  an  interpre- 
ter only  so  far,  that  when  words  are  ambiguous,  either 
from  variety  of  signification,  from  structure,  or  any  other 
cause,  they  may  lead  us  to  define  the  signification  of 
them,  or  to  select  some  one  particular  meaning.  But 
here  we  must  take  good  care,  that  the  considerations 
which  we  use  for  explaining  should  be  deduced  from 
the  plain,  perspicuous,  well  understood  language  of  oth- 
er passages,  and  that  the  words  which  we  are  endeav- 
ouring to  explain  do  not  contradict  them.  For  when  we 
investigate  the  sense  in  any  other  way  than  by  a  gram- 
matical method,  we  effect  nothing  more,  than  to  make 
out  a  meaning,  which  in  itself  perhaps  is  not  absurd,  but 
which  lies  not  in  the  words,  and  therefore  is  not  the 
meaning  of  the  writer.     (Morus,  p.  253.  XVI— XIX.) 

V^ery  much  has  been  said  both  for  and  against  the  analogy  of 
faith,  as  a  rule  of  interpretation.  I  may  safely  add,  that  on  this 
subject,  as  well  as  on  many  others,  very  much  has  been  said 
amiss,  for  want  of  proper  definitions.  What  is  the  analogy  of 
faith  7  It  is  either  simply  Scriptural  or  sectarian.  By  Scriptural 
analogy  I  mean,  that  the  obvious  and  incontrovertible  sense  of 
clear  passages  of  Scripture  affords  a  rule,  by  which  we  may  rea- 
son analogically  concerning  the  meaning  of  obscure  passages  ;  or 
at  least,  by  which  we  may  shew  what  obscure  p? phages  cannot 
mean.  E.  g.  God  is  a  spirit,  is  omniscient,  supreme,  the  creator 
and  governor  of  all  things  &c,  are  truths  so   plainly  and  incon- 


18  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

trovertibly  tau3;ht  in  the  Scriptures,  that  all  the  passaofes  which 
would  seem  to  represent  him  as  material,  local,  limited  in  his 
knowledg^e  or  power  &c,  are  to  be  interpreted  ag^reeably  to  anal- 
ogy with  the  former  truths.  The  same  thing  holds  true  of  other 
doctrines  taught  in  the  same  perspicuous  manner.  We  explain 
what  is  doubtful  or  obscure,  by  the  application  to  it  of  what  is 
plain.  This  rule  is  not  appropriate  to  the  Scriptures  only.  It  is 
adopted  by  all  good  interpreters  of  profane  authors.  It  is  a  rule 
which  common  sense  prescribes  ;  and  is  therefore  well  grounded. 

If  the  question  then  be  asked,  whether  Scripture  analogy  of 
faith  is  a  rule  of  interpretation  ;  the  answer  must  readily  be  giv- 
en in  the  affirmative. 

But  the  analogy  of  the  faith  or  creed  of  any  party  of  Chris- 
tians, taken  without  abatement,  cannot  be  applied  ae  a  rule  of 
exegesis,  unless  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  whole  creed  of  that 
party  is  certainly  correct.  If  a  Romanist,  a  Lutheran,  a  Calvin- 
ist,  or  a  Unitarian  avers,  that  the  Scriptures  are  to  be  construed 
throughout,  in  accordance  with  the  respective  Symbols  of  each  ; 
whom  are  we  to  credit .''  The  creed  of  one  party,  in  some  re- 
spects, contradicts  that  of  the  others.  Is  the  Scripture  then  to 
have  a  contradictory  exegesis  put  upon  it .''  If  not,  the  analogy 
of  party-faith  cannot  be  our  rule  of  interpretation. 

In  the  contest  about  the  analogy  of  faith  being  the  guide  of 
interpretation,  both  parties  have  usually  been  in  the  right,  in 
some  respects ;  and  in  the  wrong,  in  others.  Comp.  Campbells 
Gospels,  Prelim.  Dissert.  IV.  H  13.  14. 

§  35.  The  sense  of  Scripture  not  arbitrary.  Allowing 
the  above  principles  to  be  correct,  it  is  plain  that  the 
method  of  investigating  the  sense  of  words  in  the  Scrip- 
tures is  not  more  arbitrary  than  the  method  used  in  ex- 
plaining other  books  ;  but  equally  regulated  by  laws  de- 
duced from  the  nature  of  language.  Those  then  act 
very  absurdly,  who  subject  the  interpretation  of  the  holy 
Scriptures  to  mere  human  opinion  ;  for  example,  to  the 
decision  of  a  Roman  pontiff,  as  if  this  could  determine 
such  a  matter.     (Comp.  §  31.  Note.) 

<5  36.  We  must  not  hastily  conclude  any  sentiment  of 
the  Scriptures  to  be  unreasonable.  The  meaning,  which 
according  to  grammatical  principles  should  be  assigned 
to  any  word  of  Scripture,  is  not  to  be  rejected  then  on 
account  of  reasons  derived  from  things  or  previously  con- 


OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS.  19 

ceived  opinions ;  for  in  this  way,  interpretation  would 
become  uncertain.  In  books  merely  human,  if  reason 
and  the  nature  of  the  subject  are  repugnant  to  the  ap- 
parent sense  of  the  words,  we  conclude  there  must  have 
been  either  a  fault  in  the  writer,  or  an  error  in  the  copy- 
ist. In  the  scriptures,  if  any  sentiment  does  not  agree 
with  our  opinions,  we  must  remember  the  imbecility  of 
human  reason  and  human  faculties  ;  we  must  seek  for 
conciliation,  and  not  attempt  a  correction  of  the  passage 
without  good  authority.  It  is  wonderful,  that  in  this 
matter  more  reverence  should  be  paid  to  mere  human 
productions,  than  to  the  sacred  books. 

In  ancient  authors,  when  any  difficulty  occurs,  we 
seek  for  correction  or  conciliation ;  as  if  they  must  be 
rendered  avaixagrrjioo  faultless.  But  occasion  is  often 
taken  of  carping  at  the  writers  of  the  Scriptures,  or  of 
perverting  their  meaning  or  the  doctrines  which  they 
teach. 

Nothing  can  be  more  appropriate  to  the  present  times,  than 
the  caution  of  Ernesti,  not  to  conclude  hastily  ag^ainst  the  reas- 
onableness of  Scriptural  sentiment.  Many  set  the  Scripturps  at 
variance  with  reason,  because  they  do  not  attain  the  real  mean- 
ing of  them.  Others  decide,  independently  of  the  Scriptures, 
what  must  be  true  ;  and  then,  whatever  is  found  in  the  sacred 
books  which  thwarts  their  opinions,  they  reject  as  unreasonable. 
The  prudent  and  pious  interpreter  will  suspend  his  judgment,  in 
cases  of  difficulty,  and  investigate  with  great  patience  and  cau- 
tion before  he  decides.  Multitudes  of  passages  in  sacred  writ 
have  been  satisfactorily  elucidated  by  critics  of  this  character, 
which  have  been  given  up  as  unreasonable  by  those  of  a  differ- 
ent character.  The  time  is  coming  (I  cannot  doubt  it)  when  all 
the  dark  places  of  the  Bible  will  be  elucidated,  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  intelligent  and  humble  Christians.  But  how  near  at 
hand  that  blessed  day  is,  I  do  do  not  pretend  to  know.  "  The 
Lord  hasten  it  in  its  time  !" 

§  37.  Interpretation  should  rather  he  grammatical  than 
doctrinal.  In  comparing  reasons  for  the  exegesis  of 
particular  passages,  .greater  weight  should  be  attribut- 
ed to  grammatical  than  doctrinal  ones.  A  thing  may  be 
altogether  true  in  doctrine,  which  yet  is  not  taught  by 
some   particular   passage.      Books   of  theology   exhibit 


20  OF  THE  MEANING  OF  WORDS. 

many  doctrinal  interpretations,  consentaneous  indeed 
with  Christian  principles,  but  not  deduced  from  the 
words  interpreted  ;  doctrinally  true,  but  not  grammati- 
calhj. 

It  is  really  matter  of  regret  to  find,  in  most  of  the  old  and  dis- 
tiui^uished  writers  on  theology,  such  a  multitude  of  passages  ad- 
duced as  proof-texts,  which,  when  hermeneutically  examined, 
prove  to  be  in  no  wise  adapted  to  establish  the  doctrine,  in  con- 
firmation of  which  they  were  cited.  It  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  the  pleasure  of  reading  many  very  valuable  works  of  this 
nature,  is  greatly  abated  by  the  study  of  sacred  interpreta- 
tion, which  teaclies  more  correct  exegesis.  This  loss,  howev- 
er, is  more  than  compensated,  by  the  deep  conviction  which 
springs  from  the  examination  of  genuine  proof  passages. 

^  38.  Real  contradiction  does  not  exist  in  the  Scriptures. 
As  the  books  of  Scripture  were  written  by  men  divine- 
ly inspired,  it  is  evident  there  can  be  no  real  contradic- 
tion in  them.  God  is  not  incapable  of  seeing  what  is 
consistent,  and  what  is  contradictory  ;  nor  can  he  for- 
get, when  he  speaks,  what  was  said  on  former  occasions. 
If  apparent  contradictions  then  occur,  a  proper  method 
of  conciliation  is  to  be  pointed  out ;  of  which,  in  another 
place.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  pp.  1—49.) 

§  39.  Every  interpretation  should  harmonize  with  the 
design  of  the  writer^  and  toith  the  context.  For  the  very 
reason  that  these  books  are  inspired,  every  interpreta- 
tion ought  to  agree  with  the  design  of  the  writer,  or 
harmonize  with  the  context.  We  admit  this  principle 
in  the  interpretation  of  profane  writers  :  much  more 
ought  we  to  admit  it  in  respect  to  the  Scriptures.  Mere 
men,  through  negligence  or  want  of  knowledge,  may 
insert  some  things  that  disagree  with  their  principal  de- 
sign ;  but  not  so  the  Holy  Spirit.  Hence,  the  certain- 
ty of  any  exegesis  is  connected  with  the  design  and  se- 
ries of  the  discourse.  Rules  of  caution,  however,  are 
important  here,  as,  in  its  proper  place,  will  be  shewn. 
(Morus,  ut  supra.) 


21 

PART  I. 

CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  KIND  OF  WORDS  AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES. 

[With  this  chapter  may  be  compared,  Keil  }  43,  and  H  73 — 
84.  Beck,  pp.  129—131.  Seiler  H  41—64.  Lowth  on  Heb.  Po- 
etry, Lect.  V— 12.] 

§  40.  Design  of  the  following  chapter.  The  former 
chapter  treated  of  the  connexion  between  words  and 
ideas,  and  deduces  from  that  connexion  several  funda- 
mental principles  for  the  interpretation  of  language. 
The  present  chapter  is  appropriated  to  the  consideration 
of  words  as  used  in  a  literal  or  tropical,  emphatic  or  un- 
emphatic  sense.  It  also  treats  of  words  as  employed  in 
antithesis ;  and  of  abstract  words  as  employed  for  con- 
crete ones. 

All  these  things  belong-  to  the  nature  of  language,  as  employed 
to  communicate  our  ideas  ;  and  therefore  are  properly  classed, 
by  Ernesti,  among  the  principles  of  language,  on  which  the  sci- 
ence of  Hermeneutics  is  built.  Morus  has  thrown  this  chapter 
into  his  -preceptive  part,  and  thus  confounded  principle  with  pre- 
cept. The  rules  which  grow  out  of  the  principles  here  develop- 
ed are  exhibted  in  Part  II.  Chapters  V.  VI. 

§41.  Importanceof  the  following  considerations.  It  is 
of  great  importance,  in  respect  to  finding  the  sense  of 
words,  to  be  acquainted  with  those  distinctions  which  af- 
fect the  sense,  and  alter  or  augment  the  meaning. 

§  42.  Words  proper  and  tropical.  The  first  impor- 
tant division  or  distinction  of  words,  in  respect  to  their 
meaning,  is  into  proper  and  tropical  i.  e.  literal  and  fig- 
urative, or  (better  still)  primary  and  secondary.  (Com- 
pare Morus,  p.  260.  II.) 


22  OF  THE  KINDS  OF  WORDS 

A  ■proper  word  is  a  definite  name  given  to  a  certain  thin*;  and 
as  such,  may  be  explained  by  adverting-  to  the  projjer  names  of 
persons.  A  tropical  word  is  one  used  out  of  its  proper  i.  e.  orig- 
inal sense  ;  e.  g.  rosy  face^  snowy  skin^  where  rosy  and  snowy 
cannot  be  literally  or  properly  predicated  of  the  skin.  The  names 
trope  and  tropical  come  from  the  Greek  word  zfJOnOQ,  inversion 
conversio. 

Tropes  arise  (I)  From  similitude^  renl  or  supposed.  E.  g. 
the  vine  creeps.  This  is  called  metaphor.  (2)  From  conjunc- 
tion ;  which  is  either  physical  or  intellectual  i  e.  supposed,  be- 
lieved. Physical  or  real,  where  a  part  of  a  house  is  put  to  sig- 
nify the  whole  ;  or  the  container  for  the  thing  contained,  as  to 
offer  the  cup.,  viz.  to  offer  what  is  containd  in  it,  i.  e.  the  wine. 
The  conjunction  is  intellectual  or  supposed,  when  the  cause  is 
put  for  the  effect,  and  vice  versa^  e.  g.  blushing  for  modesty  ;  the 
sign  for  the  thing  signified  ;  or  the  subject  for  the  attribute. 
From  conjunction  arises  that  species  of  trope,  which  is  called 
metonymy. 

§43.  Words  Jii'stiisedin  their  prober  sense.  Original- 
ly, words  were  undoubtedly  used  in  their  joropcr  sense  ; 
for  they  were  invented  to  indicate  things,  and  by  these 
things  they  might  be  easily  explained,  without  any  am- 
biguity. A  small  number  of  words  sufficed,  at  an  ear- 
ly period  ;  because  there  were,  in  the  age  of  simplicity, 
but  few  objects  about  which  speech  could  be  employed. 
(Morus,  p.  262.  III.) 

What  Ernesti  says,  here  and  in  the  following  section,  about 
the  mode  of  forming  tropical  language  may  he  true  ;  but  there  are 
no  facts  to  support  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  most  rude  and  bar- 
barous languages  abound  most  of  all  in  words  used  figuratively. 
As  we  can  trace  no  language  back  to  its  original,  it  is  clear  that 
the  propositions  advanced  by  Ernesti  are  incapable  of  direct 
proof;  and  analogy,  so  far  as  we  can  go  back,  is  against  him. 
Nothing  can  be  more  destitute  of  proof,  than  a  great  part  of  the 
speculations  of  philosophising  grammarians,  about  the  original 
stale  of  language.  One  tell  us  that  the  language  of  barbarians 
has  but  few  words,  and  very  few  varieties  in  declension  ;  another, 
that  they  are  filled  with  OfOf.iarOTTeTTOt^f-itt'a;  another,  that  the 
roots  of  all  words  are  verbs  ;  another,  that  they  are  nouns  ; 
another,  that  all  the  original  words  are  monosyllabic  &:c.  Some 
of  these  things  may  be  true  of  some  languages  ;  but  what  can  all 
such  speculators  say,  when  they  come  to  know  the  state  of  lan- 
guage among  our  Aborigines  ?  A  state  which  puts  at  defiance 
all  their  theories  ;  for  in  minutiae  of  declension  they  surpass  the 
Greek  or  even  the  multiform  Arabic  ;  and  in  most  respects  they 


AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES.  23 

differ  widely  from  that  state,  which  the  above  theory  would  teach 
us  to  be  nect-ssary. 

<5  44.  3Iod€  of  forming  tropical  icords.  But  in  process 
of  time,  objects  being  multiplied,  there  arose  a  necessity 
of  using  words  in  various  senses.  For  men  now  began 
to  think  and  speak  concerning  those  things  which  had 
hitherto  been  neglected  ;  and  of  course  to  form  ideas  of 
them  in  their  minds,  or  to  describe  them  in  words.  New 
objects  also  were  invented  or  discovered  to  describe 
which,  words  became  necessary.  To  serve  this  neces- 
sity, men  resorted  to  two  different  expedients.  Either 
new  words  were  coined,  or  old  ones  were  applied  to 
new  objects.  In  those  languages  that  were  spoken  by 
a  people  ingenious  and  devoted  to  science,  or  in  those 
which  by  nature  or  art  were  flexible  and  fitted  for  the 
coining  of  new  words,  new  ones  were  most  usually  coin- 
ed. Yet  this  usage  was  not  without  exceptions  ;  for  had 
new  words  been  coined  on  every  occasion,  the  number 
of  them  would  have  been  multiplied  without  end.  In 
languages  of  a  character  differing  from  that  just  mention- 
ed, there  was  a  greater  necessity  of  applying  the  same 
word  to  the  designation  of  several  things.  Hence  it  is, 
that  a  language,  poor  as  to  variety  of  words,  either  in 
general  or  in  particular  parts  of  speech,  employs  the  more 
frequently  the  same  words  in  different  senses.  (Morus, 
p.  262.  III.) 

§  45.  Tropical  words  sometimes  become  proper  ones. 
But  there  are  several  different  points  of  light,  in  which 
tropical  words  are  to  be  viewed.  For,  first,  the  primitive 
or  proper  signification,  strictly  understood,  often  becomes 
obsolete,  and  ceases  for  a  long  period  to  be  used.  In 
this  case,  the  secondary  sense,  which  originally  would 
have  been  the  tropical  one,  becomes  the  proper  one. 
This  applies  specially  to  the  names  of  things.  Hence, 
there  are  many  words,  which  at  present  never  have  their 
original  and  proper  sense,  such  as  etymology  would  as- 
sign them,  («)  but  only  the  secondary  senses,  which  may 
in  such  cases  be  called  the  proper  sense.  (Morus,  p. 
264.  IV.) 

a)  E.  g.  In  Eng^lish,  tragedy,  comedy,  villain,  pagan,  knave  &c. 


24  «P   THE    KINDS    OP    WORDS 

§  46.  Usage  sometimes  converts  tropical  words  into 
proper  ones.  Secondly,  in  like  manner,  the  tropical  sense 
of  certain  words  has  become  so  common,  by  usage,  that 
it  is  better  understood  than  the  original  sense.  In  his 
case  too  we  call  the  sense  proper ;  although,  strictly  and 
technically  speaking,  one  might  insist  on  its  being  call- 
ed tropical.  If  one  should  by  his  last  will,  give  a  li- 
brary [bibliothccam]  to  another,  we  should  not  call  the 
use  of  hihliotheca  tropical ;  although  strictly  speaking  it 
is  so,  for  bibliotheca  originally  meant  the  shelves  or  place 
where  books  are  deposited.     (Morus,  ibid.) 

§  47.  Tropical  names  become  proper  by  transfer.  So 
thirdly,  when  names  are  transferred  to  things  destitute 
of  them,  they  become  in  respect  to  these  things  the 
same  as  proper  names  ;  as  when  we  predicate  lix-'rious- 
ness  of  a  crop,  (a)  For  although  we  in  fact  use  the  word 
luxirriousness  metaphorically,  in  respect  to  the  crop,  yet 
in  this  case  the  word  may  be  called  d^  proper  one.  The 
same  holds  true  of  perception  and  liberty  when  predicat- 
ed of  the  human  mind  ;  and  so  of  many  other  things. 
(Morus,  ibid.) 

a)  So  the  Latin  acies.^  ala.,  cornu.,  spoken  of  an  array  ;  and  in 
the  same  way,  foot  of  a  mountai/t..,  head  of  a  rivtr^  or  bed  of  a  riv- 
er &c  ;  all  originally  proper  nouns  used  in  a  very  different  sense, 
but  now  they  have  become  proper  as  thus  used,  by  transfer. 

§  48.  Tromcal  words  used  for  the  sake  of  variety  in 
expression.  Words  moreover  are  frequently  used  in  a 
tropical  manner,  without  any  necessity  arising  from  the 
occurrence  of  new  objects.  For  it  is  not  necessity  only, 
to  which  we  must  attribute  the  use  of  tropical  words, 
but  suavity  and  agreeableness  of  style  occasion  their  in- 
troduction. To  the  genius  and  habits  of  writers  much 
also  is  to  be  attributed.  For,  first,  tropes  are  used  for 
the  sake  of  variety  in  expression,  so  that  the  same  word 
may  not  often  and  always  recur.  To  this  species  of 
tropical  language  belong  metonymy,  synecdoche,  and 
other  smaller  tropes.  In  every  thing,  variety  is  de- 
manded ;  and  without  it,  tedium  quickly  follows.  No 
person,  desirous  of  writing  elegantly  and  with  suavity, 


AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES.  25 

will  fail  to  discern,  that  an  important  part  of  a  good 
style  consists  in  using  variety  of  language.  (Morus,  p. 
260.  I.) 

Examples ;  heaven  is  used  for  God^  sleep  for  death,  threshold 
for  house,  uncircumcision  for  Gentiles  &c. 

§  49.  Tropical  words  used  for  ornament.  But  second- 
ly, tropical  words,  specially  metaphors,  are  used  for  orna- 
ment.  In  metaphors,  which  are  the  most  common  spe- 
cies of  tropes,  there  is  contained  a  similitude  reduced  to 
the  narrow  compass  of  a  single  word  ;  and  the  mind  is 
delighted  with  metaphors,  because  we  are  so  formed  as 
to  be  pleased  with  similitudes  and  images,  particularly 
with  those  which  are  derived  from  objects  that  are  splen- 
did and  agreeable.     (Morus,  p.  267.  II.) 

§  50.  Tropes  used  specially  for  ornament  hy  poets  and 
orators.  The  more  desirous  a  writer  is  of  ornamenting 
his  discourse,  the  more  frequently  does  he  use  tropical 
language ;  as  is  evident  from  the  style  of  poets  and  or- 
ators. And  it  is  with  the  special  design  that  their  style 
may  be  ornate,  that  we  concede  them  the  liberty  of  fre- 
quently employing  tropical  language. 

^  51.  The  frequency  of  tropes  depends  much  on  the  gC' 
nius  of  the  ivriter.  It  should  be  observed,  however, 
that  the  genius  of  a  writer,  and  the  subject  on  w^hich  he 
writes,  are  intimately  connected  with  this.  Those 
who  possess  great  fervour  of  imagination  and  vivid  con- 
ception, more  frequently  use  tropes,  even  bold  ones,  and, 
as  it  often  seems  to  others,  harsh  ones  also.  This  re- 
sults from  the  fact,  that  they  easily  perceive  and  frame 
similitudes,  and  by  their  temperament  are  excited  to 
make  comparisons.  Hence  they  often  content  them- 
selves with  slight  similitudes.  But  great  subjects,  by 
their  importance,  naturally  excite  most  men  to  the  use 
of  tropes,  and  sometimes  of  splendid  ones.  (Morus,  p. 
268.  III.  IV.     Lowth,  Lect.  V— XII.) 

From  the  object  of  employing^  tropes,  as  above  described,  we 
may  conclude  that  he  abuses  them,  who  interprets  them  etymo-^ 
3 


26 


OF  THE  KINDS  OF  WORDS 


log-ically,  or  seeks  any  thing;  more  iu  them  than  variety  and  or- 
nament, or  urgf  s  too  far  exactness  in  estimating  the  limits  of 
meaning  in  tropical  phrases. 

§  52.  Tropes  used  from  necessity  differ  from  tJiose  em- 
ployed  for  variety  or  ornament.  From  these  principles 
we  may  understand,  that  in  all  books,  but  specially  in 
the  Scriptures,  tropical  language  used  from  necessity  dif- 
fers much  from  that  which  is  used  on  account  of  other 
reasons.  In  the  first  case,  a  thing  has  a  definite  name 
by  which  it  is  called  ;  in  the  other,  the  trope  is  used 
either  for  pleasure  or  ornament.  The  former  is  gram- 
matical ;  the  latter  rhetorical.  In  the  first,  the  reason 
of  the  trope  lies  in  analogy  of  nature  ;  in  the  second, 
it  lies  in  some  similitude.  And  since  every  thing  must 
have  some  name,  either  peculiar  or  common,  and  that 
name  belongs  to  the  thing  grammatically,  it  follows  that 
the  proper  sense  of  words  is  not  lost  in  a  grammatical 
trope,  but  only  in  a  rhetorical.     (Morus,  p.  270.  VI.) 

§  53.  The  sense  of  tropical  words  is  grammatical.  But, 
as  may  be  easily  understood  from  what  has  been  said, 
since  the  meaning  of  all  tropical  words  as  well  as  proper 
ones,  is  deduced  from  the  purpose  and  design  of  those, 
who  employed  them  to  designate  certain  things,  (as  is 
plain  from  observation;)  it  appears  that  this  meaning  is 
grammatical  or  literal,  and  that  they  are  in  an  error, 
who,  with  Jerome,  have  thought  differently.  Interpre- 
tation is  of  the  same  name  nature^  whether  it  is  applied 
to  words  tropical  or  proper.     (Morus,  p.  271.  VII.) 

§  54.  Origin  of  synonymous  ivords.  From  the  custom 
of  using  tropical  language,  flow  synonymous  words.  In 
respect  to  these,  the  interpreter  must  beware,  lest  he 
seek  for  diversity  of  meaning  where  none  really  exists ; 
which  not  unfrequently  happens.  Usually,  in  the  same 
dialect  of  the  same  nation  and  age,  proper  words  are 
not  synonymous  ;  but  when  synonymes  exist  (as  for  ex- 
ample they  do  in  Greek)  they  originate  from  different 
dialects  or  from  different  ages.     The  greatest  number 


AND  THEIR  VARIOUS  USES.  27 

of  synonymes  arises  from  tropical  words,  which,  for  the 
sake  of  variety  and  ornament,  express  the  same  idea  by 
various  names.     (Moras,  p.  271.  VIII.) 

The  interpreter  should  not  seek  for  any  definite  distinction  be- 
tween synonymes,  (1)  Where  they  are  introduced  for  the  sake 
of  variety.  (2)  VVhf re  usas^e  conjoins  two  words  ;  as  luck  and 
fortune^  peace  and  quietness^  long  and  laslini;  &c.  (3)  Where 
they  are  used  for  the  sake  of  ornament.  (4)  Where  excited  feel- 
ing- produces  a  repetition  of  the  same  idea,  while  different  words 
are  employed.  (5)  Where  it  is  the  habit  of  an  author  to  em- 
ploy synonymes  ;   e.  g-.  Cicero. 

The  Hebrew  poetry  affords  the  most  striking^  exhibition  of  syn- 
onymes, iu  its  synonymous  parallelisms  ;  where,  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  composition,  the  second  OTi^og  or  stanza  is  expect- 
ed, in  o-eneral,  to  exhibit  the  same  sense  as  the  first.  An  inter- 
preter would  mistake  the  essential  part  of  his  office,  if  he  should 
here  endeavour  to  exhibit  adifference  between  the  sense  of  words, 
which  the  nature  of  the  composition  requires  to  be  regarded  as 
synonymes. 

GENERAL  NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS. 

§  55.  Definition  of  emphasis.  In  the  use  of  language, 
cases  arise  where  the  ordinary  signification  of  a  word 
receives,  if  I  may  so  speak,  accession  or  augmetitation. 
This  may  be  effected  in  two  ways ;  the  first  of  which 
consists  in  the  use  of  a  word  in  an  honorary  or  in  a  de- 
grading sense,  e.  g.  vet^ba  evqrifAtag  et  dvaq^fiiag,  of 
which  it  would  be  irrelevant  to  treat  here.  The  second 
class  of  words  are  those,  which  receive  augmentation  in 
their  extent  or  force  of  meaning.  These  constitute  what 
may  with  propriety  be  called  emphatic  icords.  Emphasis 
then  may  be  defined  ;  an  accesion  to  the  ordinary  signi- 
f  cation  of  a  word^  either  as  to  the  extent  or  the  force  of  its 
meaning.     (Morus,  p.  321.  II.) 

Emphasis  comes  from  ijAqccPStv^  which  signifies  to  shew  or 
make  conspicuous.  It  is  to  language  what  a  nod  or  a  sign  is  to 
looks,  i.  e.  it  makes  more  siguificancy.  Examples:  when  the 
Jews  speak  of  Moses  by  the  appellation  of  the  Prophet ;  or  the 
Greeks  say,  the  Orator.,  the  Philosopher.,  the  Poet.,  meaning  De- 
mosthenes, Plato,  and  Homer  ;  there  respective  appellations  are 
tmphatiQ. 


28  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS. 

§  56.  No  word  of  itself  emphatic.  It  may  be  easily 
seen,  then,  that  no  word  of  itself  is  emphatic.  Each 
word  has  by  itself  a  certain  power,  and  designates  a  de- 
finite idea  of  a  thing  either  small  or  great,  in  which 
there  can  be  no  emphasis.  It  is  not  because  a  word 
designates  any  thing  which  is  very  great  or  very  small, 
that  it  is  emphatical.  Were  this  the  case,  then  such 
words  as  God,  the  loorld,  the  sun,  the  king,  would  be  al- 
ways emphatical ;  which  surely  no  one  will  assert. 
(Morus,  p.  322.  III.) 

If  emphasis  be  an  occasional  accession  of  force  to  a  word,  then 
the  orrfmar?/ meaning' of  the  word,  be  the  sig-nification  ever  so 
important  or  forcible,  of  coarse  is  not  emphatic. 

§  57.  Kinds  of  emphasis.  Emphasis  is  either  occasion' 
al  or  constant.  We  call  it  occasional,  when  it  is  connect- 
ed with  words  in  some  particular  place,  or  at  a  certain 
time.  From  the  animated  feelings  of  the  speaker,  or 
from  the  importance  of  the  subject,  a  word  is  chosen  to 
express  more  than  its  ordinary  import.  Constant  empha- 
sis is  that  which  usage  makes  invariably  so,  by  employ- 
ing a  word  continually  in  an  emphatic  rather  than  in 
the  ordinary  sense.     (Morus,  p.  323.  IV.) 

Constant  emphasis,  if  admitted,  would  destroy  the  very  defini- 
tion which  Ernesti  has  given  of  emphasis.  That  no  word  of  it- 
self is  emphatic,  and  that  emphasis  is  an  accession  to  the  ordina- 
ry force  of  a  word,  is  what  he  very  rightly  teaches  us.  What 
then  is  that  emphasis  which  is  constant  ? 

§  58.  Emphasis,  how  known.  Occasional  emphasis 
must  be  known  by  the  context,  and  from  the  nature  of 
the  discourse.     (Morus,  p.  324.  V.) 

I  have  retained  Ernesti's  lang^uage  here,  in  respect  to  the  term 
occasional  or  temporary  as  he  calls  it.  But  as  occasional  empha- 
sis is  really  all  which  from  the  nature  of  the  thin^  can  ever  ex- 
ist, I  shall  not  hereafter  make  any  distinction,  but  speak  simply 
of  emphasis. 

The  nature  of  the  subject  and  the  context  are  the  only  means 
of  knowing  whether  a  word  is  to  be  regarded  as  emphatic  ;  for 
this  must  shew  that  more  or  less  force  is  to  be  given  to  particu- 
lar terms.     As  a  general  rule,  we  may  say  that  emphasis  is  re- 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  EMPHASIS.  29^ 

quired  whenever  a  frigid,  incongruous,  or  inept  sense  would  be 
made  without  it.  Thus  1  John  iii.  9,  he  that  is  born  of  God  sin- 
neih  not^  which  the  writer  does  not  mean  to  assert,  understand- 
ing the  word  sinnttk  in  a  common  and  general  way  ;  but  he 
means  to  say  that  such  an  one  does  not  jm,  in  the  peculiar  sense 
of  which  he  is  speaking. 

As  to  constant  emphasis  (which  Morus  and  his  editor  have  ad- 
mitted) the  rule  for  determining  it  is  said  to  be  the  usus  loquen- 
di.  The  rule  is  good,  if  the  principle  be  admitted.  The  exam- 
ples given  to  support  this  species  of  emphasis,  are  such  as  the 
names  Jehovah  applied  to  God,  and  Son  of  man  applied  to  Christ. 
But  these  prove  no  more,  than  that  these  appellations,  applied 
in  certain  circumstances,  have  a  significant  and  exalted  mean- 
ing;  which  is  true  of  very  many  words,  where  no  real  emphasis 
is  to  be  found.     But  see  and  compare  Morus,  p.  325.  VI.  VII. 

^  59.  JVo  ground  for  dividing  emphasis  into  real  and 
verbal.  Some  rhetoricians  divide  emphasis  into  real  and 
verbal:  the  former  of  which  consists  in  the  greatness 
and  sublimity  of  things ;  the  latter  consists  of  tvords 
adapted  to  express  their  qualities.  But  this  division  is 
erroneous.  To  things  belongs  sublimity  ;  to  luords,  em' 
phasis.  Nor,  as  we  have  above  said,  does  a  word  de- 
signating a  great  object  therefore  become  emphatic. 
(Morus,  p.  328.  VIII.) 

§  60.  Tropical  loords  are  not  of  course  and  from  their 
nature  emphatic.  Those  also  err,  who  make  every 
tropical  specially  metaphorical  word  emphatic.  In 
necessary  tropes,  or  those  used  for  the  sake  of  variety, 
it  is  clear  there  can  be  no  emphasis.  Ornamental  tropes 
depend  on  mere  similitude,  which  serve  to  render  the 
discourse  agreeable.  Flagrare  cupiditate  means  no  more 
than  vehementer  cupere ;  and  no  one  gets  a  different  idea 
from  using  it.  If  then  there  be  no  emphasis  in  the  lat- 
ter expression,  there  is  none*  in  the  former.  The  er- 
ror arises  in  this  way,  that  some  understand  flagrare  cu- 
piditate to  be  used  instead  of  cupere ;  and  thence  con- 
clude, that  there  is  an  accession  of  meaning.  Hence  we 
learn,  that  the  emphasis  of  tropical  words  is  to  be  found 
3* 


30  OF  ANTITHESIS. 

in  the  same  way  as  that  of  proper  words.     (Morus,  p. 
329.  IX.) 

^  61.  Words  in  one  language  do  not  always  correspond 
exactly  to  those  in  another.  It  may  be  proper  to  repeat 
here  a  well  known,  though  very  important  and  necessa- 
ry observation,  viz,  that  every  language  has  words  and 
phrases,  to  which  none  in  any  other  language,  or  at  least 
in  that  into  which  we  are  interpreting,  exactly  corres- 
pond. Of  this  nature  are  many  words  and  phrases,  both 
in  the  Greek  and  Hebrew  Testament.  The  reason  of 
this  lies  not  solely  in  the  difference  of  objects,  peculiar 
to  every  nation  ;  such  as  pertain  for  example,  tO  laws, 
religious  rites,  manners  and  customs  &lc  ;  but  also  in  the 
variety  of  minds,  which  are  not  all  affected  in  the  same 
manner  ;  and  lastly,  in  an  arbitrary  formation  of  notions, 
respecting  those  things  which  do  not  pertain  to  substance 
and  essence.     (Campbell,  Diss.  II.) 

OF    ANTITHESIS. 

§  62.    Where  antithesis  exists,  if  the  sense  of  one  part  can 
he  found,  the  other  may  be  easily  known.     Finally,  as  ideas 
are  often  contra-distinguished   from  each   other,  so  the 
language  corresponds.     Therefore,   as  when   ideas   are 
repugnant  to  each  other,  if  you  understand  the  one,  of 
course  you  must  understand  the  other  which  is  the  oppo- 
site, (for  what  one  asserts  the  other  denies ;)  so  in  anti- 
thetic language,  whether  the  subject  or  predicate  of  a 
sentence,  the  rule  is  obvious,  that  the  interpretation  of 
the  one  part  must  be  directed  by  that  of  the  other,  which 
is  understood  either  from   the  usus  loquendi,  or,   where 
this  is  various,  from  the  context.     E.  g.  when  nudti  and 
•pauci  occur  in  the  same  sentence,  and  it  is  evident  that 
multi  means  all,  it  is  of  course  evident  that  pauci  can- 
not here  have  its  ordinary  sense,  but  means  7ion  omnes, 
without  limiting  the  idea  to  fewness  of  number.     Of  a 
like  kind  are  occfj^  and  nvivf-ict,  ygocf-tfAU  and  nvfvfiu,  in 
which  the  interpretation  of  the  one  is  to  be  accommo- 


ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE  WORDS.  31 

dated  to  that  of  the  other.     (Morus,  p.  167.  XIV.   I— 
11.) 

a)  But  if  muUi  means  all^  does  not  pauci  (the  opposite  of  it) 
mean  none  ?  In  Hebrew,  ^b  and  '^'D  ^fb  mean  all  and  none  ; 
and  ^3  Nt^   is  equivalent  to  non  omnes^  in  such  a  case. 

ABSTRACT  AND  CONCRETE  WORDS. 

§  63.  Abstract  loords  used  for  concrete.  Nor  must  the 
interpreter  neglect  the  distribution  of  words  into  ab- 
stract and  concrete.  All  languages,  specially  ancient 
ones,  often  use  abstract  terms  for  concrete  ones.  Gen- 
erally abstract  terms  are  most  frequently  employed. 

Abstract  words  are  the  names  of  qualities  or  attributes  ;  con- 
crete, of  thingfs  or  subjects.  E.  g.  divinity  is  an  abstract  word, 
meaning  the  quality  of  divine  nature  ;  but  God  is  a  concrete 
term,  meaning  the  divine  agent  or  being.  The  former  is,  by 
usage,  often  put  for  the  latter. 

§  64.  The  use  of  abstracts  for  concretes  arose  from  ne- 
cessity. This  methed  of  speaking  is  employed,  (1)  From 
necessity.  Those  languages,  which  have  but  a  few  con- 
crete terms,  necessarily  employ  abstract  ones ;  e.  g.  the 
Hebrew  and  its  cognate  dialects,  in  which  abstracts  are 
often  used  in  the  place  of  concretes.  Such  usage  being 
once  established  by  necessity,  it  often  extended  itself 
where  necessity  did  not  require  it. 

§  65.  (2)  From  a  desire  to  render  the  subject  spoken 
of  prominent.  When  an  abstract  is  put  for  a  subject 
with  its  pronoun,  or  for  the  subject  itself,  i^  directs  the 
mind  to  that  very  thing  on  account  of  which  the  predi- 
cate is  asserted.  No  one  will  deny  that  this  mode  of 
expression  is  energetic. 

§  66.  (3)  The  purpose  of  ornament  is  subserved,  not 
only  by  the  prominence  of  which  I  have  just  spoken, 
but  by  a  certain  elevation  and  grandeur  of  style,  con- 
nected with  this  mode  of  speaking. 


32  RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION. 

§  67.  Popular  and  learned  use  of  tvords.  Finally,  to 
some  words  popular  use  attributes  one  meaning,  the 
use  of  the  learned  another.  Not  that  words  naturally 
signify  one  thing  in  common  life,  and  another  in  a  trea- 
tise of  science  ;  but  that  they  are  used  less  skilfully  in 
the  one  case,  and  with  more  skill  and  accuracy  in  the 
other.  Interpreters  who  confound  these  usages,  of  course 
pervert  the  se«se  of  words. 


PART  II. 

RULES  OF  INTERPRETATION. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Introductory  Remarks, 

^  68.  Design  of  Part  11.  Thus  far  we  have  been 
employed  in  considering  the  general  nature  of  language, 
the  various  kinds  of  words  in  use,  and  also  the  meaning 
appropriate  to  each  class.  Having  taken  this  general 
view  of  the  nature  and  properties  of  words,  we  may 
now  proceed  to  deduce  from  the  principles  already  es- 
tablished various  rules  of  interpretation,  by  which  the 
efforts  of  the  interpreter  are  to  be  directed.  The  con- 
sideration of  these  rules,  with  their  various  classes  and 
ramifications,  will  constitute  the  second  part  of  the  pres- 
ent treatise  dn  Hermeneutics. 

§  69.  What  are  rides  of  interpretation  ?  They  are 
directions  or  formulas,  which  explain  and  define  the 
mode  of  rightly  investigating  and  perspicuously  repre- 
senting the  sense  of  words,  in  any  particular  author. 

§  70.  Origin  of  these  rides.  They  are  deduced  from 
the  nature  of  language,  as  above  explained ;  and  dedu- 
ced, not  by  logical  subtleties,  but  by  observation  and  ex- 
perience. 


RTTLES  OF  INTERPRETATION.  33 

§  71.  Ohiect  af  rules.  These  rules  serve  not  only 
to  assist  in  finding  the  sense  of  words,  but  also  in  judg 
ing  whether  any  particular  sense  put  upon  words  be 
true  or  false.  By  them  too  one  may  not  only  be  assist- 
ed to  understand  why  a  particular  sense  is  erroneous, 
but  also  why  the  true  one  cannot  be  discovered. 

§  72.  Rules  of  exegesis  connected  icitli  the  itsus  lo- 
quendi.  We  have  seen  above,  that  the  sense  of  words  de- 
pends on  the  usus  loqhendi.  Proper  rules  then  for  find- 
ing the  sense,  or  judging  of  it,  ought  to  have  special 
respect  to  the  usus  loquendi^  and  to  show  how  it  is  appli- 
ed to  every  particular  case. 

§  73.  Usus  loquendi  general  and  special.  The  iisus 
loquendi,  considered  at  large,  has  respect  to  a  language 
generally  ;  specially  concerned,  it  has  respect  to  some 
particular  writer.  To  the  common  usage  of  words  al- 
most every  writer  adds  something  that  is  peculiar  to 
himself;  whence  arise  the  idioms  of  particular  writers. 

§  74.  Order  in  which  the  subject  toill  he  pursued. 
The  natural  method  of  treating  the  usus  loquendi  will  be 
followed  :  so  that  we  shall  first  consider  the  method,  in 
general,  of  finding  the  usus  loquendi  in  the  dead  lan- 
guages ;  and  then  the  method  of  finding  it  in  any  partic- 
ular author,  but  more  specially  in  the  writings  of  the 
New  Testament. 


34 


PART  II. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD 
LANGUAGES. 

[CompareKeil,v^^  25—34.  Beck,  pp.  131—136.  Seiler,  h^  236— 
254.] 

§  75.  Usus  loquendi  is  known  hy  testimomj.  If  the 
usvs  loquendi  is  mere  matter  of  fact,  it  may  be  known, 
in  the  dead  languages,  by  the  testimony  of  those  who 
lived  when  these  languages  were  flourishing  and  in  com- 
mon use,  and  who  well  understood  them.  This  testimo- 
ny is  direct  or  indirect.     (Morus,  p.  74.  II.) 

By  the  usus  loquendi  is  meant,  the  sense  which  iisag'e  attach- 
es to  the  words  of  any  lang;uage.  It  is  surprising  that  any  at- 
tempts should  ever  have  been  made  to  find  the  sense  of  words  in 
a  dead  language,  by  means  different  in  their  nature  from  those 
•which  we  employ  to  find  the  sense  of  words  in  a  living  language. 
The  meaning  of  a  word  must  always  be  a  simple  matter  of  fact  ; 
and  of  course  it  is  ahoays  to  be  established  by  appropriate  and 
adequate  testimony.  Yet  how  very  diff"erent  a  course  has  been 
pursued,  I  will  not  say  by  many  Rabbinic  Cabbalistic  commmen- 
tators  merely,  nor  by  monks  and  zealots  for  the  Romish  hierar- 
chy, but,  by  many  Protestants  who  have  had  great  influence, 
and  who  deserve  on  many  accounts  the  highest  respect.  Wit- 
ness the  exegetical  principles  of  Cocceius  and  his  followers  ; 
and  read,  if  the  statement  just  made  be  doubted,  many  of  the 
articles  in  Parkhurst's  Heb.  Lexicon. 

§  76.  How  to  obtain  direct  testimony.  Direct  testi- 
mony may  be  obtained,  first,  from  the  writers  to  whom 
the  language  investigated  was  vernacular  ;  either  from 
the  same  authors  whom  we  interpret,  or  from  their  con- 
temporaries. Next,  from  those  who,  though  foreigners, 
had  learned  the  language  in  question.  («)  Thirdly,  from 
scholiasts,   glossographies,   and  versions  made  while  the 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  35 

language  was  spoken,  and  by  those  who  were  acquaint- 
ed with  it.     But  these  must  be  severally  treated  of. 

a)  Thus  the  writings  of  .\iarcus  Antoninus  a  Roman  emperor, 
and  of  Philo  and  Josephus  who  were  Jews,  may  be  used  to  illus- 
trate the  meaningf  of  Grf  ek  words,  because,  although  foreig-uera, 
they  well  understand  the  Greek  lauguage. 

§  77.  Testimony  of  cotemporary  writers.  The  moat 
important  aid  is  afforded  by  writers  of  the  first  class ; 
for  their  testimony  is  particularly  weighty.  This  tes- 
timony may  be  drawn  from  three  sources.  (1)  From 
the  definitions  of  words.  (2)  From  examples  and  the 
nature  of  the  subject.  (3)  From  parallel  passages.  (Mo- 
rns, p.  79.  V.) 

§  78.  (1)  Definitions.  In  regard  to  these,  nothing 
more  is  necessary  than  to  take  good  care  that  the  defi- 
niton  be  well  understood  ;  and  to  consider  how  much 
weight  the  character  of  the  writer  who  defines  may 
properly  give  to  it. 

§  79.  (2)  Examples  and  the  nature  of  the  svhjeet.  In 
regard  to  these,  it  may  be  said  that  a  good  understand- 
ing and  considerable  practice  is  necessary  to  enable  one 
to  judge  well,  and  to  make  proper  distinctions.  (Mo- 
rns, p.  81.  VII.) 

By  exanijjles  is  meant,  that  the  writer  who  uses  a  particular 
word,  although  he  does  not  directly  define  it,  yet  gives  in  some 
one  or  more  passages  an  example  of  what  it  means,  by  exhibit- 
ing its  qualities  or  shewing  the  operation  of  it.  Thus  Paul  uses 
the  words  (7ro//f«a  tov  n6af.iOV^  at  first,  without  an  explana- 
tion. But  we  have  an  example  of  the  meaning  of  it  in  Gal.  iv. 
9.  Thus  niGTcg  is  illustrated  by  examples  in  Heb.  xi ;  and  so 
of  many  other  words. 

The  nature  of  the  subject.,  in  innumerable  places,  helps  to  de- 
fine which  meaning  of  a  word  the  writer  attaches  to  it,  in  any- 
particular  passage.  E.  g.  '/agig  is  pardon  of  *m,  divine  benev- 
olence^ divine  aid.,  temporal  blessings  &c.  Which  of  these  senses 
it  bears  in  any  particular  passage,  is  to  be  determined  from  the 
oature  of  the  subject. 


36  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI. 

§  80.  (3)  Comparison  of  parallel  passages.  Great  cau- 
tion is  necessary  here,  in  order  to  find  the  true  sense  of 
those  passages  which  are  to  be  compared  and  judged  of, 
with  a  view  to  throw  light  on  some  more  obscure  place. 
Unless  such  caution  is  used,  the  object  cannot  be  well 
accomplished.  On  this  account,  the  principle  in  ques- 
tion ought  to  be  well  understood  ;  especially  as  all  who 
are  skilled  in  interpretation  agree  that  this  principle  of 
exegesis  is  very  broad,  and  that  it  applies  not  only  to 
the  Scriptures,  but  to  all  other  books.  (Morus,  p.  79. 
VIII.) 

§  81.  Parallelism  is  verbal  and  real.  (1)  VerhaL 
This  occurs  when  a  word  is  ambiguous  and  doubtful, 
because  neither  the  subject  nor  the  context  affords 
matter  of  illustration;  and  this  same  word,  a,  or  its 
synonyme,  (6)  is  repeated  in  a  similar  passage,  with 
those  attributes  by  which  it  may  be  defined,  or  with 
some  plain  adjunct  or  intelligible  comment,  (c)  (Morus, 
p.  85.  X.  XI.) 

The  sense  of  many  words  is  so  plain,  that  investigation  by 
prallelism,  i.  e.  the  like  use  of  them  in  other  passages,  is  un- 
necessary. But  comparison  is  specially  necessary  to  illustrate 
words  (1)  Which  belong  to  the  Hellenistic  or  Hebrew-Greek 
idiom.  E.  g.  iqo(3ovvTO  TiavTfg  is  often  said,  when  the  event 
to  which  it  relates  is  some  special  favour.  The  language  here 
may  he  compared  with  the  Hebrew  N^."*  and  THE,  or  the  syno- 
Yiymes  duvfAUOai  and  'daf-i^f]Oui^ ;  by  which  it  appears  that 
ICf.O^OVVTO  in  such  cases  means  admiration.,  astomshmtnt.  (2) 
Words  should  be  compared  which  have  a  kind  of  technical  re- 
ligious use.  E.  g.  fivGTf](jiov,  comp.  Rom  19:  24,  Colos.  1:  27, 
Eph.  3:  45.  So  n'lGTvg,  dtxaioovv7].,  (xiTuvola^  yiuii^ij  miGtg 
&c.  (3)  Words  of  unfrequent  occurrence.  The  necessity  of 
this  is  obvious.  (4")  Words  which  are  ambiguous  ;  for  words 
which  are  so  in  one  place,  frequently  are  plain  and  easy  to  be 
understood  in  another,  from  the  connexion  in  which  they  stand. 

a)  E.  g.  Christ  is  frequently  called  a  slant  of  stumbling.  In 
Pet.  2:  8,  those  who  stumble  are  said  UTieideiv  zfo  AJ^w,  to 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.       37 

reject  or  disobey  the  gospel  of  Christ.  (6)  E.g.  2 Cor.  1:21, 
uglaug  VjfAag  6  Seog ;  l  John.  2:20  yQiOfxa  is  said  to  be 
instruction  in  the  truth,  (c)  Cornp,  2  Cor.  4:  lu  with  ver?e  1 1th. 
Parallelisms,  appropriately  so  called,  are  of  this  nature  ;  the 
one  often  serving-  to  explain  the  other.  These  are  very  numerous 
in  the  Old  Testament,  and  considerably  so  in  the  New.  Comp, 
Matt.  1:  20  with  Luke  1:  35. 

To  the  cases  already  mentioned  may  be  added,  (rf)  Renewed 
mention  with  explanation.  Comp.  1  Cor.  7  :  1  with  vt  rse  2G. 
Also  (e)  Renewed  mention  with  antithesis.  Comp.  Ouvuiog 
in  Rom.  iii.  iv.  and  v.  with  Chap.  6:  23, 

§  82.  Real  Parallelism.  This  means  that  there  is  a 
parallelism  of  object  or  sentiment,  although  the  words 
are  not  the  same  ;  or,  to  describe  it  in  a  manner  some- 
what different,  it  occurs  when  the  same  thing  or  senti- 
ment is  expressed  in  other  words  more  perspicuous,  or 
with  fuller  and  more  numerous  words  the  meaning  of 
which  is  plain. 

Real  parallelism  may  respect  a  fact  or  a  doctrine^  related  or 
taugpht  in  different  passag-es.  Examples  of  the  former  are  abund- 
ant in  the  Gospels,  which  in  very  numerous  instances  relate  to 
the  same  facts.  So  in  the  books  of  Samuel  and  Kings  compared 
with  the  Chronicles. 

Parallelism  of  doctrine  or  sentiment,  is  where  the  same  princi- 
ples are  taught  in  both  passages.  To  this  head  of  parallelism 
belong  repetitions  of  the  same  composition  ;  e.  g.  Ps.  i4and  53; 
Ps.  9G  and  1  Chron.  16;  Ps.  18  and  2  Sam.  22;  some  of  Jude 
and  2  Epistle  of  Peter;  with  many  other  such  passages.  On  the 
faithful,  skilful,  and  diligent  comparison  of  the  different  parts  of 
Scripture  which  treat  of  the  same  doctrine,  depends,  in  a  great 
measure,  all  our  right  conclusions  in  regard  to  the  real  doctrines 
of  religion;  for  in  this  manner,  and  this  only,  are  they  properly 
established.  .VIostofthe  mistakes  made  about  Christian  doc- 
trine, are  made  in  consequence  of  partial  exegesis,  directed  not 
infrequently  by  prejudices  previously  imbibed.  The  studeiit  can 
never  feel  too  deeply  the  importance  of  a  thorough  comparison  of 
all  those  parts  of  Scripture^  ivhich  pertain  to  the  same  subject. 

Besides  the  verbal  and  real  parallelism  considered  above,  there 
is  another  species  of  parallelism  which  constitutes  one  of  the 
principal  features  of  Hebrew  poetry.  This  consists  in  a  corres- 
pondence of  two  parts  of  a  verse  with  each  other,  so  that  words 
answer  to  words,  and  sentiment  to  sentiment.  This  runs  through- 
out the  books  of  Job,  Psalms,  Proverbs,  Canticles,  and  most  of 
♦he  Prophets.  See  Ps.  1.  2.  19.  119.  Is.  1:  2—5.  40.  et  passim. 
4 


38  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

This  style,  so  predominant  in  the  language  of  the  Old  Testament, 
has  passed  into  many  parts  of  the  New,  which  strictly  speaking 
are  not  poetical ;  but  which  received  their  hue  from  the  influence 
that  Hebrew  poetry  had  produced  on  the  language  of  the  Jewish 
nation.  See  Luke  1:  35.  1:  46,  &c.  II:  27;  and  many  parts  of 
the  Apocalypse,  which  is  a  kind  of  poem.  The  attentive  and  ex- 
perienced observer  will  find  these  characteristic  idioms  of  He- 
brew poetry,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  in  almost  every  chapter 
of  the  New  Testament. 

The  appropriate  method  of  studying  this  part  of  exegesis  con- 
sists, of  course,  in  attention  to  Hebrew  poetry.  How  great  assis- 
tance may  be  derived  from  a  thorough  knowledge  of  this  idiom, 
one  can  scarcely  imagine,  who  has  not  made  the  experiment.  I 
cannot  dwell  upon  it  here,  except  merely  to  observe,  that  the 
student  will  be  in  no  great  danger  of  overrating  the  benefit  to  be 
derived  from  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  it ;  and  that  he  will 
find  the  advantages  very  perspicuously  stated  by  Schleusner,  De 
parallelismo  mtmbrorum  egregio  interpretationis  subeidio. 

As  Ernesti  has  failed  to  consider  the  appropriate  maxims  of 
exegesis,  in  regard  to  the  kind  of  parallelisms  now  in  question^  I 
will  add  a  few  considerations  that  may  be  useful.  (l)In  par- 
allelism of  this  kind,  seek  for  the  principal  idea  that  lies  at  the 
ground  of  both  parts  of  a  distich.  (2)  Be  not  anxious  to  avoid 
the  same  sense  or  meaning  in  both  parts,  as  though  it  would  be 
tautological,  and  unworthy  of  the  sacred  writers  ;  for  sameness 
of  meaning,  in  Innumerable  cases,  constitutes  the  very  nature  of 
the  idiom  or  mode  of  expression.  (3)  inquire  whether  one  mem- 
ber of  the  parallelism  is  explanatory  ;  or  whether  it  is  added  for 
the  sake  of  ornament;  or  is  a  repetition  or  amplification  which 
results  from  excited  feeling,  or  from  mere  custom  of  speech.  This 
inquiry  will  enable  one  to  know  how  much  exegetical  aid  may 
be  derived  from  it.  If  one  member  be  explanatory  or  exegetical 
of  the  other,  it  will  comprise  synonymous  or  antithetic  words  ;  or 
one  member  will  be  in  tropical,  and  the  other  in  proper  language; 
or  one  will  enumerate  species,  which  belong  to  the  genus  men- 
tioned in  the  other.  Instructive  on  the  above  subject  is  Morus, 
pp.  96-107. 

But  the  student  must  not  fail  hereto  read  Lowth's  Lectures  on 
Hebrew  Poetry^  or  the  preface  to  Lowth's  Commentary  on  Isaiah. 
"With  much  profit  may  be  read,  on  this  very  interesting  and  im- 
portant branch  of  a  sacred  interpreter's  knowledge.  Herder,  Geist 
der  Heb.  Poesie^  B.  I.  s.  22,  &c.  De  Wette,  Ueber  die  Fsalmcn, 
Einleitung.    Meyer,  Hermeneutik  B.  II.  s, 

§  83.  Parallel  passages  to  he  read  continuously  and  fre- 
quently. A  good  interpreter,  therefore,  must  specially 
attend  to  those  passages  of  an  author,  which  resemble 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.      39 

each  other,  when  he  finds  occasion  to  doubt  in  respect 
to  the  meaning  of  any  one  of  them.  He  should  read 
them  over  continuously  or  at  short  intervals.  For  in 
this  way,  while  the  passages  are  fresh  in  his  mind  about 
which  he  doubts,  or  with  which  others  are  to  be  com- 
pared, he  will  more  easily  trace  the  real  resemblances 
between  them,     ^^Morus,  p.  107.  XVIII.) 

§  84.  Similarity  of  passages  should  he  real  in  order  to 
he  compared^  and  not  merely  verhal.  By  this  is  meant, 
that  the  same  idea  is  presented  by  both,  and  not  merely 
that  the  language  of  each  may  be  the  same.  For  real 
likeness  between  them  cannot  exist,  unless  the  idea  of 
each  be  the  same  ;  nor,  of  course,  can  the  one  throw 
any  true  light  upon  the  other,  except  there  be  a  real 
similarity.  But  when  this  point  is  settled,  the  interpre- 
ter must  consider  which  of  the  two  is  the  most  perspic- 
uous and  definite,  and  regulate  the  exegesis  of  the  more 
obscure  passage  by  that  which  is  the  more  perspicuous. 
Explanation  in  this  way  often  becomes  very  obvious. 
(Morus,  p.  107.  XIX.) 

But  is  there  not  a  kind  of  VGTeQOv  TTQOTegOV  in  this  direc- 
tion ?  Morus  has  indeed  admitted  the  propriety  of  the  rule  ;  but. 
still  there  seems  to  me  to  be  difficulty  in  it.  In  order  to  deter- 
mine whether  two  passages  may  be  properly  compared  (one  of 
which  is  obscure)  you  muster.?/  determine  whether  there  is  real 
sitnilariiy  between  them,  i.  e.  whether  they  both  contain  the 
same  idea.  But  to  determine  this  implies  of  course  a  previous 
knowledgfe  of  what,  the  obscure  passage  contains  ;  otherwise  you 
cannot  tell  whether  the  idea  is  the  same  in  both.  You  have  al- 
ready determined,  then,  how  the  obscure  passage  is  to  be  inter- 
preted, and  so  need  not  the  comparison  after  which  you  are  la- 
bouring ;  or  else  you  assume  the  interpretation,  and  then  build 
your  exegesis  on  that  assumption.  In  either  way,  the  rule  would 
seem  to  amount  to  little  or  nothing. 

But  in  some  measure,  to  relieve  the  difficulty,  it  may  be  said 
with  truth,  you  determine  what  idea  is  conveyed  in  each  of  the 
passages  to  be  compared,  from  the  context,  the  design  of  the 
writer,  or  the  nature  of  the  case.  Having  made  this  determina- 
tion about  each  passage,  independently  of  the  other,  you  then 
bring  them  together,  and  the  one,  being  expressed  more  fully  or 
with  more  explanatory  adjuncts  than  the  other,  confirms  the  less 
certain  meaning  of  the  other.  A  comparison  of  passages,  then, 
which  is  real  (that  of  ideas)  and  not  merely  verbal^  can  never 


40  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUftNDI 

be  made  to  any  purpose,  where  the  obscurity  of  either  is  so  g;reat 
that  you  can  attain  no  tolerable  degree  of  satisfaction  about  the 
meaning-.  It  can  never  be  used  therefore  for  any  higher  degree 
of  evidence,  than  for  the  confirmation  of  a  sense  not  improbable 
in  itself,  and  not  contradicted  by  the  context. 

This  subject,  in  such  a  view  of  it,  becomes  fundamental  in 
regard  to  the  validity  of  testimony  to  the  meaning  of  words,  af- 
forded by  what  are  called  parallel  passages.  The  nature  and 
strength  of  the  evidence,  and  the  proper  mode  of  its  application, 
are  all  illustrated  by  the  above  considerations.  Unless  the  stu- 
dent forms  ideas  of  this  subject  which  are  correct,  and  grounded 
upon  principle  that  will  bear  examination,  he  is  liable  to  be  car- 
ried about  *'  by  every  wind  of  doctrine"  in  Eiermeneutics,  and  to 
be  cast  upon  the  0})iniGn,  or  conceit,  or  merely  confident  asser- 
tion of  every  commentator  or  lexicographer,  who  has  overrated 
the  authority  of  passages  called  parallel,  in  deciding  upon  some 
particular  word  or  phrase,  or  who  has  no  definite  views  of  the 
exact  nature  and  application  of  the  evidence  in  question. 

§  85.  The  exercise  of  comparison  should  he  often  repeat- 
ed. To  the  observance  of  these  principles  frequent 
practice  must  be  added,  so  that  the  interpreter  may  ea- 
sily discern  what  passages  are  similar,  and  how  he  may 
rightly  compare  them  and  judge  of  them.  It  will  be 
very  useful  here  to  consult  good  interpreters,  not  only 
of  the  Scriptures  but  of  profane  authors  ;  that  where 
they  carry  these  principles  into  practice,  and  plainly 
make  a  right  and  skilful  application  of  them,  we  may 
learn  to  imitate  them  by  attentively  considering  the 
manner  in  which  they  attain  to  the  understanding  of 
things  that  are  obscure  or  ambiguous".  By  frequently 
renewing  this  exercise,  we  may  learn  to  go  in  the  same 
path  in  which  they  have  travelled. 

The  books  of  the  New  Testament,  present  more  inducement  to 
repeat  this  exercise  very  frequently  than  any  other  books.  For 
(1)  They  are  of  all  books  the  most  important.  (2)  They  are  not 
only  all  of  the  same  idiom  in  general,  but  they  have  reference  to 
the  same  subject  viz.  the  developement  of  Christianity.  They 
originated  too  from  cotemporary  writers,  possessed  of  views,  feel- 
ings, and  language  that  were  alike.  Hence  comparison  has  more 
force  in  illustrating  the  N.  Testament,  than  in  the  illustration  of 
either  Greek  or  Latin  authors ;  many  of  whom  that  agreed  with 
each  other  in  all  the  circumstances  just  stated,  cannot  be  found. 
But  (3)  To  all  who  admit  that  the  same  Holy  Spirit  guided  the 
authors  of  the  New  Testament,  and  that  their  views  of  religpion 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.        41 

in  consequence  of  this  must  have  been  harmonious^  the  induce- 
ment to  comparison  of  various  parts  and  passag^es  with  each  oth- 
er, in  order  to  obtain  a  correct  view  of  the  whole,  must  be  very 
great  ;  and  the  additional  force  of  the  evidence  arising  from  com- 
parison, on  account  of  the  really  harmonious  views  of  the  writers, 
must  make  this  exercise  an  imperious  duty  of  every  theologian. 

§86.  Many  parallel  passages  should  he  compared.  To 
compare  one  passage  only  is  often  insufficient,  whether 
you  are  endeavouring  to  find  the  usus  loquendi  by  the 
aid  of  parallel  passages,  or  by  testimony  derived  from 
the  nature  of  the  subject  and  from  examples.  (Comp. 
§  77.)  Specially  is  this  the  case,  when  we  are  investi- 
gating the  sense  of  words  that  have  a  complex  or  gen- 
eric meaning  made  up  of  various  parts.  In  this  case, 
comparisons  should  be  made  from  numerous  passages, 
until  we  perceive  that  what  we  are  seeking  is  fully  and 
entirely  discovered.     (Morus,  p.  109.  XX.) 

Suppose  the  word  TTtarig  occurs  is  a  particular  passage,  where 
you  are  doubtful  what  sense  should  be  applied  to  it.  First  you 
call  to  mind  that  TZiOTtg  is  a  generic  word,  having  several  mean- 
ings related  to  each  other,  but  still  diverse,  as  species  under  the 
genus.  You  wish  to  determine  how  many  species  of  meaning 
ntOig  has  ;  and  in  order  to  accomplish  this,  many  passages  where 
it  is  used  must  be  compared,  in  order  that  you  may  know  wheth- 
er all  the  species  are  found.  This  being  done,  you  proceed  to 
compare  them  with  the  passage  under  investigation,  and  see 
which  will  fit  it.  And  in  this  way  all  generic  words  must  be  in- 
Testjgated,  before  the  generic  idea  can  be  determined. 

§  87.  Testimony  of  Scholiasts  respecting  the  iisiis  lo- 
quendi. It  was  said  §  76,  that  testimony  to  linguistic  us- 
uge  might  be  derived  from  Scholiasts  ;  and  this  testimony 
is  either  given  by  themselves,  or  it  is  cited  by  them  from 
others.  It  is  valuable,  in  proportion  as  the  time  in  which 
they  lived  approximates  to  the  age  of  the  author  whom 
they  interpret ;  (a)  and  also  in  proportion  to  their  knowl- 
edge of  the  language  in  which  he  wrote,  (b)  The  latter 
must  be  judged  of  by  men  of  learning  and  practical  skill ; 
although  to  judge  of  it  is  not  a  matter  of  special  difficul- 
ty. (Morus,  pp.  113—115.) 
4* 


42  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  toaUENDI. 

Scholia  means  short  notes  upon  any  author  either  of  an  exe- 
§fetical  or  grammatical  nature.  On  all  the  distinguished  ancient 
Greek  authors  scholia  have  been  written,  in  more  recent  times ; 
many  volumes  of  which  are  still  extant,  upon  Homer,  Thucy- 
dides,  Sophocles,  Aristophanes  &c.  In  like  manner  a  multitude 
of  scholia  from  the  ancient  Christian  Fathers,  specially  of  the 
Greek  church,  have  come  down  to  us  in  their  works.  Origin- 
ally they  were  brief  remarks,  occasionally  made  in  their  commen- 
taries and  Qther  writings.  Afterwards  these  were  extracted  and 
brought  together,  and  they  now  form  what  is  called  Catena  Pa- 
trum.  Many  scholia  also  are  found  on  the  margin  of  manuscripts 
or  interlined,  or  placed  at  the  end  of  a  book. 

a)  This  is  too  generally  expressed  ;  for  surely  an  ignorant  scho- 
liast of  the  second  century  would  not  be  more  valuable  than  Chry- 
sostom  in  the  fourth.  In  short,  antiquity  adds  nothing  to  the  val- 
ue of  a  scholiast,  except  as  it  renders  it  more  probable,  ceteris 
paribus^  that  he  may  have  a  better  knowledge  of  ancient  man- 
ners, customs,  history  &c,  than  a  modern  writer  would  have. 

6)  Almost  all  that  is  important  in  this  subject  turns  on  this 
point.  The  simple  question  always  is.  Is  the  author  interpreted 
well  and  skilfully  ;  not  when  or  where  the  commentator  lived. 

§  88.  Glossaries.  In  a  similar  way  is  the  testimo- 
ny of  glossographers  to  be  estimated  ;  which  testimony  is 
by  no  means  to  be  despised.  Its  credit  depends  on  its 
antiquity,  and  on  the  learning  either  of  the  glossogra- 
phers themselves,  or  of  others  whom  they  cite. 

§  89.  Nature  of  glossaries.  But  here  we  must  be 
cautious  not  to  suppose  the  Greek  glossaries  to  be  like 
our  modern  Lexicons.  They  explain  only  particular  pas- 
sages or  words  ;  especially  nouns  that  are  in  an  oblique 
case,  or  verbs  that  are  not  in  the  infinitive,  nor  first  per- 
son of  the  present  tense.  An  ignorance  of  this  con- 
struction of  the  glossaries  has  often  been  the  occasion  of 
ridiculous  errors. 

Glossarium  is  a  book  or  writing  comprehending  yXcDOaug. 
Among  the  Greeks,  yAwffffa  meant  either  an  ^rf^o«^a/^c«?orrf  pecu- 
liar to acertain  dialect  only  and  unknown  in  others,  or  an  obsolete 
word.,  or  obscure  one.  Glossary  means  a  book  containing  expla- 
nations of  obscure  and  difficult  words.  Of  course,  a  glossary  ex- 
tends only  to  a  few  of  the  words  and  phrases  of  any  author.  It  is 
not  to  be  used  as  a  lexicon  ;  for  it  is  only  a  comment  on  particu- 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.        ^^84^ 

lar  passa°fes.  It  differs  therefore  in  nothing-,  except  mere  form, 
from  very  brief  scholia. 

As  to  the  authority  of  glossaries,  it  is  regulated  by  the  same 
principles  as  that  of  scholia  ;  mere  antiquity  of  itself  adding"  no- 
thing important  to  its  weight,  which  is  proportioned  to  the  phi- 
lological knowledge  and  accuracy  of  its  author. 

The  principal  ancient  glossaries  published  are  those  of  He- 
sychius,  Suidas,  Phavorinus,  Cyrill,  Photius,  and  Etymologicon 
Magnum.  Compare,  on  this  note  and  the  two  preceding  sec- 
tions, Morus,  pp.  115—130. 

§  90.  Testimony  of  versions.  The  testimony  of  ver^ 
sions  is  to  be  estimated  by  their  antiquity,  and  by  the 
knowledge  of  the  original  which  the  translator  possess- 
ed. In  order  to  judge  of  the  latter  the  version  must 
be  compared  in  many  places  with  the  original,  in  passa- 
ges where  the  sense  is  certain.  But  here  we  must  well 
understand  the  language  of  the  version  itself,  lest  we 
should  err  in  judging  of  it,  and  rashly  suppose  the  trans- 
lator has  not  hit  the  true  sense  (which  has  often  hap- 
pened to  those  who  have  passed  sentence  on  the  Sept. 
version,  and  on  the  quotations  from  the  Old  Testament 
that  are  to  be  found  in  the  New) ;  or  lest  we  should  un- 
derstand the  words  which  are  nicely  chosen,  in  a  loio  and 
vulgar  sense.  Boyce  has  shewn  that  even  Erasmus  and 
Beza  have  erred  here.     (Morus,  p.  180.  XXXV.) 

Here  again  antiquity  is  to  be  regarded  only  as  conferring  more 
advantage  on  a  translator,  in  respect  to  a  knowledge  of  ancient 
customs,  history,  &c.  In  some  cases  too  the  translator  may  have 
lived  before  the  language  which  he  translates  had  ceased  to  be 
vernacular.  But  in  either  of  these  cases,  an  ignorant  man  could 
not  be  recommended  as  a  translator,  because  he  preceded  by 
one,  four,  or  ten  centuries,  an  intelligent  thorough  philologist. 
The  credit  of  any  version  turns  on  its  fidelity  and  ability.  No 
ancient  version,  either  Sept.  Vulgate,  Italic,  Syriac,  Chaldaic 
&c,  will  bear  any  comparison  in  respect  to  either  of  these  char- 
acteristics, with  many  recent  versions  made  by  the  finished  ori- 
ental scholars  of  the  present  day. 

§  91.  Other  similar  testimonies.  Similar  to  the  helps 
just  mentioned  are  those  writers,  who  have  explained 
to  their  readers  words  and  obscure  expressions  taken 
from  another  language.  E.  g.  Cicero  explains  many 
Greek  words,  and  Dionysius  Halicar.  many  Latin  ones. 


44  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

Of  the  same  class  are  writers  who  have  inserted  trans- 
lations from  another  language  ;  e.  g.  the  Latin  poets  and 
historians,  from  the  Greek  ;  the  writers  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament, from  the  Hebrew  of  the  Old.  (Morus,  p.  131. 
XXXVI.) 

Passag;es  cited  from  the  Old  Testament  are  frequently  ex- 
plained in  the  New,  either  by  the  connexion  in  which  they  stand, 
the  language  in  which  they  are  expressed  (comp.  Is.  40:  13  with 
Rom.  11:  34,)  or  by  some  adjuncts  or  direct  explanation. 

§  92.  Knoivledge  of  the  peculiar  style  and  all  the  cii'- 
cumstances  of  an  author  necessary.  The  principles  of  in- 
terpretation, thus  far,  apply  to  writers  of  all  ages  and  na- 
tions. But  in  addition  to  these,  there  are  some  princi- 
ples peculiar  and  appropriate  to  certain  writers  of  a  par- 
ticular age,  nation,  or  sect.  This  peculiar  nsus  loquendi 
may  be  known,  (1)  From  the  writer's  own  testimony,  ei- 
ther express  or  implied.  («)  (2)  From  the  customs  and 
principles  of  the  sect  to  which  he  belongs,  (h)  whether 
philosophical  or  religious  ;  and  these  customs  and  princi- 
ples may  be  known,  from  the  testimony  of  those  who  be- 
longed to  the  same  sect,  or  have  explained  its  principles. 
(3)  The  interpreter  must  have  a  knowledge  of  the  man- 
ners and  customs  of  the  age,  to  which  his  author  alludes  ; 
(c)  and  this  is  to  be  obtained  by  consulting  those  who 
have  given  information  on  these  topics,  (d)  (4)  The  in- 
terpreter should  have  a  general  knowledge  of  writers  of 
the  same  age.     (Morus,  pp.  132 — 141.) 

a)  If  an  author  have  a  manner  of  expression  v/ho\\y  sui  gener- 
is^ then  his  own  writings  are  the  only  legitimate  source  of  infor- 
mation ill  respect  to  it ;  and  in  them  testimony  may  be  either  di- 
rect, where  the  author  himself  gives  explanations ;  or  indirect, 
where  the  explanations  are  to  be  drawn  from  adjuncts  or  the 
context.  (6)  Every  religious  sect  has  terms  used  in  a  sense  pe- 
culiar to  itself.  Of  course  a  writer  belonging  to  this  sect  may  be 
supposed  to  use  its  language  ;  and  an  explanation  of  it  is  to  be 
found,  as  Ernesti  directs,  (c)  Every  age  has  its  own  peculiar 
language,  customs,  and  sentiments,  in  some  respect  or  other. 
Consequently  a  knowledge  of  these  peculiarities  is  necessary,  in 
order  to  explain  language  that  is  predicated  upon  them.  Hence 
it  is  plain,  {d)  That  cotemporary  authors  are  the  most  probable 
'source  of  illustration,  next  to  the  writings  of  au  author  himself; 


GENERALLY  IN  THE  DEAD  LANGUAGES.       45 

as  they  were  conversant  with  the  same  manners,  customs,   lan- 
g;uag'e,  sentiments  &c.  as  the  author. 

The  question,  To  what  nation  did  the  author  belong  ?  is  of 
great  moment,  oftentimes  in  explaining  his  method  of  using  lan- 
guage. E.  g.  what  can  be  more  diverse,  in  a  great  variety  of  re- 
spects than  the  Jewish,  and  Roman  and  Attic  method  of  writ- 
ing? 

§  93.  The  nature  of  composition  should  be  specially  re- 
garded in  the  interpretation  of  it.  History  is  one  thing, 
poetry  another,  oratory  another,  (a)  Particular  periods 
have  their  special  characteristics  in  each  of  these  modes 
of  composition,  which  frequently  arises  from  a  fashion  of 
writing  or  speaking  introduced  by  some  distinguished 
person.     (Morus,  p.  141 — 147.) 

a)  History  therefore  is  to  be  interpreted  as  history,  not  as  alle- 
gory or  mythic  fiction  ;  poetry  is  to  be  construed  as  possessing  its 
own  peculiar  characteristics  ;  and  so  of  the  rest.  No  one  cir- 
cumstance more  displays  an  interpreter's  knowledge  and  critical 
acumen,  than  a  judicious  regard  to  the  kind  of  composition,  and 
the  age,  circumstances,  and  idiom  of  the  author. 


PART  11. 

CHAPTER  III. 

OTHER  ME APCs  TO  ASSIST  IN  FINDING  THE  SENSE  OF  WORDS 
BESIDES    THE  USUS  LOQUENDI. 

[Compare  Keil,  pp.  45—80.    Beck,  pp.  127—142.  Seller,  ii  250 
—256.] 

§  94.  Design  of  the  following  chapter.  The  preced- 
ing chapter  treated  of  the  method  of  finding  the  usus  lo- 
qnendi,  i.  e.  the  meaning  which  usage  has  attached  to 
words,  by  direct  testimony.      This  testimony,   it   was 


46  SUBSIDIARY    MEANS 

shewn,  might  be  deduced  from  three  sources ;  viz,  from 
the  author  interpreted,  or  his  cotemporaries ;  from  for- 
eigners who  understood  his  language  ;  and  from  scholia, 
glossographies,  and  versions.  With  these  was  united  a 
knowledge  of  the  peculiar  style,  idiom,  country,  circum- 
stances &c,  of  the  author,  as  also  the  kind  of  composi- 
tions which  is  to  be  interpreted.  We  come  now  to  treat 
of  indirect  testimony,  to  which  we  must  frequently  re- 
sort in  order  to  find  the  meaning  of  words. 

§  95.  Necessity  of  indirect  testimony.  The  usus  lo- 
quendi  cannot  always  be  found  with  sufficient  certainty, 
by  those  means  which  have  been  pointed  out.  Proper 
evidence  respecting  it  is  sometimes  wanting ;  some- 
times usage  is  variable  or  inconstant,  even  in  the  same 
age,  or  in  the  same  writer ;  or  there  is  an  ambiguity  of 
language,  or  of  grammatical  forms;  or  an  obscurity  cov- 
ers the  subject  or  thing  treated  of;  or  novelty  of  lan- 
guage occurs  ;  or  a  neglect  of  the  usus  loquendi  which 
sometimes  happens  even  in  the  most  careful  writers. 
Other  means  therefore  must  be  used,  by  which  the  true 
sense  can  be  elicited.     (Morus,  p.  148.  I.) 

§  96.  Scope  of  a  writer  the  first  and  best  means.  The 
most  important  of  these  means  for  discovering  the  sense 
of  any  particular  passage,  is  found  in  resorting  to  the 
general  tenor  of  the  discourse.  The  design  or  scojje  of 
the  discourse  in  general  is  to  be  compared  with  the 
passage  investigated.  {a\  The  ground  of  this  rule  is, 
that  we  ought  not  to  suppose  a  good  and  judicious  writ- 
er has  said  what  is  inconsistent  with  his  design.  Abso- 
lute certainty  however  is  not  always  attainable  in  this 
way  ;  for  it  sometimes  happens,  that  several  interpre- 
tations may  agree  with  the  scope  of  the  writer.  Hence 
there  are  cases,  in  which  only  a  probability  in  favor  of 
a  certain  meaning  is  to  be  found  ;  and  even  cases  where 
not  so  much  as  this  can  be  attained.  (Morus,  p.  149. 
Ill— V.) 

a)  But  how  is  this  scope  of  the  writer  to  be  ascertained  ?  (1) 
From  the  express  statement  of  the  writer.     E.  g.  John  20  :  31, 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  47 

Rom.  3:  28.  (2)  From  the  occasion  or  circumstances  -which 
originated  the  discourse.  E.  g-.  the  parables  of  Christ,  and  many 
passages  in  the  Epistles.  (3)  From  history  i.  e.  authentic  ac- 
counts of  facts,  that  would  very  naturally  give  rise  to  the  dis- 
course in  question,  and  would  serve  to  explain  it ;  e.  g.  the  epis- 
tle of  Jude  is  directed  against  teachers  who  lived  licentiously 
2  Cor.  almost  throughout  has  reference  to  facts  which  existed  at 
that  time.  If  none  of  these  things  cast  sufficient  light  on  the 
scope  of  the  writer,  the  whole  must  be  perused  and  re-perused, 
carefully  ;  by  which  unexpected  light  often  breaks  in. 

But  some  caution  in  respect  to  the  rule  in  section  96  is  proper. 
All  parts  of  a  discourse  have  not  invariably  a  strict  connexion 
with  its  general  scope.  Many  things  are  often  said,  which  are 
wholly  irrelevant  to  it,  and  which  are  mere  obiter  dicta.  These 
ere  not  to  be  interpreted  by  the  general  scope  of  the  discourse, 
but  agreeably  to  the  subject  that  is  treated  of  in^he  place  where 
they  occur.  Recurrence  to  this  principle  is  very  important,  in 
many  parts  of  the  New  Testament. 

§  97.  Caution  in  regard  to  the  rule  above.  In  regard 
to  this  means  then  of  attaining  the  sense,  we  must  take 
care  not  to  trust  too  much  to  it,  nor  to  rely  solely  upon 
it.  Nor  must  we  rest  satisfied  with  only  some  tolera- 
ble agreement  of  the  sense  given  with  the  general  scope 
of  the  writer.  This  the  unlearned  are  very  apt  to  do, 
for  want  of  skill  in  the  languages  ;  whence  have  aris- 
en many  idle  conjectures.  We  must  insist  upon  an  ev- 
ident and  necessary  connexion  with  the  scope  of  the  dis- 
course. 

But  how  shall  we  know  when  it  is  evident  and  necessary  ?  (1) 
Where  a  meaning  plainly  contradicts  the  tenor  of  a  discourse  it 
is  to  be  rejected.  (2)  When  it  violates  the  principles  of  parallel- 
ism and  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them,  as  to  the  sense  of  a 
passage.  (See  H  80 — 86.)  (3)  Reject  a  meaning  which  gives 
an  inept  and  frigid  sense.  By  a  frigid  sense  is  meant  one  which 
contributes  neither  to  argument,  nor  perspicuity,  nor  ornament. 

A  meaning  which  infringes  upon  none  of  these  negative  pre- 
cepts, will  be  found  to  harmonize  with  the  subject  of  which  the 
author  is  treating,  unless  he  has  violated  all  the  rules  of  language 
and  reasoning. 

^  98.  Second  caution  in  regard  to  the  scope  of  the  dis- 
course.    Another  caution  is,  that  we  compare  the  mean- 


48  SUBSIDIARY    MEANS 

ing,  as  discovered  by  the  scope  of  the  writer,  with  that 
which  the  usus  loqnendi  affords,  and  see  whether  they 
can  be  made  to  agree.  In  otlier  words,  we  must  see 
whether  the  usus  loquendi  will  tolerate  any  particular 
sense  given  to  the  passage  by  the  scope  of  the  discourse, 
specially  in  respect  to  words  which  have  various  mean- 
ings ;  or  whether  there  be  a  repugnance  to  it.  Occa- 
sionally, the  meaning  derived  from  the  scope  of  the  wri- 
ter will  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  something  which  may 
serve  to  establish  its  harmony  with  the  usus  loquendi. 

But  to  interpret  solely  from  the  supposed  scope  of  a 
writer,  without  the  aid  and  consent  of  the  usus  loquendi, 
and  even  in  opposition  to  it,  belongs  rather  to  rash  con- 
jecture than  to  interpretation  by  rule.  Wherefore  this 
help  is  not  to  be  used  unless  in  cases  of  ambiguity,  or  of 
words  which  are  anat  Xfyof-iivu,  and  generally  in  cases 
where  the  best  testimony  to  the  meaning  of  words  is  ei- 
ther wanting,  or  is  insufficient  to  determine  the  sense,  {a) 
(Morus,  p.  158.  VII.  and  VIII.) 

a)  The  reason  why  the  scope  of  a  discourse  is  not  to  be  re- 
sorted to,  except  in  cases  where  ambiguity  arises,  is,  that  the 
usus  loquendi  is  the  best  evidence  which  can  be  had  of  the  mean- 
in;*  of  a  passage,  and  nothing  can  be  admitted  which  shall  con- 
tradict it,  where  it  can  be  established  by  adequate  testimony. 
But  in  case  one  doubts  what  meaning  the  usus  loquendi.  would 
assign  or  at  least  allow  to  any  word  or  phrase,  secondary  or  sub- 
sidiary means  i.  e  the  scope  of  the  discourse  may  be  resorted  to, 
for  the  sake  of  obtaining  the  desired  illustration. 

§  99.  Use  of  the  context  in  interpretation.  Of  more 
limited  extent,  (a)  but  rather  more  evident,  is  the  rule 
to  have  recourse  to  the  antecedents  and  consequents  of 
a  passage  i.  e.  the  context,  in  order  that  you  may  de- 
termine its  meaning.  This  is  done  for  two  reasons  :  ei- 
ther that  we  may  choose  out  of  several  meanings  one 
which  does  not  disagree  with  the  usus  loquendi;  or  that 
the  meaning  of  an  uncommon  word,  not  explained  by 
the  usus  loquendi,  may  be  discovered.  Here  however 
we  must  guard  against  proceeding  beyond  probability  ; 
and  to  do  this,  we  must  observe  the  same  cautions  as 
have  been  just  given  above.     (Morus,  p.  160.  IX.) 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  49 

a)  In  the  original,  angustius  ;  by  which  Ernesti  probably 
meant,  of  less  importance^  or  confined  within  narrower  limits. 
But  I  cannot  accede  to  the  propriety  of  this  sentiment ;  for  the 
immediate  context,  either  preceding,  succeeding,  or  both  togeth- 
er, is  a  rule  for  judging  of  the  meaning  of  words,  of  the  very 
broadest  e-xtent.  I  might  say  that  even  the  evidence  of  the  usus 
loquendi  is,  in  very  many  cases,  built  upon  the  context.  We  adopt 
the  opinion  that  the  usus  loquendi  sanctions  this  or  that  partic- 
ular sense,  because  the  context  clearly  shews  that  such  a  mean- 
ing is  to  be  assigned  to  it,  and  that  no  other  can  be  given  without 
rendering  the  sense  frigid  and  inept.  Moreover,  the  general  sen pe 
of  an  author  does  not  forbid  the  admission  of  a  great  variety  of 
arguments,  illustrations,  and  episodes  (if  I  may  be  indulged  in 
the  use  of  such  a  word  here)  into  the  intermediate  parts  of  a  dis- 
course ;  so  that  one  is  far  more  certain  of  giving  a  sense  that  is 
coi  gruous,  by  consulting  the  im,mediaft  context,  than  by  merely 
consulting  the  general  scope  of  the  whole.  Both,  no  doubt,  are 
to  be  regarded  ;  but  of  the  two,  the  former  is  by  far  the  most 
important  means  of  assistance. 

Indeed,  I  should  doubt  whether  there  is  any  one  rule  in  the 
whole  science  of  Hermeneutics,  so  important,  and  of  so  much 
practical  and  actual  use,  as  the  one  in  question.  Great  care  in- 
deed is  necessary,  to  decide  with  certainty  what  sense  the  con- 
text requires  that  a  word  should  have  ;  specially  when  the  im- 
mediate subject  is  briefly  stated.  But  this  care  is  as  easily  prac- 
tised as  any  other  rule  is,  which  Hermeneutics  prescribes  in  dif- 
ferent cases.  Violence  must  not  be  done  to  words,  by  forcibly 
subjecting  them  to  the  context,  against  etymology,  analogy,  the 
rules  of  grammar,  and  the  nature  of  language.  But  in  every 
thing  short  of  this,  all  good  lexicographers  and  commentators 
adapt  the  meaning  of  words  to  the  context,  in  cases  too  numer- 
ous to  need  any  specification.     (Comp.  Morus  ut  supra.) 

§  100.  Various  comparisons  useful  in  order  to  discover 
the  meaning  of  words.  Of  similar  utility  for  finding  the 
sense  of  ambiguous  or  obscure  words,  is  the  comparing 
of  subject  and  attribute;  of  nouns  and  adjectives;  'a)  of 
words  accompanied  by  other  words  that  qualify  them, 
which  may  consist  of  adverbs,  or  of  nouns  joined  to  the 
word  investigated  by  prepositions  and  constituting  a  kind 
of  adverbial  periphrasis  ;  (6)  or  finally  of  disjunctives,  (c) 
(Morus,  p.  163.  XI— XIV.) 

a)  Qualia  sint  subjecta  talia  sint  attributa,  is  the  old  rule  of 
the  schools  and  of  philosophy,  founded  upon  the  common  sense 
of  mankind.     In  accordance  with  this,  we  understand  as  tropical 


50  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

lang-uage  all  those  expressions  which  ascribe  hands,  £eet^  eyes, 
ascent,  descent  &;c,  to  God  who  is  a  Spirit.  The  principle  in 
question  is  of  vast  extent  in  construing  the  figurative  language  of 
the  Scriptures  ;  and  it  also  extends  to  many  expressions  that  are 
not  strictly  tropical.  Too  much  certainty  however  should  not 
be  ascribed  to  it ;  for  some  cases  occur,  where  the  subject  is  im- 
perfectly known,  and  of  course  we  are  unable  to  pronounce  with 
confidence  what  attributes  may  be  ascribed  to  it. 

b)  E,  g.  HUT  0\\}iv  a^iatg.  Kar  oxpiv  serves  merely  the 
purpose  of  an  adjrctive  qualifying  Hgiotg,  and  shewing  thdit  judg- 
ment from  exttrnal  appearance  only  is  meant. 

c)  By  disjunctives  ar^  meant  words  placed  in  antithesis.  E.  g. 
heaven,  earth  ;  spirit^  flesh  &c.  The  rule  for  finding  the  sense 
in  such  cases  is  obvious,  provided  the  meaning  of  either  term 
can  be  found.  J'or  whatever  meaning  one  term  has,  the  other 
has  the  opposite  ;  so  that  if  certainty  be  acquired  as  to  the  one, 
it  is  of  course  acquired  as  to  the  other,  which  is  to  be  construed 
as  a  real  antithesis.     Compare  J  62. 

<5>  101.  Analogy  of  languages  a  means  of  interpreta' 
Hon.  Analogy  of  languages  may  also  assist  in  judging  of 
the  meaning  of  words.  This  is  of  different  kinds.  The 
first  is  analogy  of  any  particular  language,  (i.  e.  the  same 
language  with  that  to  be  interpreted,  which  analogy  was 
treated  of  in  a  former  chapter,  and  shewn  to  be  useful  in 
ascertaining  the  usus  loquendi,)  the  principles  of  which 
are  developed  by  the  precepts  of  grammarians.  It  is 
necessary  here  only  to  touch  upon  this  analogy.  (Mo- 
rns, p.  168.  XV.) 

Analogy  means  similitude.  E.  g.  from  the  meaning  attached 
to  the  forms  of  words,  their  position,  their  connexion  &.c.  in  one 
or  rather  many  cases,  we  argue  to  establish  a  similarity  of  mean- 
ing, where  the  phenomena  are  the  same,  in  another.  This  an- 
alogy is  the  foundation  of  all  the  rules  of  grammar,  and  of  all 
that  is  established  and  intelligible  in  language. 

§  102.  Grammatical  analogy  useful  not  only  in  finding 
the  usus  loquendi,  but  applicable  to  some  doubtful  cases. 
E.  g.  when  the  kind  of  meaning  generally  considered  is 
evident,  (by  comparing  other  similar  words  and  meth- 
ods of  speaking  concerning  such  things  appropriate  to 
the  language),  we  may  judge  of  the  special  force  or  pow- 
er of  the  word,   by  aid  of  grammatical  analogy  :    as, 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  51 

1  Pet.  V.  5,  where  many  critics  have  attached  to  eyyiofA^ 
^o')Gu(Jdf  an  emphatic  sense,  we  must  compare  the  oth- 
er Greek  phrases  which  relate  to  clothing  or  investing. 
And  thus  we  shall  see  that  the  prepositions  tt^^/,  oifAqi, 
iv  are  used  in  composition,  without  any  accession  of 
meaning  to  the  verb  thereby ;  and  consequently  that 
iyxo^i^ojGaadf  is  no  more  than  ii^^vaaode,  with  which 
it  is  commuted  in  Clemens  Rom.  Ep.  I.  p.  39.  A  good 
interpreter  should  be  well  versed  in  such  comparisons. 
(Morus,  p.  170.  XVI.) 

§103.  Analogy  of  kindred  languages.  Another  anah 
ogy  is  that  of  kindred  languages  ;  either  as  descended 
from  one  common  stock,  as  Hebrew,  Syriac,  Chaldee 
and  Arabic  ;  or  derived  the  one  from  the  other,  as  Latin 
and  Greek.  The  former  kind  of  analogy  Schultens  has 
explained,  and  often  had  recourse  to  it,  in  his  Origines 
Ling.  Heb.,  and  in  his  various  commentaries. 

Morus  on  this  section,  says,  that  dialects  differ  only  in  the  mode 
of  declining;,  in  the  pronunciation  and  forms  of  words  &c ;  and 
ranks  the  Syiiac,  Chaldee,  and  Arabic,  amon»'  the  dialects  of  the 
Hebrew  ;  while  he  calls  the  Latin  and  Greek  cognate  languas;es. 
General  usag'e  however  is  against  him  ;  {or  cognate .  languages 
of  the  Hebrew  is  almost  the  appropriate  name  of  those  which  he 
calls  dialects. 

§  104.  Use  of  tJiis  analogy.  This  analogy  is  of  use 
to  the  interpreter,  not  only  in  assisting  him,  by  the  aid 
of  one  dialect,  to  restore  roots  which  have  perished  in 
another  that  is  the  subject  of  his  investigation,  and  thus 
opening  a  way  of  access  to  the  signification  of  words ; 
but  still  more  useful  as  a  means  of  illustrating  and  con- 
firming that  sense  of  words,  which  the  scope  of  the  dis- 
course commends. 

This  is  a  subject  deeply  interesting'  to  every  student  of  the 
original  languages  of  the  Bible,  especially  of  the  Hebrew. 
Analogy,  moderately  and  judiciously  used,  is  of  great  worth ; 
but  pushed  too  far,  it  degenerates  into  a  violation  of  all  the  fun- 
damental rules  of  interpretation.  Comp.  Morus,  p.  176.  XIX — 
XXII,  where  several  valuable  cautions  may  be  found.  Better 
etill  may  be  found  in  the  admirble  preface  of  Gesenius  to  his 


52  SUBSIDIARY   MEANS 

Hebrew  lexicon,  preface  to  part  I.  pp.  4 — 6.  part  II.  4 — 14. 
See  also  Jahn  on  the  study  of  the  original  languag^es  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, pp.  19,  20,  and  Note  G. 

§  105.  Etymology  an  uncertain  guide.  The  fluctuat- 
ing use  of  words,  which  prevails  in  every  language, 
gives  rise  to  frequent  changes  in  their  meaning.  There 
are  but  few  words  in  any  language,  which  always  retain 
their  radical  and  primary  meaning.  Great  care  there- 
fore is  necessary  in  the  interpreter,  to  guard  against  rash 
etymological  exegesis  ;  which  is  often  very  fallacious. 
Etymology  often  belongs  rather  to  the  history  of  lan- 
guage, than  to  the  illustration  of  its  present  meaning  ; 
and  rarely  does  it  exhibit  any  thing  more  than  a  specious 
illustration. 

See  an  admirable  illustration  of  this,  in  Campb.  IV.  H  IS— 26. 

^  106.  Expressions  which  convey  a  similar  meaning  are 
to  he  compared,  although  in  respect  to  etymology  they  may 
differ.  That  analogy  is  particularly  useful  to  an  inter- 
preter, which  leads  him  not  only  to  compare  similar 
words  and  phrases,  and  so  cast  light  from  the  one  upon 
the  other ;  but  also  to  compare  expressions,  which, 
though  dissimilar  in  respect  to  etymology,  are  employed 
to  designate  the  same  idea.  Of  this  nature  are  mngafii' 
vog  vno  Trjv  dfAaQTiav  compared  with  the  Latin  addictus 
alicui,  and  wg  dici  nvgog  compared  with  amhustus^  when 
the  Latin  words  are  used  tropically.  So  we  may  com- 
pare the  Hebrew  D']b:;'l  T"^!^.  ^^^^  *^^  Greek  iyinod(av. 
For  as  the  Greeks  clearly  use  luTTodo'iv  where  the  Lat- 
ins say  e  medio ;  so  innodcov  and  d';b:j'l  1'^3,'n  are  so 
much  alike,  that  the  Greek  would  almost  seem  to  be 
made  out  of  the  Hebrew  phrase.  Hence  we  may  see 
that  the  sense  of  D^V^'l  'J'^a^  is  e  medio.    (Morus,  p.  180. 

XXL)  .-:-... 

§  107.  Foundation  of  analogy  in  all  languages.  No 
one  can  doubt  that  men  are  affected  in  nearly  the  same 
way  by  objects  of  sense.  Hence,  those  who  speak  of 
the   same  objects   perceived  and   contemplated   in    the 


ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  53 

same  manner,  although  they  may  use  language  that  dif- 
fers in  respect  to  etymology,  yet  must  be  supposed  to 
have  meant  the  same  thing ;  and  on  this  account,  the 
one  may  be  explained  by  the  other.  (Morus,  p.  178. 
XX.) 

Men  are  physically  and  mentally  affected  in  the  same  manner, 
by  very  many  objects  ;  and  of  course,  it  may  be  presurr.c-d  that 
they  entertain  and  mean  to  express  the  same  ideas  concerning: 
these  objects,  however  various  thair  language  may  be.  Besides, 
modes  of  expression  are  often  communicated  trom  one  people  to 
another.  Of  the  use  to  be  made  of  these  facts,  the  folio  wing:  sec- 
tion treats. 

§108.  Use  of  the  above  general  principle.  In  general, 
this  principle  is  of  great  extent,  and  of  much  use  to  the 
interpreter  in  judging  of  the  meaning  of  tropical  lan- 
guage, and  in  avoiding  fictitious  emphasis.  According- 
ly, we  find  it  resorted  to  now  and  then  by  good  inter- 
preters, with  great  profit.  But  it  needs  much  and  ac- 
curate knowledge  of  many  tongues  to  use  it  discreetly  ; 
whence  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  its  use  is  not 
very  common  among  interpreters.  (Morus,  p.  181. 
XXII.) 

The  following  general  cautions,  on  the  subject  of  comparing 
"words  and  languages  with  each  other,  may  be  of  some  utility. 
(1)  The  meaning  in  each  or  any  language  is  not  to  be  resolved 
into  the  authority  of  lexicons,  but  that  of  good  writers.  (2) 
"Words,  phrases,  tropes  &;c.  of  any  ancient  language,  are  to  be 
judged  of  by  the  rules  of  judging  among  those  who  spoke  that 
language,  and  not  by  those  which  prevail  in  modern  times,  and 
have  originated  from  different  habits  and  tastes.  (3)  Guard 
against  drawing  conclusions  as  to  the  meaning  of  words  in  the 
same  or  different  languages,  from  fanciful  etymology,  similarity 
or  metathesis  of  letters  &;c.  (4)  When  the  sense  of  words  can 
be  ascertained  in  any  particular  language  by  the  ordinary  means, 
other  languages,  even  kindred  ones,  should  not  be  resorted  to, 
except  for  the  purpose  of  increased  illustration  or  confirmation. 
(5)  Take  good  care  that  rtal  similitude  exists,  whenever  com- 
parison is  made.     See  Morus,  pp.  182 — 184. 

§  109.  Interpretation  hy  appeal  to  the  nature  of  things, 
the  common  sense,  views,  and  feelings  of  men  Sfc.     We 

5* 


54  SUBSIDIARY  MEANS 

must  also  resort  to  the  nature  of  things,  and  the  analo- 
gy of  the  sentiment  which  a  writer  is  inculcating,  that 
we  may  find  the  true  meaning  of  his  words,  and  not  at- 
tribute to  them  more  nor  less  than  he  did.  Every  wri- 
ter, spontaneously  or  from  education,  feels  that  his  read- 
ers must  understand  what  he  is  saying,  so  that  there  is 
no  danger  of  misapprehension.  It  happens  not  unfre- 
quently,  that  on  this  account  he  uses  language  which  is 
not  altogether  accurate,  if  it  be  judged  of  by  the  rules 
of  logical  precision.  Of  this  nature  are  catachresis,  hy- 
perbole, hypallage,  and  those  phrases  which  assert  gener- 
ally what  is  true  of  only  a  part,  or  of  some  particular 
kind.  These  and  other  like  modes  of  speech  are  intro- 
duced by  vulgar  custom  into  every  language,  specially 
into  the  oriental  ones.  They  abound  in  poetry  and  or- 
atory. Nor  is  there  any  particular  reason  that  a  wri- 
ter should  take  special  pains  to  avoid  them.  It  is  ne- 
cessary therefore  in  these  cases,  to  have  recourse,  for 
the  sake  of  interpretation,  to  the  nature  of  things,  {a)  to 
innate  conceptions,  common  sense,  and  the  plain  ele- 
ments of  knowledge,  (h)  Moreover,  we  must  avoid  urg- 
ing mere  verbal  criticism  too  far,  or  introducing  far  fetch- 
ed etymologies,  or  hastily  concluding  that  the  expres- 
sion of  the  author  is  faulty.  Language  is  made  by  pre- 
vailing usage ;  nor  can  that  be  faulty  language,  which 
agrees  with  the  usage  of  those  who  are  well  skilled  in 
it.  Wherefore  grammatical  anomalies  are  not  only  free 
from  fault  when  predominant  usage  sanctions  them,  but 
they  become  a  part  of  the  language,  so  that  one  who  de- 
parts from  them  may  be  said  to  write  inaccurately. 

a)  E.  g.  the  mind  is  inflamed ;  in  interpreting;  which  expres- 
sion we  resort  to  the  nature  of  the  mind,  to  show  that  the  sense 
o{  inflamed  must  be  tropical.  So  when  the  sun  is  said  to  rise, go 
down  &c  ;  God  to  ascend^  descend  &c,  we  resort  to  the  real  na- 
ture of  the  subjects  in  question  in  order  to  explain  the  languag-e. 
So  in  explaining-  prophetic  languag^e,  if  the  event  prophesied  have 
come  to  pass,  we  resort  to  the  history  of  the  event,  to  cast  light 
on  the  language  which  predicts  it. 

6)  E.  g.  pluck  out  thy  right  eye  ;  cut  off  thy  right  hand.  In 
construing  this,  our  views  of  the  worth  of  life,  and  of  our  mem- 
bers ;    our  views  of  duty  as  to  the  preservation  of  life  and  use- 


OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI.  55 

fulness  ;  and  our  knowledg-e  of  the  nature  of  the  Christian  relig- 
ion in  general,  all  conspire  to  lead  us  to  reject  the  literal  exposi- 
tion, and  to  give  the  words  a  tropical  sense.  So  when  Christ 
tells  his  disciples  to  salute  no  one  by  the  way^  &c ;  and  in  like 
manner,  in  innumerable  other  cases. 

As  to  the  various  figures  of  speech  mentioned  in  the  section 
above,  can  it  be  doubted  whether  they  occur  in  the  Scriptures  ? 
Catachresis  is  the  use  of  a  word  so  as  to  attribute  to  a  thing  what 
cannot  be  really  and  actually  predicated  of  it.  When  the  heav- 
ens then  are  said  to  listen  ;  the  floods  to  clap  their  hands  ;  the 
hills  to  skip  ;  the  trees  of  the  forest  to  exult  ;  what  is  this  but  ca- 
tachresis of  the  boldest  kind  ?  Hyperbole  magnifies  a  thing  be- 
yond its  real  greatness.  When  the  Saviour  says,  //  is  easier  for 
a  camel  to  go  through  the  eye  of  a  needle^  than  for  a  rich  man  to 
enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  which  is  afterwards  explained  as 
simply  meaning, '  how  hardly  shall  they  that  have  riches  be  sav- 
ed ;'  was  not  his  language  hyperbole  ?  Hypallage  means  a  change 
of  appropriate  language  for  unappropriate.  E.g.  Luke  1:  64, 
his  mouth  and  his  tongue  aveco^drj.  The  student,  however, 
must  not  be  content  with  a  meagre  note  on  this  great  subject. 
Let  him  peruse  and  re-peruse  Lowth*s  Lectures  on  Hebrew  po- 
etry, where  the  nature,  design,  and  extent  of  figurative  language 
in  the  Scriptures,  is  better  unfolded  than  in  any  other  book  of 
which  I  have  any  knowledge.  Comp.  also  Glassii  Philol.  Sac. 
ed.  Dathii,  Vol.  II.     (Morus,  pp.  185—194.) 

In  regard  to  that  usage,  by  which  the  whole  is  put  for  a  part, 
and  a  part  for  the  whole,  it  is  by  no  means  unfrequent  in  the 
Scriptures.  How  often  do  we  meet  with  nag  or  navrig^  when 
only  a  large  or  considerable  number  is  intended.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  part  is  put  as  the  representative  of  the  whole,  in  very 
many  passages;  e.g.  Ps.  8:7,8.  Rom.  8:38,39.  Surely  in 
the  last  example  here,  the  apostle  does  not  mean  to  say  that  the 
things  which  he  particularizes,  are  the  only  things  which  are  un- 
able to  separate  us  from  the  love  of  Christ.  He  means  to  say 
that  nothing  whatever  can  efi'ect  a  separation.  In  all  such  cases, 
the  extent,  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  scope  of  the  discourse, 
must  determine  the  latitude  in  which  the  words  are  to  be  taken. 

Especially  must  common  sense,  as  Ernestisays,  be  appealed  to 
in  the  interpretation  of  parables,  allegories,  and  all  kinds  of  fig- 
urative languag-,  proverbial  expressions  &c.  Every  writer  ad- 
dresses himself  to  the  common  sense  of  his  fellow  men. 

§  110.  The  error  of  pressing  etymologies  too  far  not 
unfrequent.  The  fault  of  pressing  etymologies  too  far, 
is  more  general  than  we  should  be  apt  to  imagine.  For 
not  only  they  are  guilty  of  this  fault,  who  explain  all 


56  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

words  by  tracing  them  to  their  primitive  meaning 
(which  is  very  common)  ;  but  those,  also,  who  always  in- 
sist too  strenuously  on  the  ordinary  and  grammatical 
force  of  a  word.  Hence  arise  many  false  interpretations 
and  fictitious  emphasis.     But  of  this  more  hereafter. 


PART  IV. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI  OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT. 

[Keil,  pp.  46—60.     Beck,  pp.  131—136.     Seller,  H  236—257.] 

§  111.  What  has  been  said  thus  far  in  this  treatise, 
has  respect  to  the  laws  of  interpretation  generally  con- 
sidered. We  come  now  to  treat  of  our  subject  with 
reference  to  the  exegesis  of  the  New  Testament. 

§  112.  Knoivledge  of  the  N.  Testament  dialect  impor- 
tant. In  the  first  place,  we  must  inquire  concerning  the 
kind  of  language  or  dialect  in  general,  which  the  writ- 
ers of  the  N.  Testament  use  ;  for  a  knowledge  of  this 
is  highly  important,  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to  find 
the  sense  of  the  words  and  judge  of  it ;  as  will  speedily 
be  shewn. 

§  113.  The  question  to  be  here  investigated.  This  sub- 
ject in  general  is  comprised  in  a  single  question^  viz, 
Is  the  N.  Testament  in  its  words,  phrases,  and  form  of 
language,  pure  (a)  classic  Greek ;  or  does  it  partake  of 
the  Hebrew  idiom  1 

The  former  is  defended  by  Pfochen,  Stolberg,  E. 
Schmidt,  Blackwall,  Georgi,  and  a  few  others  not 
very  eminent  for  their  knowledge  of  Greek  ;  the  lat- 
ter by  Erasmus,  Luther,  Melanctlion,  Camerarius,  Beza, 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  57 

Drusius,  Casaubon,  Glass,  Gataker,  Solan,  Olearius, 
Vorstius,  and  many  others  who  were  well  skilled  in  the 
Greek  language  ;  with  whom  also  Origen  and  Chrys- 
ostom  agree.  (Morus,  p.  195.  II.  Vide  etiam  pp.  217 — 
222.) 

a)  We  call  that  a  pure  style,  which  has  neither  barbarisms  nor 
solecisms  in  it. 

§  1 14.  What  is  exdndedfrom  the  present  question.  That 
this  question  may  be  rightly  understood  and  judged  of, 
we  must  premise,  that  the  inquiry  is  not,  whether  some 
have  not  mistaken,  or  do  not  still  mistake,  pure  Greek 
expressions  for  Hebraisms.  We  may  readily  concede 
this  ;  for  error  may  be  and  has  been  committed  here ; 
and  there  are  some  modes  of  speech,  which  are  com- 
mon to  all  languages.     (Morus,  p.  204.  IV.  I.) 

§  115.  The  question  further  limited.  Nor  is  the  ques- 
tion, whether  the  same  Greek  words  and  phrases,  occur- 
ring in  the  N.  Testament,  may  be  found  in  good  Greek 
authors.  This  we  may  often  concede.  Nor  do  we  in- 
quire, whether  some  phrase,  apparently  a  Hebraism, 
may  be  found  in  some  sublime  or  tragic  poet,  e.  g.  in 
Eschylus  or  Sophocles,  and  used  in  the  same  sense ;  as 
^rj^u  for  the  ?nain  land.  For  poets,  specially  these  and 
lyric  ones,  say  many  things  in  an  unusual  way,  which 
are  not  to  be  imitated  in  common  usage.  They  even 
intermix  foreign  expressions ;  and  sometimes  use  anti- 
quated phrases.  Many  such  things  Stanley  has  noted  in 
Eschylus  ;  and  Zwingle  in  Pindar,  whose  preface  to  this 
author  should  be  read.  The  same  is  the  case  in  Sopho- 
cles.    (Morus  pp.  203— 209.) 

§  116.  The  same  subject  continued.  Nor  is  it  incon- 
sistent with  the  purity  of  N.  Testament  Greek,  that 
certain  words  are  found,  which  designate  objects  un- 
known to  the  Greeks,  and  are  therefore  to  be  under- 
stood in  a  manner  different  from  Greek  usage,  because 
they  borrow  their  meaning  from  the  Hebrew  manner  of 
speaking.  Of  this  kind  are  nlaitg,  fiirdvooa,  and  other 
words.     (Morus,  p.  209.  IV.) 


58  ON  FINDING  THE   USUS  LOQUENDI 

§117.  The  question  directly  stated.  The  question,  as 
to  the  idiom  of  the  N.  Testament,  turns  on  the  use  of 
such  words  and  phrases  as  designate  those  objects  that 
the  Greeks  are  accustomed  to  desionate  ;  and  the  inqui- 
ry here  must  be,  whether  such  words  in  the  N.  Testa- 
ment are  used  in  the  same  sense  which  the  Greeks  at- 
tach to  them ;  and  whether  phrases  not  only  have  the 
same  syntax  as  that  of  classic  Greek,  but  also  the  same 
sense  as  in  the  Greek  authors :  for  this  is  essential  to  the 
piirily  of  language.  E.  g.  dty.utooi>v^}  used  for  liberality; 
iiXoyla  for  plenty;  yto  iv  6  v  ^or  profane.  So  also  dlnutog 
ivonrtov  Tov  Seov^  aQTOv  qccyeti/,  nuQUGniiat  ivoiuiov 
xhog  6lc.  have  a  peculiar  sense  in  the  N.  Testament. 
(Morus,  pp.  197.) 

§  118.  With  ujJmt  kind  of  Greek  is  the  N.  Testament  to 
be  compared  ?  In  regard  to  the  writers  with  whom  the 
N.  Testament  Greek  is  to  be  compared,  we  must  see 
that  they  themselves  are  pure  i.  e.  ancient  prosaic  au- 
thors, who  have  not  derived  any  thing  in  their  style  from 
the  Scriptures  of  the  N.  Testament ;  and  then  histori- 
cal WTiters  must  be  compared  with  historical ;  doctrinal 
with  doctrinal ;  poetical  with  poetical,  (a)  (Morus,  pp. 
208.  209.) 

a)  Several  hymns  in  the  New  Testament,  and  most  of  the 
Apocalypse,  with  occasional  quotations  from  the  poetry  of  the 
Old  Testament,  are  poetical  in  their  nature^  though  not  in  their 
form  ;  at  least  they  are  not  in  the  form  of  Greek  poetry. 

§119.  New  Testament  Greek  not  pnre.  The  question 
being  thus  stated  and  defined,  we  deny,  without  hesita- 
tion, that  the  diction  of  the  New  Testament  is  pure 
Greek  ;  and  contend  that  it  is  modeled  after  the  He- 
brew, not  only  in  single  words,  phrases,  and  figures  of 
speech,  but  in  the  general  texture  of  the  language.  This 
can  be  established  by  clear  examples,  more  numerous 
than  even  those  who  agree  with  us  in  opinion  have  sup- 
posed. For  Luke  himself,  who  is  usually  thought  to  be 
the  most  pure  in  his  stylo,  has  innumerable  Hebraisms. 
The  very  beginning  of  his  Gospel,  after  a  short  preface 
of  pure  Greek,   immediately  goes  into  the  use  of  the 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  59 

Hebrew  idiom  so  exactly,  that  it  seems  to  be  translated 
literally  from  a  Hebrew  original. 

§  120.  Some  phrases  are  common  to  Greek  and  Hebrew. 
To  prove  that  Hebrew-Greek  is  the  language  of  the 
New  Testament,  by  citing  examples  here,  would  be  su- 
perfluous ;  as  these  may  be  found  in  abundance,  by  con- 
sulting the  works  of  OLearius,  Vorstius,  Leusden,  Glass, 
and  others.  It  may  be  proper  however  to  remark,  that 
although  certain  phrases  may  be  found  in  pure  Greek, 
yet  they  may  also  be  Hebraisms.  For  it  may  happen, 
that  a  writer,  in  translating  a  Hebrew  expression,  may 
adopt  words  used  by  a  good  Greek  writer ;  which  is  an 
observation  sanctioned  by  the  authority  of  Gataker, 
Hemsterhuis,  Raphel,  and  others.  E.  g.  y^aiQctv  ;f«/^i«ii/ 
met.im  metuere,  which  are  good  Greek  and  Latin,  but  al- 
so literal  translations  of  the  Hebrew  irs  ^n2. 

§  121.  Arguments  to  support  the  sentiment  expressed  in 
§  119.  It  is  no  small  argument  for  the  Hebraistic  style 
of  the  New  Testament,  that  many  parts  of  it  can  be 
more  easily  translated  into  Hebrew  than  into  any  other 
language  ;  as  Erasmus  Schmidius  confesses,  though  a 
strenuous  defender  of  the  classic  purity  of  the  New 
Testament.  Nay,  many  parts  of  the  New  Testament 
can  be  explained  in  no  other  way  than  by  means  of  the 
Hebrew.  Moreover,  in  many  passages,  there  would 
arise  an  absurd  or  ridiculous  meaning,  if  they  should  be 
interpreted  according  to  a  pure  Greek  idiom  ;  as  ap- 
pears from  the  examples  produced  by  Werenfels,  and 
by  me  in  my  essay  De  difficultt.  interpr.  gramm.  N.  Test. 
§12;  to  which  many  others  might  easily  be  added. 
Theology  would  have  been  freed  from  many  errors  that 
have  crept  in,  if  Hebraisms  had  not  been  interpreted  as 
pure  Greek  ;  as  Mela^ncthon  in  his  commentaries  has 
frequently  shewn.     (Morus,  p.  198.  III.) 

§  122.  Additional  argument.     It  is  another  argument  in 


60  ON  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

favour  of  the  Hebraisms  of  the  New  Testament,  that 
former  Greek  and  Latin  interpreters,  who  have  followed 
the  manner  of  classic  Greek  in  their  interpretations,  hav^e 
often  tortured  the  sense,  and  made  it  plainly  inept.  E. 
g.  in  explaining  ai'pdfaf40>  reXfiorrjiog,  as  MeJancthon 
remarks.  The  same  thing  has  happened  to  modern  in- 
terpreters who  are  ignorant  of  the  Hebrew  idiom  ;  while 
to  those  who  are  acqu'iinted  with  it,  such  passages  are 
very  plain.  But  mistakes  on  such  ground  could  not  be 
made,  if  the  apostles  had  written  pure  Greek.  (Morus, 
p.  199.) 

^  123.  Objections  anstvered.  We  need  not  be  under 
any  apprehension  that  the  dignity  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment will  suffer,  by  the  admission  that  Hebraisms  may 
be  found  in  its  style.  Truth  cannot  injure  religion ; 
and  many  reasons  moreover  may  be  given,  why  the  He- 
brew-Greek style  was  proper  and  necessary  for  the  New 
Testament  writers. 

For  1,  The  writers  of  the  New  Testament  could  not 
spontaneously  write  Greek  well,  inasmuch  as  they  were 
born  and  educated  Hebrews ;  nor  did  they  learn  Greek 
in  a  scholastic  way  ;  nor  were  they  accustomed  to  the 
reading  of  Greek  authors.  This  is  true  of  Paul  as  well 
as  the  others.  For  although  he  was  born  at  Tarsus, 
where  schools  of  rhetoric  and  philosophy  were  estab- 
lished, it  does  not  follow  that  he  attended  them  ;  nor 
that  he  was  familiar  with  the  Greek  poets,  because  he 
quotes  a  single  verse  from  one  of  them.  Greek  taste, 
style,  and  literatu'-e  were  plainly  foreign  to  a  man,  who 
belonged  to  the  most  rigid  of  the  sect  of  the  Pharisees, 
and  was  brought  up  at  the  feet  of  Gamaliel. 

2.  Nor  was  it  congruous  that  the  Holy  Spirit  should 
inspire  the  apostles  to  write  pure  Greek.  For  passing 
by  the  consideration,  that  if  they  had  written  classic 
Greek  no  critic  would  now  admit  that  they  were  the 
authors  of  the  books  ascribed  to  them,  we  may  say  that 
the  apostles  themselves  would  not  have  understood 
their  own  language,  unless  by  additonal  inspiration  giv- 


OP  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  61 

en  for  this  very  purpose.  Much  less  would  the  common 
people  among  the  Jews  have  understood  it ;  for  whom 
these  books,  for  the  most  part,  were  primarily  written  ; 
and  who,  through  hatred  of  the  Greeks  and  of  Grecian 
eloquence,  would  not  have  approved  of  a  classic  style, 
it  being  so  contrary  to  the  diction  of  the  Septuagint,  and 
so  diverse  from  the  Hebrew  Scriptures. 

Finally,  as  the  New  Testament  is  built  upon  the  Old, 
the  same  diction  ought  to  be  preserved  throughout. 
(Morus,  pp.  210—217.) 

§  124.  Hebrew-Greek  idiom  does  not  necessarily  make 
the  style  of  the  New  Testament  obscure.  Nor  does  the 
Hebrew  idiom  of  the  New  Testament  injure  its  perspi- 
cuity. Every  writer  has  special  reference  to  his  own 
times  ;  to  those  for  whom  he  primarily  writes  ;  not  to 
future  times,  so  as  to  neglect  his  cotemporaries.  The 
obscurity  which  arises  from  this  mode  of  writing  is  not 
a  necessary  one  ;  but  results  merely  from  the  change 
which  time  makes  in  languages.  It  is  an  obscurity  com- 
mon to  all  good  ancient  writers ;  for  the  ground  of  it 
lies  in  the  ignorance  of  later  readers,  and  not  in  the  wri- 
ters. 

^V^^.  Language  of  the  New  Testament  is  Hehrew-GrceTc. 
Hence  the  style  of  the  New  Testament  may  justly  be 
named  Hebrew-Greek.  If  any  with  Scaliger  and  Drusius 
choose  to  call  it  Hellenistic^  let  them  not  with  Heinsius 
understand  by  this  a  peculiar  dialect;  which  Salmasius 
has  sufficiently  refuted.  Nor  would  I  name  it  the  Alex- 
andrine dialect ;  for  the  Jews  in  other  places  wrote  in 
the  same  style.  The  Alexandrine  dialect,  concerning 
which  there  is  extant  a  little  book  of  one  Irenaeus  an  Al- 
exandrine grammarian,  respects  merely  peculiarities  of 
language  appropriate  to  the  Alexandrians  ;  such  for  ex- 
ample as  existed  among  the  Attics,  lonians  &c.  Some 
choose  to  call  it  the  Macedonian  dialect,  because  many 
words  in  the  New  Testament  are  peculiar  to  the  Mace- 
6 


62  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

donians,  and  the  language  agrees  more  with  that  of  Po- 
lybius,  Diodorus  Siculas  &lc.  than  with  that  of  the  ancient 
Greek  writers.     (Morus,  pp.  '2'2'2 — 234.) 

§  126.  It  also  comprises  Latinisms.  Nor  is  all  which 
is  not  pure  Greek  of  course  to  be  named  Hebraism  ;  for 
some  words  are  of  Latin  derivation,  occasioned  by  inter- 
course with  the  Romans  ;  and  others  are  of  the  Syriac, 
Chaldee,  or  Rabbinic  dialect.  Vide  Olearius  de  Stylo 
Nov.  Test.  Sect,  didac.  ii.  iii ;  et  Wetstenium  ad  N. 
Test.  Acta.  13.  48.     (Morus,  pp.  235—238.; 

Besides  Latinisms,  as  GTCfy.ovXaTMQ^  ^ovaroidia,  and  such 
phrases  as  Xu^i^dvaov  OVfAlSovhov  consilium  capere^  IgyuGiav 
OOVVCCt  operam  dareSzc^  there  are  Persian  words  to  be  found  in 
the  New  Testament,  as  ^ccCcc^  judyot^  ccyyag6V6iv  ;  Syriasms, 
as  a^l3a.  (.iccgav  add ;  also  Chaldaisms  and  Rabbinisms. 
See  Marsh's  Michaelis  on  the  New  Testament  idioms. 

§  127.  Metliod  of  Jinding  the  usiis  loqiiendi  of  the  New 
Testament  not  difficult.  These  things  being  settled  re- 
specting the  general  nature  of  the  New  Testament  dic- 
tion, it  will  be  easy  to  point  out  the  method  of  ascer- 
taining the  nsus  loquendi,  and  of  drawing  aid  from  it  in 
the  interpretation  of  particular  passages  so  as  to  assist 
the  interpreter. 

§  128.  Rules  for  finding  the  itsus  loquendi.  First,  the 
interpreter  should  be  well  skilled  in  the  Greek  and 
Hebrew  idioms ;  so  that  he  can  distinguish  between 
pure  Greek,  and  that  method  of  writing  which  is  deriv- 
ed from  another  language.  This  is  necessary,  in  order 
rightly  to  interpret  either.  In  regard  to  good  Greek, 
he  must  specially  consult  not  only  the  writers  who  have 
used  the  popular  language,  but  writers  of  a  proximate 
age,  who  have  imitated  the  Attic  diction,  though  not 
studiously.  Among  these  are,  Polybius,  Diodorus  Sicu- 
lus,  and  Artemidorus  ;  in  which  authors  are  many  words 
common  to  the  New  Testament,  either  not  used  at  all 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  63 

by  the  old  Greeks,  or  else  used  in  a  different  sense.  (Mo- 
ms, p.  238—240.) 

§  129.  Much  caution  necessary  to  decide  what  is  classic 
and  ivhat  is  Hebrew-Greek  ;  Sept.  and  Ilebreio  to  he  com- 
pared. In  all  places,  therefore,  let  him  carefully  ex- 
amine whether  the  diction  be  pure  Greek  or  not ;  in 
which  there  is  more  difficulty  than  one  might  be  apt  to 
suppose.  Where  the  diction  departs  from  pure  Greek, 
let  him  resort  to  the  Hebrew.  To  do  this  properly,  he 
must  not  only  be  acquainted  with  the  genius  of  the  He- 
brew, as  it  is  developed  in  the  forms  and  tenses  of 
words,  in  the  construction  of  them,  and  in  the  junction 
of  the  members  of  a  sentence  (which  however  will  of- 
ten be  sufficient),  but  he  must  also  know  in  what  Greek 
words  the  Jews  were  accustomed  to  express  Hebrew 
things,  when  they  spoke  in  the  then  common  Greek 
style,  without  aiming,  like  Philo  and  Josephus,  at  ele- 
gant classic  diction.  In  this  way,  by  a  proper  compar- 
ison with  the  Hebrew,  he  may  elicit  the  sense. 

Sometimes  there  is  no  better  method,  than  to  trans- 
late the  Greek  directly  into  the  Hebrew ;  which  often- 
times may  be  easily  done  by  a  tolerable  Hebrew  schol- 
ar, both  as  it  respects  single  words  and  also  phrases.  But 
at  other  times,  this  is  difficult  on  account  of  the  rare  oc- 
currence of  words,  or  the  obscurity  of  them,  or  the  dis- 
similar etymology.  The  Septuagint,  therefore,  must  of- 
ten be  consulted  ;  and  the  interpreter  should  be  so  fa- 
mjiiar  with  it,  as  readily  to  know  in  what  way  Hebrew 
expressions  are  translated  into  Greek.  For  as  the  ori- 
gin of  speaking  and  writing  in  Greek,  concerning  sacred 
things,  took  its  rise  from  that  version,  so  it  is  evident, 

THAT  this  version  MUST  BE  THE   BASIS  OF  ACQUAINTANCE 
WITH   THE   HEBREW-GREEK. 

It  will  be  useful  also  to  be  v/ell  acquainted  with  wri- 
ters on  the  Hebraisms  of  the  New  Testament  in  gene- 
ral ;  such  as  Vorstius,  Leusden,  and  especially  Gataker 
the  most  learned  of  them  all.     (Morus,  p.  241.  ii.)    • 


64  OF  FINDING  THE  USU6  LOQUENDl 

§  130.  Aquila  and  SymmacJius  to  he  studied.  It  will  be 
proper,  moreover,  to  study  the  remains  of  Aquila's 
Greek  version,  which  exhibits  a  similar  diction  ;  as  he 
was  not  very  remote  from  the  age  of  the  apostles,  and 
has  some  things  in  his  version  which  may  be  of  special 
use  here.  The  version  of  Symmachus  should  also  be 
read,  who,  by  translating  into  pure  Greek,  has  made  the 
understanding  of  Hebrew  more  easy. 

In  addition  to  the  Hebrew-Greek  mentioned  in  f(»  12B — 130, 
the  Apocrypha  is  of  special  use  in  the  attainment  of  this  idiom. 
Also  the  apocryphal  hooks  of  the  New  Testament,  and  several 
of  the  apostolic  and  early  fathers,  exhibit  a  style  in  many  re- 
spects partaking  of  this  idiom.     Comp.  Morus,  p.  241 — 245. 

§  131.  When  the  Hebrew  idiom  is  to  he  preferred.  It  is 
a  sound  maxim  too,  that  when  the  same  word  or  phrase 
is  Hebraistic,  and  also  good  Greek,  and  a  meaning  not 
at  all  incongruous  may  be  assigned  to  it,  as  used  accord- 
ing to  either  idiom,  we  should  prefer  that  sense  which 
accords  with  the  Hebrew  idiom.  For  it  is  more  proba- 
ble that  Hebrew  writers  used  the  latter  idiom  ;  especial- 
\y  if  the  phrase,  understood  as  classic  Greek,  should  be 
of  the  more  polished  and  refined  kind.  Accordingly  I 
should  explain  K«roj/?oA>fi/  GntQf-iaTog,  Hebrews  11  :  11. 
by  the  Hebrew  in  Genesis  4  :  25,  rather  than  from  the 
Greek  idiom.  So  dnoOvriG'Aitv  iv  d^uQTiaig^  John  8  :  24 
by  the  Greek  idiom  would  mean,  you  icill  persevere  to 
the  end  of  life  in  sinning ;  by  the  Hebrew,  you  ivill  he 
condemned  on  account  of  your  sins.     (Morus,  p.  246.  ^I.) 

<§)  132.  In  the  doctrines  of  religion,  the  Hebrew  idiom  is  to 
he  specicdly  regarded.  An  interpreter  should  particular- 
ly observe,  that  when  things  appropriate  to  religion 
specially  to  the  Christian  religion  are  spoken  of,  the 
idiom  should  be  referred  to  the  Hebrew ;  because  in 
speaking  of  religious  matters,  the  writers  of  the  New 
Testament  were  accustomed  to  use  the  phraseology  of 
the  Hebrew  Scriptures.     The  interpreter  will  be  much 


OP  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  65 

assisted  here  by  the  analogy  of  doctrine  ;  with  which  he 
ought  to  be  familiar,  lest  the  words  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment should  be  drawn  to  a  sense  alien  from  that  which 
the  authors  desired  to  express,  and  different  from  the 
essential  points  of  religion.     (Morus,  p.  246.  XII.) 

§  133.  Specially  is  Hebreic  idiom  to  he  regarded  in  re- 
spect to  the  forms,  tenses,  and  numbers  of  ivords.  Nor 
should  the  maxims  here  inculcated  be  applied  only  to 
the  meaning  of  words  and  phrases,  but  also  to  the  forms 
and  tenses  of  verbs,  and  also  to  the  number  of  both  nouns 
and  verbs.  In  respect  to  these  things,  the  idiom  of  the 
New  Testament  not  unfrequently  departs  from  classical 
Greek,  and  follows  the  Hebrew.  An  interpreter  who 
neglects  this  will  fall  into  great  difficulties,  and  commit 
many  surprising  and  almost  ridiculous  mistakes.  (Mo- 
rus, p.  248.) 

§  134.  Other  idioms  to  he  consulted  in  certain  cases. 
When  the  Hebrew  idiom  fails  us  in  the  explication  of  a 
passage  or  word,  we  must  then  have  recourse  specially 
to  the  Syriac,  Chaldee,  or  Rabbinic.  All  concede  that 
we  should  have  recourse  to  the  Syriac  and  Chaldee  ; 
but  all  do  not  rightly  understand  the  nature  of  this  com- 
parison ;  as  is  evident  from  the  attempts  of  some,  who 
have  endeavoured  to  cast  light  upon  the  Greek  of  the 
New  Testament,  by  comparing  the  Syriac  version  of  it. 
The  right  method  of  proceeding  is  to  have  recourse  to 
the  Syriac  when  we  find  ourselves  deserted  by  the  He- 
brew. If  we  find  the  idiom  to  be  Syriac,  then  we  can 
attain  to  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  or  word,  when  we 
have  attained  a  right  understanding  of  the  Syriac  which 
corresponds  with  it.  This  may  be  more  easily  and  cer^ 
tainly  attained,  provided  the  Syriac  be  still  a  living  lan- 
guage ;  which  however  I  find  to  be  doubted. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Chaldee  and  Rabbinic. 
But  he  who  expects  aid  different  from  that  which  has 
just  been  described,  will  seek  and  hope  for  it  in  vain. 
6* 


Ob  OF  FINDING  THE  USUS  LOQUENDI 

He  will  either  labour  to  no  purpose  in  heaping  up  what 
will  be  useless  ;  or  will  abuse,  to  a  bad  purpose,  a  help 
in  exegesis  which  is  by  no  means  to  be  despised.  At 
most,  he  will  only  be  able  to  determine  whether  the 
Syriac  interpreter  has  rightly  translated  or  not.  (Mo- 
rus,  p.  249.  XIII.) 

§  135.  Direct  testimony  not  always  sufficient.  Thus  far 
we  have  described  the  method  of  discovering  the  usus 
loqucndi  in  particular  passages  of  the  New  Testament, 
by  evidence  which  we  call  direct.  But  although  this 
evidence  is  important  and  goes  very  far,  yet  alone,  it  is 
not  always  sufficient.  There  are  many  things  in  the 
New  Testament  which  are  described  in  a  novel  way, 
because  the  things  themselves  are  neiv.  Not  that  a  re- 
ligion absolutely  new  is  taught ;  but  ancient  doctrines 
are  delivered  in  language  more  perspicuous,  appropri- 
ate, and  distinctive,  the  veil  of  figures  and  allegories  be- 
ing removed.  New  words  were  therefore  necessary  in 
order  to  describe  new  things  ;  among  which  words  are 
many  that  are  adapted  to  designate  certain  things,  on 
account  of  some  similitude  to  them.  These  words,  by 
the  way,  were  not  invented  by  the  apostles,  and  could 
not  have  been  ;  for  such  invention  is  a  thing  that  belongs 
to  minds  trained  up  by  literary  discipline,  and  not  to  un- 
lettered men.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  terms 
of  such  a  kind  were  suggested  by  the  Holy  Spirit ;  which 
is  an  argument  in  favour  of  the  divine  inspiration  of  the 
Scriptures.  Of  this  nature  are  such  words  as  SacfiOin^f- 
G^ai,  iccgiaoog,  duayevvav,  and  others.  (Morus,  p.  249. 
XIV.) 

§  136.  New  ivords  to  he  explained  hy  testimony  direct 
and  indirect.  Such  words  cannot  be  explained  from  the 
more  ancient  usus  loquendi,  but  have  an  interpretation 
peculiar  to  themselves,  yet  not  less  certain  than  the  oth- 
er which  is  gathered  from  ancient  usage.  This  inter- 
pretation depends  on  the  direct  testimony  of  the  writers. 
Hence  it  must  be  gathered  from  the  collation  of  similar 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  67 

passages ;  as  we  have  already   taught  above.     (Morus,  p. 
251.) 

§  137.  Greek  fathers  to  he  consulted.  Nor  is  the  tes- 
timony of  the  ancient  Greek  fathers  of  the  church  by 
any  means  to  be  neglected,  which  has  respect  to  the 
meaning  of  words  and  phrases  ;  whether  it  be  the  testi- 
mony of  professed  interpreters,  or  of  other  writers.  Re- 
specting a  choice  of  interpreters  among  the  fathers,  and 
the  use  to  be  made  of  them,  we  shall  hereafter  treat.  I 
would  merely  observe  here,  that  in  those  authors  who 
are  not  direct  interpreters,  passages  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment now  and  then  occur  in  such  a  connexion,  or  with 
such  adjuncts,  that  we  may  clearly  perceive  what  mean- 
ing the  age  attached  to  them.  Such  interpretations  we 
find  in  Clemens  Romanus,  Ignatius,  Hippolytus,  Cyril  of 
Jerusalem,  and  others.  The  interpreter,  in  reading  such 
authors,  should  diligently  attend  to  this.    (Morus.  p.  251. 

III.) 

§  138.  These  may  exhibit  interpretations  of  the  primitive 
age  of  Christianity.  In  writers  of  very  early  times,  there 
may,  not  improbably,  be  interpretations  that  have  come 
down  from  the  apostolic  age  ;  certainly  if  they  are  con- 
sentaneous with  apostolic  doctrines,  they  are  not  lightly 
to  be  rejected.  It  is  one  mark  that  they  are  worthy  of 
our  approbation,  if  they  are  of  a  character  appropriate 
to  the  apostolic  style,  formed  and  moulded  after  the  ge- 
nius and  idiom  of  the  Hebre\v.(«^     (Morus,  ubi  supra.) 

a)  But  who  will  venture  to  decide  upon  this,  except  by  the 
use  of  common  means  of  interpretation  ? 

§  139.  Glossaries.  The  ancient  glossaries  may  be  of 
use  here,  specially  that  of  Hesychius  ;  in  which  is  found 
many  things  pertaining  to  certain  passages  of  the  New 
Testament,  that  were  deduced  from  the  most  ancient  in- 
terpreters of  it,  and  which  are  of  a  character  by  no 
means  to  be  despised. 


68  OF  FINDING    THE  USUS  "LOQUENDI 

Similar  to  these  are  a  few  of  the  glossaries  of  Suidas, 
and  also  of  Photian  ;  both  of  which  are  to  be  used  with 
that  caution,  in  respect  to  any  particular  word,  which 
requires  us  well  to  ascertain  whether  the  word  in  the 
glossary  really  belongs  to  the  passage  which  we  desire 
to  interpret. 

In  regard  to  all  these  things,  good  judgment  is  requi- 
site in  order  to  determine  what  is  useful  and  what  is 
worthless,  and  to  distinguish  between  them  ;  which  is 
done  much  in  the  way  that  has  been  above  described. 
(Morus,  p.  252.  IV.) 

§  140.  Glosses.  Even  the  glosses  in  some  manuscripts, 
that  have  crept  into  the  text  of  the  New  Testament  in 
place  of  the  true  reading,  may  be  used  to  assist  the  in- 
terpreter either  to  understand  the  true  text,  or  to  find 
means  for  illustrating  or  confirming  the  true  interpreta- 
tion. Thus  for  ipfuvijGov  in  John  7  :  5,  Chrysostom  has 
the  reading  igojirjGov  Homil.  51,  and  explains  it  by  fnux^e 
TOVTO  ya()  I'aivv  i{)Oiii]aov.  These  glosses  may  have 
flowed  from  the  ancient  schools  instructed  by  Origen ; 
although  some  indeed  may  have  proceeded  from  the 
Latin  commentaries.     (Morus,  ubi  supra.) 

§  141.  Context.  When  all  the  above  described  means 
fail,  w^e  must  then  resort  to  the  context,  and  to  the  well 
known  nature  of  the  things  themselves.  (Morus,  p. 
252.  V.) 

§  142.  Analogy  of  faith.  The  analogy  of  Scripture 
and  of  Christian  doctrine  should  be  always  before  our 
eyes,  so  that  the  interpretation  may  be  guided  by  it,  i.  e. 
that  it  may  be  so  far  guided  by  it  as  that  no  explanation 
contrary  to  it  should  be  adopted  ;  and  in  the  obscure 
phrases,  where  the  meanincy  may  be  doubtful,  the  sense 
may  be  accommodated  to  the  analogy  of  Scripture  senti- 
ment. 

This  rule  need  not  be  wondered  at,  as  common  sense 
has  sanctioned  it  and  applied  it  to  the  interpretation  of 
other  books ;  all  of  which  are  to  be  explained,  gener- 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  b9 

ally,  and  in  particular  passages,  agreeably  to  the   analo- 
gy of  that  doctrine  which  they  contain. 

Analogy  of  doctrine  or  faith  does  not  consist  in  the 
doctrine  which  is  approved  by  any  particular  body  of 
men  as  uncandid  or  unskilful  persons  assert ;  for  then  it 
would  be  various  and  inconstant.  Grammatical  analogy 
is  the  rule  of  speaking,  or  form  of  speech,  constituted 
by  the  laws  of  the  language,  which  is  opposed  to  anoma- 
ly or  a  method  of  speaking  in  opposition  to  usage,  or 
varying  from  it.  In  like  manner,  the  analogy  of  sacred 
doctrine  or  faith  consists  in  the  summary  of  religion,  and 
the  rules  plainly  taught  in  the  Scriptures  ;  whence  the 
Latin  church  called  it  regulajidei.  To  this  analogy  all 
things  are  to  be  referred,  so  that  nothing  may  be  dis- 
cordant with  it.  And  when  this  is  done,  the  analogy  of 
faith  is  said  to  be  preserved.  Nor  as  to  faith  and  prac- 
tice does  analogy  of  Scripture  differ  from  analogy  of 
doctrine.  Examples  of  analogy,  and  of  judgment  agree- 
ably to  analogy,  may  be  found  in  Galatians  6 :  15,  16. 
1  Corinthians  15  :  3 — 11  &c.  where  the  writer  calls  that 
analogy  ra  Tipcora.  In  all  the  departments  of  learning, 
analogy  of  such  a  kind  has  the  force  of  a  rule,  both  in 
our  judgment  and  interpretation  of  a  passage.  (Morus, 
p.  253.  XVI.) 

In  a  special  manner  must  we  betake  ourselves  to  anal- 
ogy, in  those  passages  which  seem  to  speak  what  disa- 
grees with  that  which  is  plainly  taught  in  other  parts  of 
the  Scriptures,  and  with  common  sense,  concerning  di- 
vine and  human  things.  For  it  is  common  to  all  unin- 
spired writers,  although  eloquent,  and  thinking  and  writ- 
ing with  acuteness  and  subtilty,  that  when  they  are  not 
composing  a  summary  of  doctrine,  or  the  elements  of  it, 
nor  treating  designedly  of  any  head  of  doctrine,  they 
exhibit  the  common  views  and  elements  of  learning,  as 
taught  by  usual  discipline  and  instruction.  Nor  do  they 
always  speak  of  things  in  such  a  way  as  a  subtile  and 
scholastic  method  of  discipline  would  demand  ;  but  of- 
ten use  the  more  vulgar  and  popular  methods  of  expres- 
sion.    The  same  traits  of  style  are  found  in  the  works 


70  OF  FINDING  THE   USUS  LOQUENDI 

of  the  sacred  writers ;  who  in  all  respects  desired  to 
speak,  and  must  have  spoken  in  order  to  be  understood, 
more  kumano  ;  the  Holy  Spirit  so  guiding  them,  that  they 
differed  as  little  as  possible  from  the  usual  method  of 
speaking.  It  is  not  therefore  to  be  wondered  at,  if  we 
find  in  their  expressions  some  things  seemingly  harsh, 
since  this  is  characteristic  of  the  oriental  genius  and 
method  of  expression.  (Morns,  pp.  255 — 259.) 
Respecting-  the  subject  of  analogy,  compare  ^  34. 

^  143.  Difficult  Idioms  to  be  spcciaUy  studied.  The  stu- 
dent who  aspires  to  the  faculty  of  interpreting,  should 
be  familiar  and  well  acquainted  with  the  more  difficult 
forms  of  speech  in  the  sacred  writers,  or  those  forms 
which  differ  from  the  idioms  of  our  own  language,  and 
are  not  adapted  to  express,  with  simplicity  and  logical 
accuracy,  principles  of  any  doctrine.  A  right  under- 
standing of  these  he  must  by  all  means  attain  ;  so  that 
he  may  not  be  impeded  in  his  inquiries,  or  thrown  into 
embarrassment  by  them.  E.  g.  many  things  are  affirm- 
ed siinply  and  ivitlwut  any  limitation,  which  however  are 
to  be  understood  as  having  only  a  particidar  and  partial 
application.  Specially  is  this  the  case  in  moral  proposi- 
tions. In  like  manner,  active  verbs  do  not  always  indi- 
cate action  or  efficacy  properly  considered ;  which 
Glass  in  his  Philol.  Sacra,  Calovius  de  persona  Christi 
p.  527,  and  Turretine  de  interp.  Sac.  Literarum,  have 
already  noted.     (Morus,  p.  256.  I.  II.) 

§  144.  Difficult  for jns  inprofane  writers  to  he  studied. 
It  will  be  very  useful  also  to  attend  to  such  forms  of 
speech  in  common  books,  or  classics  ;  for  there  is  scarce- 
ly any  form  of  speech  in  the  sacred  books,  which  is  not 
found  in  other  writings.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt 
that  an  interpreter  will  understand  the  Scriptures  with 
much  more  facility,  if  he  be  flimiliar  and  well  acquaint- 
ed with  the  difficulties  and  obscure  forms  of  speech  in 
other  books.  Those  things  which  appear  to  be  some- 
what hard  or  clogojed  in  the  writings  of  Paul  will  not 
be   wondered  at,   nor  give   offence,  if  one  goes  from  the 


OF  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  71 

Study  of  Thucydides  to  the  interpretation  of  the  apos- 
tle. Nor  will  such  an  one  be  alarmed  at  faults,  which 
seem  hardly  to  be  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  sanc- 
tity of  the  Scriptures  :  nor  at  transpositions,  apparent 
want  of  consistency  in  construction,  enallages,  and  the 
like  things.  This  has  indeed  often  happened  to  some 
good  men  ;  but  they  were  not  well  skilled  in  the  lan- 
guages. Such  an  alarm  is  rather  the  result  of  unlearn- 
ed superstition  than  of  a  judicious  reverence  for  the 
wopd  of  God  ;  as  Melancthon  has  justly  observed.  De- 
dic.  Epist.  ad  Romanos. 


PART  11. 

CHAPTER  V. 

RULES  IN  RESPECT  TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE. 

[Keil,  pp.  115—128.     Beck,  pp.  129—136.     Seller,  H  50—78.] 

§  145.  Design  of  this  chapter.  Having  explained  the 
method  of  finding  the  sense  of  the  New  Testament  by 
the  usus  loqiiencV  or  other  artificial  aids,  we  come  now 
to  treat  separately  of  certain  things  which  usually  are 
not  enough  explained,  nor  made  sufficiently  explicit  in 
regard  to  theory  or  practice.  The  first  of  these  re- 
spects tropes ;  the  second,  emphasis  ;  the  third,  apparent 
contradictions  or  discrepancies.     Of  these  in  their  order. 

§  146.  Duty  of  an  interpreter  in  respect  to  tropical  lan- 
guage. In  respect  to  tropical  language  the  office  of  the 
interpreter  is  two  fold.  First,  he  must  rightly  distin- 
guish it  from  language  not  tropical,  so  as  not  to  mistake 
the  one  for  the  other  (as  formerly  the  disciples  of  Je- 
sus and  the  Jews  did,  in  respect  to  some  of  the  Saviour's 


72  RULES  IN    RESPECT 

discourses)  (a)  and  so  as  not  to  pervert  the  proper  sense 
of  words  by  a  tropica/ interpretation.  Secondly,  he  must 
rightly  interpret  tropes  and  give  their  true  sense.  For 
it  often  happens  that  men  think  they  have  attained  the 
tropical  sense  of  words,  when  they  understand  only  the 
literal  one  ;  and  they  are  deluded  by  an  empty  shadow, 
or  pervert  the  trope  by  an  etymological  interpretation. 
To  avoid  these  faults,  it  is  proper  to  give  rules  drawn 
from  the  nature  of  tropical  diction  as  learned  from  use 
and  observation,  by  which  the  interpreter  may  be  gbiid- 
ed  in  the  judging  and  in  the  interpreting  of  figurative 
language.  (Morus,  p.  274.  IX.) 
a)  E.g.  Joha6;52.     John  4:   II.     Matt.  16:  6— 12. 

§  147.  Certain  rules  respecting  tropical  diction  to  he  eX" 
amined.  In  order  to  judge  of  diction  whether  it  should 
be  taken  in  a  literal  or  tropical  sense,  the  vulgar  maxim 
is,  not  readily  to  depart  from  the  literal  one.  But  this 
maxim  is  neither  strictly  true,  nor  perspicuous,  nor  adap- 
ted to  use.     (Morus,  p.  ^520.) 

Not  easily  ;non  facile),  if  you  rightly  understand  the 
phrase,  means  almost  never,  very  rarely.  This  is  errone- 
ous ;  for  tropes  in  the  sacred  writings  are  very  common  ; 
so  much  so  that  Glass  has  filled  a  large  volume  with 
them.  It  is  ambiguous  ;  for  it  describes  no  certain  mark 
or  characteristic  by  which  tropical  language  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  that  which  is  to  be  literally  understood  ; 
which  is  certainly  a  great  fault  in  a  rule. 

Danhauer,  Tarnoflf,  and  Calovius  have  stated  the  prin- 
ciple in  question  with  more  distinctness,  when  they  aver 
that  the  literal  meaning  is  not  to  he  deserted  without  evident 
reason  or  necessity.  No  one  will  deny  that  where  there 
is  plain  and  necessary  reason  for  departure  from  the  lit- 
eral sense,  we  may  admit  the  tropical.  But  some  appa- 
rent repugnance  of  things  or  facts,  is  not  hastily  to  lead 
us  to  reject  the  literal  sense.  The  older  writers  regard 
the  phrase  proper  sense  as  of  the  same  meaning  with  lit- 
eral or  historic  sense ;  and  rightly  teach  that  icc  should 
not  depart  from  the  customary  signijication  of  a  word, 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE,  73 

loitliout  a  weighty  and  sufficient  reason.  That  we  may 
sometimes  depart  from  it  is  evident,  from  the  fact  that 
the  sacred  writers  themselves  do,  beyond  all  doubt, 
sometimes  depart  from  it.  And  indeed,  in  respect  to 
many  words,  the  tropical  sense  is  the  customary  or  usual 
one.     (Morus,  p.  320.) 

§  148.  How  to  examine  whether  language  is  tropical. 
We  may  commonly  understand,  at  once,  whether  a  word 
is  to  be  taken  tropically  or  not,  by  simply  examining  the 
object  spoken  of,  either  by  the  external  or  internal  sens- 
es, or  by  renewing  the  perception  of  the  object.  To 
judge  of  figurative  language,  in  such  cases,  is  very  easy  ; 
and  in  uninspired  writings,  it  very  rarely  happens  that 
there  is  any  doubt  about  it,  because  the  objects  spoken 
of  are  such  as  may  be  examined  by  our  senses,  external 
or  internal,  and  therefore  it  may  be  easily  understood. («) 
In  the  Scriptures,  however,  doubts  have  frequently 
arisen  from  the  nature  of  the  subjects  there  treated  ; 
which  are  such  as  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  examina- 
tion of  our  senses.  E.  g.  the  divine  nature, (6)  divine  op- 
erations &/C.  are  subjects  beyond  the  scrutiny  of  our 
senses  :  and  the  question  whether  the  language  that  re- 
spects such  things  is  to  be  understood  literally  or  tropi- 
cally, has  given  rise  to  fierce  controversies,  which  are 
still  continued,  (c)  In  these,  the  parties  have  often  dis- 
puted about  tropical  diction,  in  a  way  which  savoured 
more  of  metaphysical  or  dialectical  subtilty  than  of  truth. 
(Morus,  p.  275.  XI.) 

a)  E.  o".  Injlamed  mind  we  understand  tropically,  by  repeating" 
the  perception  of  the  ideaof  mmr^,  and  taking  notice  that  the  lit- 
eral meaning  of  tn^a/rtCiZ  is  incongruous  with  it.  In  interpreting 
the  phrase  snowy  locks.,  we  appeal  to  the  external  senses,  which 
determine  that  the  meaning  of  snowy  here  must  be  tropical. 

6)  To  the  language  which  respects  God  and  his  operations,  may 
be  added  all  that  respects  the  invisible  things  of  a  futnre  state 
i.  e.  heaven,  hell  &c.  The  controversy  whether  descriptions  of 
this  nature  are  to  be  literally  or  tropically  understood,  is  by  no 
means  at  an  end.  One  of  the  things  which  the  human  mind  learns 
very  slowly,  is  to  detach  itself  from  conceptions  that  arise  from 
material  objects,  and  to  perceive  that  in  all  the  descriptions  of  a 

7 


74  RULES  IN  RESPECT 

future  state,  words  are  of  absolute  necessity  employed  which 
originally  have  a  literal  sense,  because  languag-e  affords  no  other. 
Even  the  internal  operations  of  our  own  mind,  we  are  obliged 
for  the  same  reason,  to  describe  in  language  that  of  necessity  must 
be  tropically  understood.  Almost  all  men,  indeed,  now  allow  that 
most  of  the  language  employed  to  describe  God  and  his  opera- 
tions, is  necessarily  to  be  understood  as  tropical.  Most  men  will 
allow  that  the  language  which  respects  the  heavenly  world  may 
be  so  considered  ;  but  Vv^hat  regards  the  day  of  judgment,  or  the 
world  of  woe,  they  would  strenuously  contend,  must  be  literally 
understood.  There  is  indeed  sufficient  inconsistency  in  this,  and 
it  betrays  no  small  degree  of  unacquaintance  with  the  nature  and 
principles  of  interpretation  ;  but  *as  it  is  productive  of  no  conse- 
quences specially  bad,  the  error  is  hardly  worth  combating.  The 
motive  no  doubt  may  be  good,  which  leads  to  the  adoption  of  this 
error.  The  apprehension  is,  that  if  you  construe  the  language 
that  respects  the  day  of  judgment  or  the  world  of  woe  figurative- 
ly, you  take  away  the  reality  of  them.  Just  as  if  reality  did  not, 
of  course,  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  figurative  language,  which  would 
be  wholly  devoid  of  meaning  without  it.  But  how  inconsistent 
too  is  this  objection  !  The  very  person  who  makes  it,  admits  that 
the  language  employed  to  describe  God  and  his  operations,  and 
also  to  describe  the  heavenly  world,  is  tropical ;  that  it  must  of 
necessity  be  construed  so.  But  does  this  destroy  the  reality  of  a 
God  and  of  his  operations,  and  of  the  heavenly  world  ? 

c)  Who  is  ignorant  of  the  innumerable  controversies  that  have 
arisen,  about  the  tropical  and  literal  sense  of  a  multitude  of  pas- 
sages in  the  sacred  writings  ?  Almost  all  the  enthusiasm  and  ex- 
travagance that  have  been  exhibited  in  respect  to  religion,  have 
had  no  better  support  than  gross  material  conceptions  of  figura- 
tive language  ;  or,  not  unfrequently,  language  that  should  be 
properly  understood  has  been  tropically  construed.  There  is  no 
end  to  the  mistakes  on  this  ground.  Nor  are  they  limited  to  en- 
thusiasts and  fanatics.  They  develope  themselves  not  unfrequent- 
ly in  the  writings  of  men,  grave,  pious,  excellent,  and  in  other 
parts  of  theological  science  very  learned.  Indeed,  it  is  but  a  re- 
cent thing,  that  it  has  come  to  be  considered  as  a  science,  and  a 
special  and  essential  branch  of  theological  science  — to  study  the 
nature  of  language,  and  above  all  the  nature  of  the  oriental  bib- 
lical languages.  Long  has  this  been  admitted  in  respect  to  the 
classics,  and  all  works  of  science  in  ancient  languages.  But  in 
regard  to  the  Bible,  the  most  ancient  book  in  the  world,  and 
written  in  a  language  the  idiom  of  which  is  exceedingly  diverse 
from  our  own,  it  seems  to  have  been  very  generally  taken  for 
granted,  that  no  other  study  was  necessary  to  discover  its  mean- 
ing than  what  is  devoted  to  any  common  English  book.     At  least 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE.  75 

a  Bible  with  marginal  references,  studied  by  a  diligent  and  care- 
ful use  of  these  references,  might  surely  be  understood  in  a  most 
satisfactory  manner.  In  very  many  cases,  the  Jirst  thing  has  been 
to  study  theology  ;  the  second  to  raad  the  bible  in  order  to  find 
proofs  of  what  had  already  been  adopted  as  matter  of  belief.  This 
order  is  now  beginning  to  be  reversed.  The  nature  of  language, 
of  scripture-language,  of  figurative  language,  and  of  interpreta- 
tion, is  now  beginning  to  be  studied  as  a  science,  the  acquisition 
of  which  is  one  of  the  greatest  ends  of  study  ;  as  it  is  the  only 
proper  mode  of  leading  a  theologian  to  the  knowledge  of  what 
the  bible  really  contains.  Here  too  is  a  common  arbiter  of  the 
disputes  that  exist  in  the  Christian  world.  The  nature  of  lan- 
guage and  of  tropical  words  thoroughly  understood,  will  remove 
from  among  all  intelligent  and  candid  men,  who  really  love  the 
truth,  a  great  part  of  all  the  diversities  of  opinion  that  exist. 

<^  149.  Certain  words  not  tropical.  Those  words  are 
not  to  be  regarded  as  tropical  which  have  lost  their 
original  and  proper  signification,  and  are  used  no  longer 
in  any  but  a  secondary  sense ;  as  we  have  already 
shewn. 

§  150.  Words  tropical,  ichere  the  subject  and  predicate 
disagree.  Beyond  all  doubt  those  phrases  are  tropical 
the  subject  and  predicate  of  which  are  heterogeneous; 
as  where  corporeal  and  incorporeal,  animate  and  inani- 
mate, rational  and  irrational,  are  conjoined  ;  (a)  and  also 
species  of  a  different  genus.  Things  that  cannot  possi- 
bly exist  in  any  particular  subject,  cannot  be  logically 
predicated  of  it ;  for  the  fundamental  rules  of  logic,  in 
respect  to  this,  are  inherent  in  the  human  mind.  If 
then  such  things  appear  to  be  predicated,  the  phrase 
must  be  tropically  understood.     (Morus,  p.  278.  XII.) 

By  this  rule  the  language  of  the  New  Testament 
should  be  interpreted  which  respects  the  person  of  Jesus, 
to  whom  divine  and  human  qualities  are  attributed.  For 
the  latter  are  attributed  to  him  as  a  man  ;  the  former  as 
a  divine  person  united  with  the  human  ;  and  therefore 
they  may  be  properly  understood. 

a)  E.  g.  ihejidds  smile.,  the  stones  cry  out.,  thejloods  clap  their 
hands  &c. 


76  RULES  IN  RESi»ECT 

^151.  haws,  history,  didactic  works,  seldom  admit  tropesl 

As  the  customary  use  of  language  shews  the  above  prin- 
ciple to  be  correct,  so  the  same  use  also  shews  that  trop- 
ical language  is  rarely  employed  in  several  cases  now 
to  be  mentioned,  if  you  except  words  which  have  lost 
their  primary  signification,  or  such  as  constitute  very 
easy  tropes.  Legislators  in  their  statutes ;  historians  in 
their  narrations  of  facts,  where  they  aim  simply  at  the 
declaration  of  them  (for  some  narrations  are  designedly 
ornate,  and  decorated  to  please  the  fancy) ;  and  those 
who  teach  any  branch  of  science,  where  the  direct  ob- 
ject is  teaching  and  not  merely  occasional  allusions  ;  all 
these  employ  tropes  very  seldom.  Hence  it  follows, 
that  in  writings  of  such  a  kind  tropes  are  not  to  be  ac- 
knowledged, unless  it  can  be  clearly  shewn  that  either 
by  general  usage,  or  by  the  use  of  the  writer,  certain  tro- 
pical words  are  appropriated  to  designate  particular  things. 
Of  this  nature  are  several  words  of  the  New  Testament, 
e.  g.  those  which  signify  illumination,  regeneration  &lc. 
(Morus,  p.  281.  XIV.) 

The  principle  laid  down  in  this  section  needs  more  explana- 
tion. It  is  not  correct,  that  in  the  Mosaic  law,  for  example,  and  in 
the  gospels  and  epistles,  there  are  not  a  great  abundance  of  trop- 
ical words.  But  still,  it  is  true  that  these  cmnpositions,  so  far  as 
they  are  mere  precept,  mere  narration,  and  mere  language  of  in- 
struction, comprise  as  few  tropes  as  the  nature  of  the  case  will 
admit,  and  these  mostly  of  the  easier  and  more  obvious  kind. 

The  importance  of  the  principle  thus  defined,  is  very  great.^ 
Some  interpreters,  in  ancient  and  modern  times,  have  turned  into 
allegory  the  whole  Jewish  ceremonial  law.  So  formerly  and  re- 
cently, the  history  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  fall  of  man, 
the  flood,  the  account  of  the  tower  of  Babel  &c.  have  been  ex- 
plained either  as  f.wdOi,  or  as  philosophical  allegories  i.  e.  phi- 
losophical speculations  on  these  subjects,  clothed  in  the  garb  of 
narration.  By  the  same  principles  of  exegesis,  the  gospels  are 
treated  as  ^ivdot,  which  exhibit  an  imaginary  picture  of  a  per- 
fect characttr  in  the  person  of  Jesus.  In  a  word,  every  narra- 
tion in  the  Bible  of  an  occurrence  which  is  of  a  miraculous  nature 
in  any  respect,  is  f.ivdog  ;  which  means,  as  its  abettors  say,  that 
some  real  fact  or  occurrence  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  story,  which 
is  told  agreeably  to  the  very  imperfect  conceptions  and    philosQ- 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE.  77 

phy  of  ancient  times,  or  has  been  augrmented  and  adorned  by 
tradition  and  fancy. 

But  that  such  liberties  with  the  lang-uag^e  of  Scripture  are  ut- 
terly incompatible  with  the  sober  principles  of  interpretation,  is 
sufficiently  manifest  from  the  bare  statement  of  them.  The  ob- 
ject of  the  interpreter  is,  lojind  out  ivhal  the  sacred  writers  me cmt 
to  say.  This  done,  his  task  is  performed.  Party  philosophy  or 
scepticism  cannot  g-uide  the  interpretation  of  lang^uage.  Comp. 
Morus,  pp.  281—291. 

§  152.  Usits  loquendi  in  regard  to  things  wliicli  cannot 
he  examined  by  our  feelings  and  conceptions.  In  regard 
to  divine  things,  which  can  be  known  merely  by  reve- 
lation and  cannot  be  examined  by  the  test  of  our  own 
feelings  or  views,  we  can  judge  only  from  the  iisus  lo- 
quendi of  the  sacred  writers  whether  their  language  is 
to  be  understood  literally  or  tropically. 

This  usage  can  be  known  only  from  the  comparison  of 
similar  passages  ;  which  is  done  in  various  ways.  (1) 
When  different  words  are  employed  in  different  passages 
respecting  the  same  thing,  it  is  easy  to  judge  which  are 
tropical.  E.  g.  the  phrase  to  he  horn  of  water ^  John  3:  5, 
is  tropical ;  for  the  same  thing  is  literally  expressed  in 
Mark  16:  16.(rt)  (2)  When  the  same  word  is  used  ev- 
ery where  respecting  the  same  thing,  it  has  a  proper 
sense. (6)  (3)  When  the  same  method  of  expression  is 
constantly  used  respecting  divers  things,  which  are  sim- 
ilar, or  which  have  some  special  connexion,  it  is  to  be 
understood  literally. (c)     (Morus,  p.  291.  XV.) 

a)  So  the  n"*"iZl  covenant  which  God  made  with  Abraham,  is 
explained  in  Gal.  "3:  16  as  meaning-  a  promise.  The  latter,  as  be- 
ing plain,  is  to  direct  us  in  the  interpretation  of  the  other  passage. 

&)  E.  g.  uvuGxaaig  ve'AOMv,  iyelfjerac  Ofo/na,  ^monoielrao, 

are  constantly  used  in  respect  to  that  which  is  to  take  place  at  the 
end  of  the  world,  and  therefore  are  not  tropical. 

c)  Which  rule  requires  some  abatement.  E.  g.  God  gave  the 
Israelites  bread  from  heaven^  and  Christ  gives  his  disciples  bread 
from  heaven.  The  latter  is  very  different  from  manna.  In  fact, 
the  latter  case  is  plainly  an  instance  of  tropical  language.  The 
context,  then,  or  nature  of  the  subject  treated  of,  is  to  be  our 
guide  in  such  cases. 


78  RULES  IN  RESPECT 

§  153.  Adjuncts  itsefulin  determining ivlien  icords  ar'e 
tropical.  We  may  also  form  a  judgment  respecting  trop- 
ical language,  from  the  adverbs,  epithets,  or  other  limi- 
tations expressing  the  manner  or  nature  of  things.  (Mo- 
rns, p.  295.  XVI.) 

This  case  resolves  itself  substantially  into  the  principle  of  the 
following  section. 

§  154.  Context  to  he  consulted.  The  context  also  will 
frequently  assist  us.  For  when  the  whole  passage  is 
allegorical,  we  must  acknowledge  a  trope  in  particular 
parts  that  are  connected  with  the  whole  allegory.  E.  g. 
iivQog  in  1  Cor.  3:  13,  which  relates  to  '^vXa  and  '^oqtov 
in  the  context.  In  like  manner  the  language  is  to  be 
regarded  as  tropical,  when,  although  the  preceding  con- 
text is  to  be  literally  understood,  there  is  a  manifest 
transition  to  allegory.     (Morus,  ubi  supra.     Compare  al- 


so 


§99.) 


Thus  far  respecting  the  means  of  distinguishing  what 
is  tropical, 

§  155.  Sources  of  tropical  interpretation.  In  regard  to 
interpreting  tropical  language,  we  may  observe  that  there 
are  two  sources  of  aid.  The  one  is  the  subject  itself; 
the  other,  the  usus  loquendi.  The  interpretation  by  the 
aid  of  the  subject  is  easy,  when  the  nature  of  it  affords 
an  obvious  similitude  ;  e.  g.  (fojTCGfAog  is  easily  under- 
stood as  used  tropically. 

In  regard  to  the  usus  loquendi  the  general  usage  of  the 
Hebrew  tongue  in  respect  to  tropical  words  must  be 
first  understood,  as  in  words  corresponding  to  ^oj>),  d^a- 
varog.,  xifjn^,  doBrj  &z^c  ;  then  Greek  usage  in  general. 
Passages  must  also  be  compared  in  which  the  same  thing 
is  expressed  by  a  proper  word,  or  in  which  such  proper 
word  is  employed  in  the  context  so  that  the  sense  is  ob- 
vious. Here  too  we  many  use  the  comparison  of  words 
that  are  conjoined  and  similar ;  examples  of  which  will 
hereafter  be  produced. 

§  156.  Caution  to  be  used  in  judging  from  etymology. 


TO  TROPICAL  LANGUAGE*  79 

We  must  be  very  cautious,  however,  not  to  judge  of 
tropes  from  mere  etymology  ;  as  this  is  very  fallacious. 
E.  g.  OQd^OTOfxHv  in  2  Tim.  2:  15,  some  have  interpreted 
as  implying  a  distinction  between  the  law  and  the  gospel 
which  is  mere  trifling.  For  Xoyog  aXri^elug  in  the  con- 
text means  the  gospel ;  the  law  is  not  the  subject  of  dis- 
course here.  Analogy  of  the  language  might  have  taught 
them  that  ogd^OTOfxeiv  here  means  to  possess  right  views 
of  the  gospel,  and  correctly  to  communicate  these  to  oth- 
ers. So  the  ancients  understood  it,  and  Gerhard  among 
the  moderns  ;  ogOoro^iia,  being  anciently  commuted 
with  OQ&odoilcc,  and  ^lacvoTOfAeiv  being  used  to  signify 
entertaining  and  disseminating  novel  opinions  respecting 
religion.     (Morus,  p.  298.  XIX.) 

§  157.  Method  of  determining  ivhether  a  trope  is  ade- 
quately understood.  It  is  one  proof  that  you  understand 
tropical  language,  if  you  can  substitute  proper  words  for 
tropical  ones.  Not  that  a  person  who  can  do  this  always 
rightly  understands  the  words  ;  but  if  he  cannot  do  it  he 
certainly  does  not  understand  them.  The  sacred  writers 
themselves  sometimes  subjoined  proper  words  to  tropical 
ones,  e.  g.  Col.  2:  7.  The  best  Greek  and  Latin  writers 
frequently  do  the  same  thing. 

It  is  useful  also  to  make  the  experiment,  whether, 
when  the  image  presented  by  the  tropical  expression  is 
removed  from  the  mind,  any  idea  still  remains  in  it  dif- 
ferent from  the  image  itself  which  can  be  expressed  by 
a  proper  word.  This  experiment  is  specially  to  be  made, 
when  words  designating  sensible  objects  are  transferred 
to  the  expression  of  intellectual  ones,  e.  g.  '^avarog,  ^wt], 
6t,udr}yif]  ^c :  in  respect  to  which  it  is  easy  to  be  deceiv- 
ed.    (Morus,  p.  300.  XX.) 

The  context,  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  parallel  passages 
are  the  most  effectual  means  of  ascertaining^  this, 

OF  ALLEGORIES. 

[Compare  Keil,  pp.  115—120.  Beck,  p.  129.  II.  Seller,  H 
41 — 78.  Much  more  satisfactory  will  be  Morus,  Dissert,  de  cau- 
sis  AUtgorice,  explicandis^  in  his  Dissert t.  Theol.  philoL  Vol.  I. 
pp.  370—393.] 


80  ALLEGORIES. 

§  158.  Allegories  how  interpreted.  As  allegories  fre- 
quently occur  in  the  sacred  books,  which  abound  in 
tropical  diction,  it  seems  proper  to  say  something  here 
of  the  method  of  interpreting  them.  First  of  all,  the 
general  design  of  the  allegory  is  to  be  ascertained  ; 
which  is  easily  done  when  it  is  connected  with  a  con- 
text explanatory  of  its  design.  For  the  most  part,  how- 
ever, it  is  expressly  declared.     (^Morus,  p.  301.  XXI.) 

'^XXfjyM^ia  is  derived  from  wAAo  (KyOQHTUV,  i.  e.  a  differ- 
ent llnrii:,  iS  iuid  from  that  which  is  meant.  It  differs  from  met- 
aphor, in  that  it  is  not  confined  to  a  word,  but  extends  to  a 
whole  thought,  or  it  may  be  to  several  thoughts.  Allegory  may 
be  expressed  moreover  by  pictures,  Ezech.  4 :  1  ;  by  actions 
Ezech.  111.  IV.  V.     Luke  22:  36,  or  by  any  significant  thing. 

One  most  important  principle  in  explaining  allegories  is  omit- 
ted by  Ernesti.  I  refer  to  the  rule,  that  comparison  is  not  to  be 
extended  to  all  the  circumstances  of  the  allegory.  Thus  in  the  par- 
able of  the  good  Samaritan,  the  point  to  be  illustrated  is  the  ex- 
tent  of  the  duty  of  beneficence.  Most  of  the  circumstances  in  the 
parable  go  to  make  up  merely  the  verisimilitude  of  the  narration, 
so  that  it  may  give  pleasuse  to  him  who  hears  or  reads  it.  But 
how  differently  does  the  whole  appear,  when  it  comes  to  be  in- 
terpreted by  an  allegorizer  of  the  mystic  school  ?  The  man  going 
down  from  Jerusalem  to  Jericho  is  Adam  wandering  in  the  wil- 
derness of  this  world  ;  the  thieves  who  robbed  and  -wounded  him 
are  evil  spirits ;  the  priest  who  passed  by  on  the  one  side  with- 
out relieving  him  is  the  Levitical  law  ;  the  Levite  is  good  works  ; 
the  good  Samaritan  is  Christ ;  the  oil  and  wine  are  grace  &;c. 
"What  may  not  a  parable  be  made  to  mean,  if  imagination  is  to 
supply  the  place  of  reasoning  and  philology  ?  And  what  riddle 
or  oracle  of  Delphos  could  be  more  equivocal,  or  of  more  multi- 
farious significancy  than  the  Bible,  if  such  exegesis  be  admissi- 
ble ?  It  is  a  miserable  excuse  which  interpreters  make  for  them- 
selves, that  they  render  the  Scriptures  more  edifying  and  signifi- 
cant, by  interpreting  them  in  this  manner.  And  are  the  Scrip- 
tures then  to  be  made  more  signijicant  than  God  has  made  them  ; 
or  to  be  mended  by  the  skill  of  the  interpreter,  so  as  to  become 
more  edifying  than  the  Holy  Spirit  has  made  them  ?  If  there  be 
a  semblance  of  piety  in  such  interprc  tations,  a  semblance  is  all. 
Real  piety  and  humility  appear  to  tiie  best  advantage  in  receiving 
the  Scriptures  as  they  are,  and  expounding  them  as  simply  and 
skilfully  as  the  rides  of  language  will  render  practicable,  rather 
than  by  attempting  to  amend  and  improve  the  revelation  which 
God  has  made. 


ALLEGORIES.  81 

^  159.  This  being  done,  the  primary  word  is  to  be 
sought  for,  and  the  force  of  it  expressed  by  a  proper 
word.  Other  tropical  words  are  then  to  be  explained 
agreeably  to  this,  {a)  In  this  way  the  explanation  of  par- 
ticular things  will  be  rendered  more  easy,  and  we  may 
avoid  errors.  The  design  of  the  exhortation  in  the  form 
of  allegory,  found  in  1  Corinthians  5 :  6,  is,  that  the  Co- 
rinthians should  be  purified  from  vitious  inclinations  and 
the  faults  springing  from  them.  Zvfxrj,  therefore,  here 
means  vice  ;  a^ufiog  free  from  vice  viz.  to  be  a  true  Chris- 
tian. 'Eogru^av,  consequently,  is  not  to  celebrate  a 
feast  (according  to  its  proper  signification)  for  a  tropi- 
cal meaning  is  required.  It  means  to  serve  God,  to  2vor' 
ship  God,  to  he  a  Christian,  to  be  free  from  former  vices, 
and  ivorship  him  in  purity. 

It  is  altogether  incongruous  to  understand  one  part 
literally  an'd  another  tropically,  in  the  same  allegory  ;  (6) 
as  those  do  who  take  nvQog  in  1  Corinthians  3:  15  lite- 
rally, when  all  the  context  is  to  be  understood  tropical- 
ly. Indeed  the  expression  wg  dcci  nvgog  makes  it  plain, 
that  the  word  is  to  be  figuratively  understood.  (Morus, 
p.  309.  XXV.) 

a)  The  meaning  of  the  author  is,  that  the  word  which  desig;- 
nates  the  leading'  design  of  the  allegory  being  explained,  the  re- 
mainder is  to  be  interpreted  in  conformity  with  it. 

6)  This  rule  is  of  great  importance,  and  of  wide  extent.  I  wish 
I  could  add,  that  it  is  not  every  day  transgressed  by  multitudes 
who  expound  the  Scriptures. 

To  the  brief  precepts  here  given  by  Ernesti,  may  be  added 
from  Morus,  (1)  That  we  must  sometimes  resort  to  history,  in  or- 
der fully  to  explain  allegory.  E.  g.  the  kingdom  of  God  is  lik- 
ened to  leaven,  which  gradually  ferments  the  whole  mass  into 
which  it  is  put ;  and  to  a  grain  of  mustard  seed,  which  gradually 
springs  up  and  becomes  a  large  plant.  History  shews  that  the 
Church  has  arisen  from  small  beginnings,  and  is  extending  itself 
through  the  earth.  (2)  The  nature  of  the  subject  v/ill  frequently 
direct  the  interpretation  of  the  allegory.  E.  g,  ye  are  the  salt  of 
the  earth  &c.  Matt.  5:  13.  The  subject  is,  the  instructions  to  be 
given  by  the  disciples.  The  leading  word  (salt)  in  the  allegory 
means  instruction ;  and  the  sentiment  of  the  passage  is.  Ye  are 
the  teachers,  by  whom  others  are  to  be  preserved  from  corrup- 
tion i.  e,  destruction.     See  Morus,  pp.  311 — 313. 


82 


ALLEGORIES. 


§  160.  Parables.  Not  unlike  to  the  method  of  inter- 
preting allegories  is  that  of  explaining  parables,  which  of- 
ten contain  allegory.  We  must  guard  here  against  urg- 
ing too  far  the  meaning  of  all  parts  of  a  parabolical  nar- 
ration, and  refer  the  particular  parts  to  the  general  de- 
sign, so  that  all  may  be  accommodated  to  it.  It  is  a  very 
common  fault  of  interpreters  to  urge  the  explanation 
too  far  ;  but  it  is  a  very  great  fault.  Therefore  in  Luke 
15:  11  &/C.  we  are  not  to  seek  for  a  doctrinal  meaning 
in  Giolr],  fi6a)[og,  danzvXiog  &c.  Such  circumstances  are 
commonly  added  to  complete  the  form  of  the  narration, 
and  to  make  it  a  more  finished  picture  of  what  might  be 
supposed  to  have  happened  ;  as  is  commonly  done  in 
stories,  fables,  and  other  things  of  like  nature.  (Morus, 
pp.  314—320.) 

Parable^  in  Greek  usag;e,  means  any  composition  introduced  in- 
to a  discourse.  It  may  be  called  an  example  taken  from  things 
real  or  fictitious,  designed  for  special  and  graphical  illustration, 
the  means  of  explaining  it  are  the  context,  the  subject,  the  oc- 
casion &c.  as  in  allegory.  The  caution  suggested  by  Ernesti 
against  interpreting  all  the  minute  circumstances  of  a  parable  so 
as  to  give  them  a  mystic  significancy,  is  very  important. 

It  should  be  added  here,  that  allegory  differs  from  parable  only 
in  the  style  and  mode  of  expression.  Take  an  allegory  and  ex- 
press it  in  the  historic  style,  and  you  convert  it  into  a  parable. 
Hence  the  same  rules  of  exegesis  apply  to  both.  Comp.  Beck, 
p.  134.  Keil,  ?}  78—81.  Seiler,  71—78  and  0  183.  But  spe- 
cially worthy  of  thorough  study  is  Storr's  Comment,  de  parabolis 
Christi^  Opuscula.  Vol.  I,  p.  89,  See  also  Lowth's  Lectures  oh 
Allegory  and  Parables,  Lect.  x — xii. 


83 
PART  IL 

CHAPTER  VI. 

RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 

[Keil,  {  42.     Beck,  p.  130.  III.     Seller,  ii  65—70.] 

§  161.  Errors  respecting  emphasis  very  frequent.  In 
no  part  of  an  interpreter's  business  are  errors  more  fre- 
quently committed,  than  in  judging  of  emphasis.  The 
reason  of  this  is,  that  many  are  too  prone  to  find  empha- 
sis every  where;  supposing  that  by  so  doing,  they  exhib- 
it the  sacred  writers  as  speaking  in  a  manner  more  wor- 
thy of  themselves  and  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scriptures. 
However,  nothing  can  have  dignity  attached  to  it,  which 
has  not  truth  for  its  basis. 

§  162.  Ground  of  these  errors.  The  ground  of  this  is 
want  of  skill  in  the  knowledge  of  the  original  Scripture 
languages ;  for  many  who  interpret,  are  obliged  in  gen- 
eral to  depend  merely  on  the  definitions  of  Lexicons, 
and  are  ignorant  of  the  analogy  of  languages,  because 
they  have  not  been  sufficiently  accustomed  to  these  stu- 
dies. It  is  common  for  men  of  this  sort  to  push  etymol- 
ogies, specially  tropical  ones,  to  an  excessive  length  ; 
from  which  very  little  that  is  useful  can  be  extracted. 
Yet  from  these,  they  form  notions  which  never  entered 
the  minds  of  the  sacred  writers.  They  form  moreover 
rules  respecting  emphasis,  independently  either  of  any 
reason  drawn  from  the  nature  of  things  and  of  language, 
or  of  the  usus  loquendi. 

Mistakes  such  as  these  may  be  very  easily  committed 
with  respect  to  the  Hebrew  language,  in  regard  to  those 
forms  of  speech  in  the  New  Testament,  which  are  de- 


§4  RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 

duced  from  the   Hebrew  ;  because  this  idiom   is  so  un- 
like the.  occidental  languages  of  modern  Europe. 

§  163.  Need  of  rules  to  direct  us  in  judging  of  emphasis. 
On  this  account  there  is  the  more  need  of  well  ground- 
ed precepts,  drawn  from  the  nature  of  human  language 
and  of  things,  that  we  may  judge  correctly  of  emphasis ; 
so  that  we  may  neither  pass  by  those  which  are  real, 
nor  follow  after  those  which  are  imaginary.  Erasmus 
(on  1  Cor.  7:1)  thinks  this  may  be  endured  in  hortato- 
ry and  consolatory  preaching  ;  but  for  myself,  I  had 
rather  every  thing  should  have  a  solid  foundation,  as 
there  is  no  weerZof  any  ihing  fictitious.  In  serious  argu- 
ment, fictitious  emphasis  is  intolerable.  Indeed  it  is 
nothing  less  than  to  sport  with^that  which  is  sacred. 

§  164.  Insufficient  rules.  The  vulgar  rule,  which  bids 
us  beware  of  making  fictitious  emphasis  or  of  neglecting 
real  ones,  although  good  sense,  is  in  fact  7io  rule ;  as  it 
does  not  serve  at  all  to  direct  the  mind  in  judging  where 
emphasis  really  exists.  No  one  believes  himself  to  make 
fictitious  emphasis.  There  are  some  other  maxims  con- 
cerning emphasis,  which  are  not  formed  with  good  judg- 
ment, nor  worthy  of  refutation  here. 

§  165.  Kinds  of  ivriting  where  emphasis  is  rare.  To 
proceed  with  precepts.  First,  it  is  clear,  that  in  regard 
to  subjects  which  are  to  be  explained  with  great  nicety  ; 
in  perspicuously  exhibiting  the  precepts  that  respect  any 
branch  of  the  sciences  ;  in  laws  ;  in  simple  narrations  of 
facts  &/C.  emphasis  can  scarcely  find  place.  For  empha- 
sis is,  in  a  certain  sense,  tropical  or  figurative  ;  and  this 
kind  of  language  does  not  belong  to  writings  of  the  class- 
es just  named,  as  I  have  already  shewn  §  151,  and  as  all 
concede.     (Morus,  p.  330.  XI.) 

That  is,  simple  narration,  simple  instruction,  simple  legislation, 
for  the  most  part  is  destitute  of  emphases,  except  such  as  are  of^ 
the  lower  and  more,  usual  kinds.  But  in  the  Pentateuch,  Gospels, 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS.  85 

and  Epistles,  for  example,  which  are  specimens  of  the  different 
kinds  of  composition  in  question,  are  intermixed  many  passages 
which  contain  words  that  are  emphatic. 

§  166.  No  icord  of  itself  is  emphatic.  Secondly,  we 
must  guard  against  finding  emphasis  in  any  word  of  it- 
self, whether  used  properly  or  tropically  ;  because,  as 
has  been  already  shewn,  no  word  used  either  figurative- 
ly or  literally  has  of  itself  an  emphasis.  Emphasis  im- 
plies an  accession  of  meaning  to  the  ordinary  signiji ca- 
tion of  a  word. 

§  167.  Emphasis  not  to  be  taught  hy  etymology  or  re- 
curring to  the  original  sense  of  vmrds.  Thirdly,  empha- 
sis should  not  be  deduced  from  the  etymology  of  a  word, 
(which  often  misleads  as  to  the  proper  sense  of  it) ;  nor 
in  tropical  expressions  should  we  recur  to  the  proper 
sense  of  the  words  to  deduce  emphasis  from  it ;  as  has 
sometimes  been  done  in  respect  to  the  word  igivvav. 
Tropically  used,  this  word  does  not  signify  to  seek  icith 
great  exertion  and  diligence ;  for  the  Holy  Spirit  is  said 
igevvav  ra  §a-&ti  trig  -deoxriTog,  to  whom  this  emphatic 
meaning  surely  will  not  apply.  The  ancient  interpre- 
ters used  eQivvav  in  the  same  sense  as  yivwGiiitv.  In 
both  of  the  above  points,  errors  are  very  frequent.  (Mo- 
rus,  p.  331.XII.) 

§  168.  Prepositions  in  composition  do  not  alioays  make 
any  accession  of  meaning  to  a  word.  In  Greek  words, 
moreover,  we  are  to  take  special  care  not  to  make  any 
accession  of  signification  to  the  word,  simply  because  it 
is  compounded  with  a  preposition.  E.  g.  dva,  dno,  uQO, 
avf^  Ik,  nsQh  compounded  as  in  dvaoravQOvv,  avuvrid^iiv, 
Gv^fiuQTVQeLv,  TiQoyLvojGAtLv  &.C.  Many  are  accustomed 
to  build  arguments  on  such  imaginary  emphasis,  and  of- 
tentimes very  incongruously  ;  while  use  and  observation 
teach  us,  that  tliese  prepositions  do  not  always  change 
the  meaning  of  simple  words;  nay,  they  very  commonly 
are  redundant,  as  in  Polybius.     The  custom  of  the  Ian- 


86 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS'. 


guage,  in  such  cases,  must  be  well  studied.     (Morus,  p. 
331.  XIII.) 

§  169.  Emphasis  not  to  he  deduced  merely  from  theplu" 
ral  number.  We  must  be  cautious  also  that  we  do  not 
deduce  emphasis  merely  from  the  use  of  the  plural  num- 
ber, supposing  that  where  the  plural  is  put  instead  of 
the  singular  it  necessarily  denotes  emphasis.  This  is 
not  correct  either  in  regard  to  Hebrew  («)  or  Greek. 
With  good  reason  Melancthon  blames  Origen  for  mak- 
ing a  distinction  between  ovquvov  and  ovgavovg.  A  sim- 
ilar mistake  Origen  also  made  in  regard  to  oixri^f^ioTg^ 
in  Romans  12:  1,  which  many  have  incautiously  imitated, 
as  Bengel  has  the  former  error.  (Morus,  p.  332.  XIV.) 
a)  If  all  that  is  meant  here  be  simply  that  some  nouns  have 
only  a  plural  form,  that  others  are  used  both  in  the  singular  and 
plural  with  the  same  meaning-,  and  that  in  neither  of  these  cases 
is  emphasis  to  be  found  ;  all  this  may  readily  be  conceded.  But 
Ernesti,  and  his  commentators  Morus  and  Eichstaedt,  have  stat- 
ed the  assertion  in  the  absolute  form,  that  the  plural  has  no  em- 
phasis even  in  the  Hebrew  language.  I  have  softened  this  as- 
sertion in  the  translation  ;  and  add  here,  It  is  so  far  from  being 
correct,  that  the  pluralis  excellentioe  (e.  g.  in  D'^nbN,  D^Slit 
1D'^^5''3  &;c.)  is  formed  on  the  very  basis  that  the  plui-al  is  em- 
phatic in  such  cases.  This  principle  extends  to  many  cases  of 
the  Hebrew;  e.  g.  their  inward  part  is  Dl^Tl  depravities  i.  e. 
very  depraved.  It  is  a  principle,  however,  which  no  grammari- 
an has  yet  sufficiently  defined  and  established. 

§  170.  Abstract  tvords  not  of  course  emphatic  when  used 
for  concrete  ones.  In  like  manner,  we  must  beware  of 
attaching  emphasis  to  an  abstract  word  which  merely 
stands  for  a  concrete  one.  Some  learned  men  have  done 
this  ;  and  even  Glass  himself  admits  that  it  may  proper- 
ly be  done,  as  do  many  others  who  have  followed  his 
example.  But  they  have  neither  given  any  good  rea- 
son for  this,  nor  shewn  the  origin  or  cause  of  the  pre- 
tended emphasis  ;  so  that  it  seems  to  be  rather  a  thing 
which  they  wish,  than  one  which  they  can  intelligibly 
leach.     The  true  ground  of  using  abstract  words  in  the 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 


87 


room  of  concrete  ones,  is  either  from  necessity,  or  for 
the  sake  of  perspicuity  ;  not  on  account  of  emphasis.  In 
the  sacred  books,  the  necessity  of  it  springs  from  the  He- 
brew dialect,  which  often  employs  abstract  words  in  this 
manner,  because  it  has  only  a  few  concrete  ones.  The 
mistake  of  the  interpreters  in  question,  arises  from  the 
infrequency  of  the  practice  in  the  Latin,  and  in  their 
own  vernacular  tongue.  But  dissimilarity  of  idiom  does 
not  constitute,  as  a  matter  of  course,  any  real  emphasis. 
The  ground  above  taken  is  quite  clear  also  from  anoth- 
er circumstance,  viz.  that  in  the  same  forms  of  expres- 
sion, abstracts  and  concretes  are  commuted  for  each 
other.  Comp.  Col.  1:  13  and  Matt.  3:  17.  Also  Eph. 
o:  8  and  4:  18  &c.     (Morus,  p.  332.  XV.) 

§  171.  Entplinsismust  not  he  deduced  merely  from  orien- 
tal idioms.  In  the  sacred  books,  and  specially  in  the  He- 
braisms of  the  New  Testament,  we  must  take  care  not 
to  seek  for  and  recognize  emphasis  merely  in  the  idiom 
which  is  so  very  dissimilar  to  ours.  Many  persons,  though 
acquainted  with  the  Hebrew,  have  often  made  this  mis- 
take. But  nothing  is  more  fallacious.  In  the  oriental 
languages,  many  things  appear  hyperbolical,  (if  you  trans- 
late them  literally  i.  e.  merely  by  the  aid  of  common 
lexicons  and  etymology),  which  are  not  in  reality  hyper- 
bolical. E.  g.  in  Lamentations,  it  is  said,  my  trouble  is 
great  as  the  sect ;  which  is  simply  equivalent  to  the  Latin 
expression,  mala  mea  sunt  mcuima.  (Morus^  p.  335. 
XVI.) 

§  172.  Hoic  to  discover  emphasis  in  doubtful  cases.  If 
there  be  no  adequate  testimony  to  shew  that  any  word 
has  a  constant  emphasis,  we  must  consult  usage.  And 
here  we  should  first  inquire,  whether  in  all  the  passages 
where  the  word  is  found  emphasis  would  be  congruous. 
Next,  whether  in  the  same  passage,  or  a  similar  one, 
another  word  may  be  substituted  in  the  room  of  this, 
which  other  contains  a  special   designation  of  intensity. 


88 


RULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS. 


If  neither  of  these  be  the  case,  but  the  word  in  question 
may  be  commuted  for  others  which  are  plainly  unem- 
phatic ;  or  in  some  of  tlie  passages  where  the  word  oc- 
curs, a  special  designation  of  intensity  is  made  by  add- 
m^  some  other  word  for  this  purpose  ;  then  there  is  no 
emphasis  to  be  recognized  in  the  word  in  question.  E.  g. 
some  have  attached  emphasis  to  dnoy.aQadoy.iag  in  Ro- 
mans 8  :  19  ;  but  in  Phil.  1  :  20  it  would  be  incongru- 
ous. There  it  is  used  as  a  synonyme  with  tXnldv  (as  it 
is  also  by  the  LXX^,  and  in  fact  commuted  with  it  in 
verse  22.  Nor  is  emphasis  always  attached  to  such 
phrases  as  %aQdv  ;f«/^6£j' ;  (a)  for  such  phrases  are  of- 
ten used  when  another  word  is  added  to  indicate  inten- 
i^ity  ;  e.  g.  Matt.  2  :  10.  This  would  be  useless  if  they 
indicated  intensity  of  themselves. 

It)  But  in  Hebrew,  it  is  admitted  by  the  best  oriental  scholar?, 
not  only  that  such  forms  as  irN'ipD  bViipS  admit  of  emphasis,  but 
that  this  is  the  prevailing^  nsus'loquendi.  Consequently  the  im- 
itation of  this  in  Greek  may  be  emphatic. 

§  173.  Further  rules  to  discover  emphasis.  The  usual 
or  temporary  emphasis,  arising  from  the  affection  of  the 
speaker  or  some  other  cause,  may  be  recognized  with- 
out difficulty  by  the  following  mark,  viz.  if  the  ordinary 
signification  of  the  word  is  far  below  the  manifest  inten- 
sity of  the  affection  which  the  speaker  or  writer  feels,  or 
is  incompetent  to  describe  the  greatness  of  the  object. 
If  emphasis  be  not  admitted,  in  such  cases,  the  discourse 
would  be  frigid  ;  which  fault  is  certainly  very  foreign 
from  the  style  of  the  sacred  writers. 

§  174.  Continued.  Another  rule  for  finding  whether 
a  word  or  phrase  is  emphatic  is  this.  If  the  usual  force 
of  the  word  or  phrase  would  give  a  frigid  meaning, 
when,  on  the  other  hand,  an  apt  one  would  arise  if 
some  intensity  were  given  to  the  word,  there  is  a  plain 
necessity  of  emphasis  ;  which  is  the  best  guide  for  find- 
ing it.  So  in  1  Cor.  4:  3,  4,  uranQtvitv  is  constantly  em- 
phatic :  meaning  either  to  be  tried  bf/   the  judgment  of 


IIULES  RESPECTING  EMPHASIS.  89 

another^  or  io  take  to  one's  self  the  right  of  trying  and 
judging,  or  to  have  the .  right  of  judging,  or  to  be  able 
rightly  to  judge.  But  if  you  translate  it  simply  to  judge, 
a  frigid  sense  would  be  given  to  it  not  at  all  adapted  to 
the  context.  In  like  manner  jiIotii/  in  Col.  1:  4  is  used, 
as  the  context  shews,  to  denote  the  constancy,  greatness, 
or  fruit  fulness  of  faith.  For  Paul  was  not  necessitated 
to  know,  by  report,  that  the  church  at  Colosse  had  sim- 
ply Christian  faith,  since  he  had  founded  that  church. 
So  in  Rom.  1:  8,  that  faith  must  have  been  special  which 
was  celebrated  throughout  the  world.  Also  in  Matt.  4  : 
2,  Ineivaae  must  imply  intensity,  from  the  circumstances 
of  the  case. 

§  175.  Emphasis  must  not  contradict  the  nsus  loquendi. 
In  this  however  the  usus  loquendi  is  not  to  be  neglected. 
It  must  be  so  far  consulted,  as  to  see  that  the  emphasis 
implies  nothing  repugnant  to  it. 


PART  11. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING  APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES. 

[;Kei],  }  102.     Beck,  pp.  192—194.] 

J  176.  If  two  passages  contradict  each  other,  the  text  of 
one  must  be  faulty.  If  it  could  be  plainly  shewn  that  two 
passages  of  Scripture  are  so  repugnant  to  each  other, 
that  no  method  of  conciliation  is  practicable,  it  must 
then  necessarily  follow  that  one  of  the  readings  in  the 
usual  copies  must  be  faulty.  Consequently  an  emenda- 
tion of  the  text  must  be  sous^ht.     Of  this  nature  per- 


MEANS  OF  HAIIMOMZING 

haps  is  the  passage  in  John  19:  14,  compared  with  Matt. 
27:  45,  and  Mark  15:  25.  Also,  as  many  think,  Luke  3: 
36,  compared  with  Genesis  10:  24  ;  though  this  is  not 
clear,  in  my  view.  Some  add  Matt.  27:  9,  compared 
with  Zechariah  11:  12,  13.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  3.  I.) 

§  177.  If  the  text  of  both  be  genuine,  then  conciliation  is 
to  be  sought  where  appar-ent  discrepancies  exist.  If  the 
text  of  both  passages  plainly  appears  to  be  genuine,  so 
that  it  cannot  fairly  be  questioned,  then  it  must  be  un- 
derstood that  there  is  a  mere  appearance  of  inconsisten- 
cy ;  which  should  be  removed,  ai>d  the  passage  concili- 
ated by  a  proper  interpretation.  (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  7.  II.) 

§  178.  Discrepancies  doctrinal  and  historic.  The  ap- 
pearance of  inconsistency  sometimes  occurs  in  passages 
of  a  doctrinal  and  sometimes  of  a  historiccd  kind.  The 
writers  of  the  New  Testament  sometimes  appear  to  be 
at  variance  with  themselves  :  (a)  sometimes  with  each 
other  ;  (b)  and  occasionally  with  the  writers  of  the  Old 
Testament. (^c^  Many  writers  have  laboured  to  harmo- 
nize these  apparent  discrepancies  ;  some  devoting  them- 
selves to  the  consideration  of  a  particular  class  of  them, 
and  others  treating  of  the  whole.  A  cataloo^ue  of  these 
writers  may  be  found  in  Le  Long,  Pfaff,  Fabricius,  and 
others.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  8.) 

a)  E.  ^.  1  Cor.  8:  1  comp.  verse  7.  (&)  E,  g.  Paul  asserts  that 
a  man  is  justified  by  faith  and  not  by  works  ;  James,  that  he  is 
justified  not  by  faith  only,  but  also  by  works,  (c)  E.  ^.  in  many 
passages  cited  from  the  Old  Testament,  by  the  writers  of  the  New 
Testament. 

^  179.  Causes  of  apparent  discrepancy  in  doctrinal  pas- 
sages. In  doctrinal  passages,  an  apparent  contradiction 
that  is  to  be  removed,  arises,  for  the  most  part,  either 
from  the  style  of  the  authors,  which  is  rather  of  the  pop- 
ular kind  than  that  of  nice  refinement,  or  from  the  ge- 
nius of  the  oriental  languages  which  differs  so  widely 
from  that  of  the  western  ones.  An  apparent  contradic- 
tion, in  respect  to  doctrines  plainly  taught,   (which  has 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES,  91 

often  been  objected  to  our  religion  by  impious  and  pro- 
fane men,  e.  g.  Julian  in  Cyril's  works,  who  says  that  it 
is  expressly  taught  there  is  but  one  God,  and  yet  Matt, 
xxviii.  ascribes  Divinity  to  three,)  is  to  be  removed  by 
theologians  in  the  way  of  explaining  things  rather  than 
words  merely  ;  and  so  it  comes  not  directly  within  the 
province  of  the  interpreter.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  9.) 

§  180.  Method  of  harmonizing  apparent  doctrinal  dis- 
crepancies. The  method  of  harmonizing  doctrinal  pas- 
sages may  be  regulated  by  the  following  maxims.  An 
obscure  passage,  i.  e.  one  in  which  is  something  ambi- 
guous or  unusual,  should  be  explained  in  accordance 
with  what  is  plain  and  without  any  ambiguity. (^f/^  Again, 
a  passage  in  which  a  doctrine  is  merely  touched  or  ad- 
verted to,  is  to  be  explained  by  other  passages  which  pre- 
sent plain  and  direct  exhibitions  of  it.  (b) 

We  must  however  be  careful  to  harmonize  apparent 
discrepancies,  if  it  can  be  done,  by  recourse  to  the  usus 
loqucndi ;  so  that  all  occasion  of  doubt  or  cavilling  may 
be  removed.  For  it  is  very  desirable  that  the  usus  lo- 
qucndi should  justify  that  sense  which  we  put  on  any 
doubtful  passage,  from  having  compared  it  with  passag- 
es that  are  plain  and  clear.  (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  9.  and  10.) 

a)  E.  g.  we  explain  all  anthropopathic  expressions  in  regard 
to  God,  by  the  plain  truth  that  his  nature  is  spiritual. 

6)  E.  g^.  the  subject  of  justiiication  in  Rom.  III.  is  designedly 
treated  at  large  ;  of  the  resurrection,  in  1  Cor.  XV.  Such  pas- 
sages are  called  classic  (loci  classici),  and  by  them  other  ex- 
pressions which  simply  occur  obiter  are  to  be  explained. 

§181.  Continued.  It  is  very  important  to  remember, 
that  many  things  of  a  doctrinal  nature  are  simply  and 
absolutely  declared,  agreeably  to  common  usage  in  all 
languages,  which  still  have  only  a  relative  sense.  This 
may  be  accounted  for  from  the  fact,  that  there  are  parts 
of  religion  which  are  commonly  known  and  understood  ; 
therefore  such  parts  do  not  need  accurate  limitations. 
E.  g.  that  we  are  saved  bi/  faith  is  one  of  the  elementary 
principles  of  the  Christian  religion.     The  sacred  writers 


9'i  MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING 

therefore  do  not,  on  every  mention  of  any  duty,  remind 
us  of  this  principle ;  as  they  expect  us  to  keep  it  in 
memory.  When  they  say  then  that  almsgiving  is  ac- 
ceptable to  God,  they  expect  to  be  understood  as  mean- 
ing, if  it  he  accompanied  by  faith.  In  this  way  apparent 
discrepancies  may  be  reconciled  ;  and  the  reconciliation 
becomes  the  more  probable,  as  the  reason  for  it  can  be 
given.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  11.) 

Apparent  discrepancies  arising  from  oriental  siy\e  or  manner  of 
expression  (J  179)  are  pretty  numerous.  E.  ^.  pluck  out  the  eye 
that  otfends  thee  ;  it  is  easier  for  a  camel  to  g:o  through  the  eye 
of  a  needle  &c  ;  to  follow  Christ,  one  must  hate  parents  &c.  Luke 
14:  26.  The  context,  passages  similar  as  to  the  subject,  the  na- 
ture of  the  style,  the  subject  itself  «tc.  are  the  means  of  finding 
the  true  sense  of  such  places;  and  then  the  harmony  of  them 
with  other  passages  is  obvious.     (Morus,  Vol.  !I.  pp.  U — 14.) 

Apparent  discrepancies  between  various  writers,  or  between 
different  parts  of  the  same  author,  not  unfrequently  occur.  E.  g. 
Rom.  Ill  and  James  II.  in  respect  to  justification.  The  mode  of 
conciliation  is  simply  to  obtain  a  complete  vieiv  of  the  meaning  of 
each  writer.  It  will  then  be  seen,  for  example  in  this  case,  that 
Paul  is  arguing  against  those  who  would  establish  meritorious 
justification  :  James,  against  Antinomian  views  of  the  gospel. 
TVorks.,  in  FauPs  epistle,  means  complete  obedience  to  the  laio  ;  ia 
James,  it  means  such  obedience  as  must  be  the  necessary  const' 
quence  of  christian  faith.  The  object  of  both  apostles  being  ful- 
ly understood,  all  discrepancy  vanishes.  In  like  manner,  the  ad- 
vice of  Paul  in  1  Cor.  VII.  respecting  matrimony,  is  only  pro  tem- 
pore., and  dictated  merely  t>y  the  present  exigencies  of  the  times  ; 
for  the  apostle,  in  many  other  places  of  his  writings,  has  express- 
ed a  diflerent  sentiment.     (Morus,  pp.  14 — 17.) 

Similar  to  the  apparent  discrepancy  just  mentioned,  is  the  case 
Avhere  different  predicates  are  ajiparently  asseited  of  the  same 
subject.  E.  g.  Rom.  3:  20,  it  is  said  that  a  man  cannot  be  justi- 
fied by  works;  but  in  2:  13,  it  is  stated  that  the  TTOti^Tai  doers 
of  the  law  shall  be  justified.  Here  one  verse  states  the  rule  of 
legal  justification  ;  the  other  asserts  that  no  man  can  claim  it  on 
the  ground  of  that  rule.  Again,  where  we  are  said  to  he  justified, 
by  faith.,  the  m*  aning  is,  that  tve  receive  pardon  on  the  ground  of 
gratuity;  hut  justification.,  as  ap])lied  to  the  (/o(?r*  of  the  law, 
means  reicard  on  the  ground  of  merit  or  perfect  obedience.  (Mo- 
rus, Vol.  II.  p.  17.  Vf.) 

Discrepancies  seem  to  exist,  at  times,  between  the  writers  of 
the  Old  Testament  and  the  Nen-,  merely  from  the  different  man- 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES. 


93 


ner  in  which  they  express  themselves  on  the  same  subjects  ;  Avhen 
this  is  rather  to  be  attributed  to  different  degrees  of  light  which 
the  writers  had,  and  to  the  differences  in  the  eras,  manners,  hab- 
its &c.  of  each.  E.  g.  the  subject  of  war  ;  of  loving  enemies  ;  of 
benevolence  to  the  Gentiles  ;  of  God's  equal  and  paternal  regard 
to  them;  of  gratuitous  justification  ic.  A  representation  less  per- 
fect, in  the  Old  Testament,  need  not  to  be  understood  as  contra- 
dicting one  more  perfect  in  the  New.  (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  13. 
VII.) 

Finally,  in  every  case  of  apparent  doctrinal  discrepancy,  the 
rule  to  guide  the  interpreter  is  simple,  viz.  find  the  true  meaning 
of  each  writer  ;  take  every  thing  into  view,  which  the  principles 
of  interpreting  language  require  ;  the  subject,  scope,  context, 
design,  age,  habits,  style,  object  «Sz;c.  of  the  author  ;  and  when 
the  meaning  is  found  of  each  writer,  the  passages  may  be  brought 
together  without  fear  of  any  real  discrepancy. 

§182.  Origin  of  apparent  liistorical  discrepancies.  Ap- 
parent discrepancies  of  a  historical  nature,  originate  from 
a  difference  of  design  and  manner  in  narrating  the  same 
thing  ;  as  often  happens  in  the  gospels.  For  a  diversi- 
ty of  design  varies  the  choice  of  circumstances.  Many 
circumstances  differ,  after  all,  in  nothing  important  as  to 
designating  the  ideas  which  the  authors  in  common  mean 
to  designate ;  and  oftentimes  they  may  be  either  com- 
muted for  each  other,  or  omitted.  It  is  of  no  importance^ 
sometimes,  whether  a  thing  be  asserted  in  a  generic  or 
specific  form.  Hence,  appearances  of  discrepancy  have 
frequently  arisen.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  22.  IX.) 

§  183.  Continued.  But  far  more  frequently  an  ap- 
pearance of  discrepancy  arises  from  the  mere  manner  of 
expression ;  which  seems,  at  first  view,  to  imply  a  dif- 
ference in  the  things  described,  while  it  is  merely  a 
difference  in  the  mode  of  describing  them.  It  is  very 
evident,  that  the  best  and  most  careful  writers  do  not 
always  exhibit  the  same  precise  and  accurate  method  in 
respect  to  the  names  of  things,  persons,  or  places  ;(rtj 
in  regard  to  numbers, (^6^  dates, ('c^  years  &c.  Nor  are 
they  usually  blamed  for  this,  nor  ought  they  to  be. 
Hence,  where  several  names  of  the   same  object  exist;. 


94  MEANS  OF  HARMONIZING 

they  sometimes  exhibit  one,  and  sometimes  another.  In 
regard  to  the  manner  of  expressing  time,  places,  and 
numbers,  sometimes  they  use  the  more  vulgar  and  in- 
distinct method,  and  sometimes  the  more  nice  and  accu- 
rate one.  In  designating  time  they  vary.  They  some- 
times put  genus  for  species,  and  vice  versa.  Examples 
of  such  a  nature  occur  in  common  histories,  and  also  in 
the  Gospels. 

ft)  E.  g.  Matt.  17:  14.  comp.  Luke  9:  38.  Gadarene  and  Ger- 
g-asene.  Matt.  8:  28.  comp,  with  Mark  5:  2.  Matt.  5:  1.  comp. 
Luke  6:17,  h)  xMatt.  27:  44  comp.  Luke  23:  39.  Matt.  8:  5—9 
camp.  Luke  7:  1—10.  Matt.  8:  28.  comp.  Mark.  5:  2.  Acts  7:  !4 
comp.  Gen.  46:  27.  Acts  7:  6.  comp.  GaL  3:  17.  c)  Luke  2:  2. 
comp.  with  the  history  of  the  Syrian  Proconsuls. 

§  184.  IVe  should  he  conversant  with  conciliations  of 
passages  in  the  best  classic  authors.  With  these  usages  in 
v/riting  history  we  ought  to  be  well  acquainted,  either 
by  our  own  study  of  the  classics,  or  from  the  remarks 
of  skilful  interpreters  :  e.  g.  Perizonius  Animadverss.  in 
hist,  et  al.  lib.  ;  Duker  on  Livy  ;  Wesseling  on  Herodo- 
tus and  Diodorus.  An  acquaintance  with  these  will  en- 
able us  promptly  to  obtain  aid  from  them,  when  it  is 
needed,  for  harmonizing  passages  which  seem  to  disa- 
gree ;  for  it  is  plain  that  the  difficulty  of  harmonizing 
passages  arises,  for  the  most  part,  from  want  of  skill  in 
this  exercise.     (Morus,  Vol.  II.  p.  28.  XIII.) 

§  185,  Historical  facts  not  to  he  confounded  because  oj'  u 
slis>ht  similitude,  nor  to  be  represented  as  different  on  at- 
coant  of  some  slight  discrepancy.  In  historic  discrepan- 
cies we  must  guard  against  confounding  things  which  re- 
ally differ,  merely  because  they  have  some  similitude  ; 
or  deducing  discrepancies  thence,  as  has  often  happen- 
ed, in  the  interpretation  of  prafane  authors.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  must  not  rashly  multiply  facts  because 
there  are  some  slight  discrepancies  in  the  narration  of 
them.  The  reading  of  history,  and  of  good  commenta- 
ries upon  different  authors,  is  very  important  to  assist 
one  here. 


APPARENT  DISCREPANCIES.  05 

On  the  subject  of  harmonizing  the  narrations  contained  in  the 
Gospels,  it  is  difficult  to  say  any  thing  here  which  will  give  even 
a  faint  representation  of  the  efforts  that  have  been  made.  Sever- 
al hundred  harmonies  have  been  published.  Some  have  chosen 
one  Gospel  as  exhibiting  the  regular  order  of  time,  and  made  the 
rest  to  conform  to  it ;  others  have  rejected  the  supposition  of  per- 
fect chronological  order  in  any.  Some  have  made  the  number  of 
facts  related  as  small  as  possible,  and  ibrced  the  language  to  a 
harmony  ;  others  have  multiplied  the  number  of  facts,  so  that 
every  narration  comprising  a  single  circumstance  of  discrepancy 
from  others,  has  been  supposed  to  contain  a  history  of  a  similar 
but  still  of  a  separate  fact.  Some  have  supposed  the  public  min- 
istry of  Christ  to  have  continued  for  three  years  ;  others  for  more 
than  seven. 

Dispute  about  the  sources  of  the  Gospels  has  been  multiplied 
almost  without  bounds,  among  the  German  critics.  By  different 
writers,  each  of  the  first  three  Evangelists  has  been  considered  as 
the  source  of  the  rest;  while  others  allow  that  there  are  two  in- 
dependent writers,  and  the  rest  are  compilers.  Many  others 
suppose  that  original  Hebrew  or  rather  Syro-Chaldaic  documents 
existed  in  writing,  from  which  the  first  three  evangelists  drew  in 
common.  Hence  their  resemblance  to  each  other  in  respect  to 
diction.  But  different  copies  of  such  documents,  they  suppose, 
were  used  by  the  Evangelists,  which  had  been  interpolated  or 
augmented.  Hence  their  discrepancies.  Some  assert  a  perfect 
harmony  between  the  Evangelists  even  in  the  minutest  circum- 
stances ;  while  others  maintain  discrepancies  which  amount  to 
absolute  contradictions. — Where  shall  the  young  interpreter  go, 
to  find  a  refuge  from  such  a  chaos  of  doubts  and  difficulties  as  are 
here  presented  ?  If  I  may  venture  to  express  an  opinion,  which 
is  not  the  mere  result  of  speculation,  I  would  say  ;  Let  him  go  to 
the  diligent,  thorough,  repeated  study  of  the  Gospels,  with  a 
candid  mind,  united  to  a  life  of  prayer  and  faith.  Let  him  carry 
with  him  to  this  study  a  fundamental  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
language,  that  he  may  not  be  embarrassed  with  the  mere  forms 
of  words.  I  will  venture  to  add,  that  he  will  find  it  necessary  to 
believe  with  Jerome,  that  the  Scripture  consists  in  the  sense  of 
a  passage^  and  not  in  the  words  only ;  which  are  the  mere  co-y- 
tume  of  the  sense.  Notions  o{  verbal  inspiration  may  be  and  of- 
ten have  been  such,  as  to  render  the  conciliation  of  the  Evangel- 
ists a  desperate  undertaking.  That  notion  which  attaches  abso- 
lute perfection  to  the  form  of  language^  as  well  as  to  the  sense 
which  it  conveys,  makes  the  reconciliation  of  them  impossible. 
In  some  cases,  two,  three,  or  even  the  four  Evangelists  relate  the 
same  thing  in  different  words.  Now  ifthe/or/H  of  the  words  in 
■one  is   absolutely  perfect^   what  is  to  be  said  of  the  other  three. 


96  WEANS  OF  HARMONIZINe 

who  have  adopted  different  forms  ?  And  if  the  form  of  a  narra- 
tion in  Luke,  with  two,  three,  or  more  circumstances  interwoven 
is  absolutely  perfect,  what  becomes  of  the  narrations  in  Matthew 
and  Mark,  where  one  or  more  of  these  circumstances  are  omitted  ? 

It  is  a  fact  which  admits  of  no  doubt,  that  the  sacred  writers 
differ  from  each  other  as  much  in  respect  to  the  mode  of  writing^ 
as  profane  authors.  The  proper  question  always  is.  What  is  the 
meaning  which  they  design  to  convey?  What  is  their  principal 
or  special  object  in  conveying  it  ?  These  questions  being  answer- 
ed, it  matters  not  in  what  garb  this  meaning  is  clad  ;  nor  wheth- 
er more  or  fewer  circumstances  accompany  it,  that  are  not  es- 
sential to  the  main  point. 

Considerations  of  this  nature  will  help  to  remove  the  apparent 
discrepancies  of  the  Gospels  ;  as  they  are  now  presented  to  us. 
And  as  to  speculations  about  the  origin  of  them,  very  little  terra 
firma  has  yet  been  won,  by  all  the  adventures  that  have  been 
undertaken. 

The  student  may  read  with  some  profit,  Morus  Vol.  II.  pp.  24 
— 29;  and  many  of  Newcome's  notes,  printed  at  the  end  of  his 
Harmony,  are  the  result  of  good  sense  joined  with  much  critical 
experience. 

§  186.  Douhtf III  passages  to  he  interpreted  bi/  plain  ones. 
In  harmonizing  passages,  it  is  very  important  to  deter- 
mine which  is  to  be  accommodated  to  the  other.  We 
ought  to  have  some  rule  here,  lest  we  should  wander 
from  our  way.  The  rule  is  this  ;  if  one  passage  be  plain 
and  accurately  expressed,  so  as  to  admit  of  no  doubt,  it 
cannot  admit  of  any  accommodation.  The  doubtful  one 
must  be  accommodated  then  to  the  plain  one. 

§  187.  A  perfect  Harmony  not  to  be  expected.  After  all, 
I  should  admit  (with  Pfaff )  that  a  perfect  Harmony  of  the 
Gospels  can  hardly  be  made  by  rule.  Conjecture  must 
sometimes  be  applied  to  the  rules  of  harmonizing,  and 
to  the  use  of  them  in  particular  cases.  But  it  is  well  to 
observe  here,  that  the  subject  respects  merely  occasion- 
al historical  facts;  of  which  one  may  be  ignorant  with- 
out endangering  his  salvation.  Nay,  better  submit  to  be 
ignorant  here,  than  to  torture  one's  brain  to  hnd  out 
what  is  not  of  essential  importance. 


ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES.  97 


PART  III. 


ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES. 


§  188.  A?i  interpreter  should  not  only  understand  the 
Scriptures^  hut  he  ahle  to  explain  them  icell^  so  as  to  give 
an  exact  delineation  of  the  original.  An  interpreter 
should  not  only  possess  a  thorough  understanding  of  the 
Scriptures,  but  also  the  faculty  of  interpreting  and  ex- 
plaining them  well.  On  this  subject,  it  may  be  proper 
to  say  a  few  things. 

The  object  of  interpretation  is  to  give  the  sense  of  an 
author,  without  addition,  diminution,  or  change.  A  ver- 
sion ought  to  be  an  exact  image  of  the  original  arche- 
type, in  which  image  nothing  should  be  drawn  either 
greater  or  less,  better  or  worse,  than  the  original ;  but 
so  composed  that  it  might  be  acknowledged  as  another 
original  itself.  It  follows,  that  a  translator  should  use 
those  words,  and  those  only,  which  clearly  express  cdl 
the  meaning  of  the  author,  and  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
author.     But  this  needs  illustration. 

§  189.  The  ujords  of  the  version  ought  to  correspondas 
exactly  as  possible  to  those  of  the  original.  First,  as  the 
sayne  meaning  must  be  conveyed,  those  words  are  to  be 
selected,  the  force  of  which  plainly  corresponds  to  that 
of  the  original,  and  which  are  not  ambiguous,  but  of  a 
plain  and  established  meaning  among  those  for  whom 
the  translation  is  made.  Those  words  are  to  be  pre- 
ferred (if  such  can  be  found)  which  correspond  alto- 
ge  aer  with  the  words  of  the  author,  in  respect  to  ety- 
mology, tropical  use,  and  construction.  But  great  cau- 
tion is  necessary  here,  in  judging  whether  the  usage 
9 


yo  ON  TRANSLATING  THE   fe'CRIPTURES 

of  the  two  languages  agrees.  Otherwise  no  version  can 
be  made,  which  can  be  well  understood  by  those  who 
are  ignorant  of  the  original  language;  but  rather  an 
obscuration  of  the  author,  and  not  unfrequently  a  per- 
version of  him.  For  men  will  understand  the  words  of 
a  Latin  version,  according  to  the  Latin  iisus  loqueiidi, 
(and  so  of  a  German  translation)  ;  when  they  ought  to 
be  understood,  if  the  rule  above  be  violated,  according 
to  the  Greek  and  Hebrew  idiom.  Or  perhaps  the  un- 
learned reader  will  not  understand  them  at  all,  although 
from  the  habit  of  hearing  and  using  the  words  he  may 
think  he  understands  them.  A  frequent  case  indeed 
among  the  unlearned  ;  and,  I  may  add,  among  their  teach- 
ers also. 

§  190.  TV/ten  one  cannot  translate  ad  vcrhum,  he  must 
translate  ad  scnsum.  But  if  appropriate  words  as  above 
described  cannot  be  selected,  on  account  of  the  differ- 
ence of  idiom  between  the  two  languages  (the  original 
and  that  of  the  translator),  which  often  express  the  same 
things  by  words  that  do  not  correspond  in  their  etymol- 
ogy or  their  proper  signification,  (specially  is  this  the 
case  with  the  oriental  and  occidental  languages),  so  that 
a  literal  translation  of  the  former  would  be  often  unin- 
telligible in  the  latter  ;  then  we  must  relinquish  the  de- 
sign of  translating  ad  verbu?n,  and  content  ourselves  with 
merely  giving  the  sense  of  the  original  plainly  designat- 
ed. 

<5>  19  L  A  knowledge  of  Hebrew,  as  tvellas  Greeks  neces- 
sary to  translate  the  Neio  Testament.  This  can  be  ef- 
fected only  by  one  who  has  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
both  languages.  To  accomplish  this  in  respect  to  the 
New  Testament,  a  man,  besides  the  knowledge  of  his 
vernacular  tongue,  must  have  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
both  Greek  and  Hebrew.  This  is  necessary,  not  only 
to  understand  the  original,  but  to  judge  of  what  is  pecu- 
liar to  each  language,  and  to  express  the  sense  of  the 
original  in  a  manner  adapted  to  the  genius  of  his  own 
language. 


ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES.  99 

§  192.  Cases  wlierc  ice  must  adhere  to  the  mode  of 
iranslating  ad  vcrhiim.  But  various  causes  operate  to 
prevent  a  translator  from  strictly  following  the  rule  in 
5>  190.  For  first,  when  \\\q  form  and  manner  of  the  Greek 
words  has  such  a  connexion  with  the  things  signified 
and  the  method  of  arguing,  that  those  things  cannot  be 
well  understood,  nor  the  argument  proceed  well,  if  a 
translation  ad  verhum  be  not  made,  then  we  must  sacri- 
fice the  idiom  of  our  own  language  and  adhere  to  that  of 
the  Greek.  This  frequently  happens  in  respect  to  the 
epistles  of  Paul ;  e.  g.  2  Cor.  III.  in  regard  to  the  words 
ygaf.if.iaTog  and  jivevfAUTog,  also  (^ot?;?;  add  Gal.  3:  16; 
and  in  respect  to  allegories,  John  X. 

§  193.  Conilnued.  Antithesis,  paronomasia,  and  the 
like  figures  of  speech,  also  require  a  modification  of  the 
rule  in  §  190.  For  the  grace  and  beauty  of  these  perish 
when  the  language  is  changed.  Paul  has  many  of  these 
figures.  But  they  cannot  always  be  preserved,  as  anoth- 
er language  will  not  always  admit  them.  E.  g.  in  Matt. 
IG:  18.  nirgog  and  nhga,  the  paronomasia  can  be  pre- 
served in  Latin  but  not  in  English. 

194.  Continued.  Another  class  of  words  which  must 
be  literally  rendered,  are  those  for  which  no  equivalent 
ones  can  be  found  in  the  language  of  the  translator,  so 
as  fully  and  unambiguously  to  express  the  idea.  E.  g. 
the  word  Cw/J;  and  others  as  nlaTig^  ftexuvoca,  &c. 

§  195.  Continued.  In  very  difficult  and  doubtful  pas- 
sages, also,  a  literal  translation  must  be  given,  because  a 
version  ad  sensum  would  be  assuming  that  one  definitely 
understood  the  real  meaning  of  the  passage.  This  he 
might  do  in  a  commentary,  but  not  in  a  translation.  With 
propriety  says  Castalio  on  1  Pet.  4:  6,  "■  This  I  do  not 
understand,  therefore  I  translate  it  ad  verbum.''^ 

§  196.  In  translating,  we  ought  to  lean  toivards  our 
own  vernacular  idiom.     A  good  acquaintance  with  these 


100  ON  TRANSLATING  THE  SCRIPTURES. 

maxims  of  translation,  specially  ^practical  acquaintance, 
will  enable  any  one  to  judge  whether  a  version  has  pre- 
served the  right  method  in  regard  to  purity  of  language, 
or  introduced  too  many  of  the  idioms  of  the  original.  As 
versions,  however,  are  not  made  for  the  learned  who  can 
read  the  original,  but  for  others  and  specially  for  the 
common  people,  it  is  better  to  incline  to  the  idiom  of 
our  vernacular  tongue,  (even  in  cases  where  you  might 
with  some  propriety  adhere  to  the  original  idiom),  for 
the  sake  of  rendering  the  translation  more  intelligible. 
It  was  well  said  by  Jerome  to  Pammachius,  when  speak- 
ing of  the  best  mode  of  interpretation,  "  Let  others  hunt 
after  syUahles  and  letters  ;  do  you  seek  for  the  sense'"' 


APPENDIX. 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

Extract  translated  from  a  dissertation  of  Dr.  Morns, 
late  Professor  of  Theology  in  the  University  of  Leipsic, 
entitled  DY.  discrimine  sensus  et  significationis  in 
iNTERPRETANDO,  and  Contained  in  his  Dissertationes 
Theol  et.  Philol.  Vol.  L  No.  11. 

[To  the  above  rules  of  Erntsti,  the  object  of  which  is  to  guide 
the  translator  in  making  a  version  of  the  original  Scriptures  into 
his  own  wrnacular  language,  I  have  thought  it  would  be  ac- 
ceptable and  useful  to  those  for  whom  this  little  volume  of  the 
elements  of  Hermeneutics  is  designed,  to  subjoin  an  extract  from 
the  dissertation  of  Morus  just  mentioned,  which  appears  to  be 
very  judicious  and  instructive.  To  the  business  of  teaching  Fler- 
meneutics,  Morus  was  peculiarly  attached  and  devoted  ;  and 
few  men  have  understood  it  better,  or  left  behind  them  more  use- 
ful precepts  on  this  interesting  subject.  Equally  removed  from 
the  recent  latitudinarianism  of  many  German  interpreters,  and 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  101 

from  the  mystic  and  technical  method  of  the  older  interpreters, 
he  formed  and  nurtured  a  school  which  has  produced  great  and 
lasting  influence  upon  the  science  of  interpretation  ;  and  the 
principles  of  which,  for  the  most  part,  must  commend  themselves 
at  once,  when  well  understood,  to  every  intelligent  and  unbias- 
sed mind. 

The  dissertation  in  question  commences,  with  pointing  out  the 
impossibility  of  translating  ad  vtrbum  out  of  one  language  into 
another,  in  every  case  that  may  occur.  The  reason  of  this  is 
grounded  in  the  difiureut  modes  in  which  men  of  different  nations 
view  the  same  objects,  and  express  themselves  in  respect  to  them. 
The  age  in  which  writers  live,  their  different  manners,  customs, 
culture,  temper,  manner  of  life,  knowledge,  &c.  all  concur  in  pro- 
ducing these  differences.  In  consequence  of  the  operation  of 
causes  so  diverse,  there  is  in  one  language  much  of  rude  antiqui- 
ty, in  another  a  high  or  a  partial  state  of  cultivation  ;  in  one  the 
connexions  and  transitions  are  circuitous,  in  another  short  and 
easy  ;  in  one  ellipsis  abounds,  in  another  it  is  unfrequent ;  one  is 
profuse  in  allegories  and  tropes,  another  dry  and  jejune  in  ex- 
pression ;  one  abounds  with  equivocal  and  indefinite  phraseolo- 
gy, another  with  definite  and  certain  Vv'ords  ;  one  is  fitted  for  ex- 
pression in  respect  to  the  arts  a:id  sciences,  another  destitute  of 
such  meaus  of  expression  ;  one  is  copious,  another  is  furnished 
with  a  scanty  stock  of  words. 

In  consequence  of  these  diversities,  and  the  differences  of  idiom 
which  spring  out  of  them,  it  becomes  impossible  always  to  trans- 
late ad  verbuvi  from  the  one  to  the  other.  In  such  cases,  Morus 
justly  contends  that  the  translator,  abandoning  a  lite?-al  version, 
should  aim  at  exactly  coinmuuicating  the  stnstf.  E.  g.  the  literal 
translation  of  ycaxojg  e^dv  is  (o  have  badly  ;  but  what  idea  could 
an  English  reader  attach  to  this  translation?  Leaving  then  the 
version  ad  vtrbum^  we  must  translate  it  to  be  sicf:.^  which  conveys 
the  exact  sense  of  the  Greek  phrase  in  an  intelligible  form.  And 
this  instance  tr;ay  serve  to  illustrate  what  Morus  means  by  the 
phrase,  diffcrenct  betwten  the  signification  (Uid  the  sense  of  words. 
The  former  is  the  literal  and  primary  meaning  of  the  words  sim- 
ply considered  ;  the  sense  is  the  idea  conveyed  by  the  words,  in 
the  phrase,  or  in  the  connexion  v/here  thev  stand. 

"What  is  !=ai(l  of  words  may  also  be  applied  to  phrases  and  sen- 
tences tor  the  same  reasons,  and  from  the  same  causes.  In  all 
these  cases,  where  the  sense  cannot  b*^  given  by  a  literal  trans- 
lation, we  must  choose  other  words  which  will  designate  it ;  and 
where  particular  words  are  wanting  in  our  own  language  to  do 
this,  we  must  have  recourse  to  circumlocutt'-n. 

Having  discussed  these  princi]:iUs  ot   translating,  Tvlorus  pro- 
ceeds to  descant  upon  the  method  of  applying  them  to  practice. 
As  this  subject  is  a  matter  of  importance  to  all  who  are  to  ex- 
9* 


102  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

pound  the  word  of  God  ia  their  own  vernacular  tongue,  I  shall 
here  present  it  in  a  translation  of  the  author's  words.] 

It  is  proper  here  to  point  out  the  duty  of  the  inter- 
preter, in  reference  to  the  above  principles.  In  regard 
to  the  first  case,  namely,  where  we  abandon  a  literal 
version,  and  use  a  word  which  will  convey  the  sense  of 
the  original,  I  may  say,  in  general,  that  the  word  substi- 
tuted should  approximate  as  nearly  as  possible  in  its  sig- 
nification to  that  of  the  original  word  which  it  repre- 
sents. On  accuracy  of  this  kind  depends,  in  a  high  de- 
gree, the' excellence  of  any  version. 

But  as  it  rarely  suffices  to  give  merely  general  direc- 
tions, I  will  descend  to  particulars.  A  version  then 
should  exhibit  a  trope  where  the  original  does,  whether 
it  be  used  for  the  sake  of  ornament  or  variety  ;  an  en- 
ergetic word,  where  there  is  one  in  the  original.  Let 
the  translator  avoid  tropes,  where  the  diction  of  the 
original  is  not  figurative  ;  let  him  avoid  technical  ex- 
pressions, where  those  of  common  life  should  be  used. 
E.  g.  TtXiiOv  should  not  be  rendered  perfection,  hxxi  pro- 
hity^  uprightness.  Let  him  not  commute  genus  for  spe- 
cies, nor  antecedent  for  consequent.  In  respect  to  words 
which  depend  on  an  excited  state  of  mind,  such  as  re- 
proachful terms,  and  those  of  complaint,  lamentation, 
and  indignation,  also  proverbs,  and  proverbial  phrases, 
let  him  compare  these  most  carefully  with  the  practice 
of  common  life  ;  and  what  men  are  wont  to  say  on  such 
occasions  let  him  express  in  his  version,  and  not  rest 
satisfied  with  some  kind  of  general  meaning,  nor  make 
a  version  which  is  cramped  by  its  diction.  In  general, 
let  him  take  care  to  form  a  right  estimate  of  subjects 
from  the  nature  of  the  predicates  attached  to  them  ; 
which  is  a  matter  of  great  importance,  where  there  is 
a  departure  from  a  literal  version.  It  will  also  afford 
an  antidote  against  negligence  and  error. 

It  is  sufficient  to  have  given  these  few  hints  ;  and  he 
who  wishes  for  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the  laws  of 
translating,  must  inquire  into  the  grounds  or  reasons  of 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  103 

these  laws.  The  reasons  are,  a  desire  to  translate 
closely  and  not  paraphrastically  ;  a  wish  to  give  an  ex- 
act idea  of  the  thing  designated  by  the  original  words, 
so  that  the  reader  may  understand  it ;  the  necessity  of 
exhibiting  the  external  beauty  of  the  original  diction ; 
and  the  design  of  so  exhibiting  the  writer's  thoughts  in 
our  own  language,  as  to  make  it  apparent,  that  if  the 
writer  himself  had  used  our  language  he  would  have  ex- 
pressed this  proverb,  that  exclamation,  that  forumla  of 
speech,  just  as  the  translator  has  done. 

In  regard  to  the  second  case,  viz.  where  circumlocu- 
tion is  to  be  employed,  one  rule  may  be  given  to  guide 
the  translator.  Let  him  use  words,  if  possible,  which 
do  not  express  entirely  an  idea  that  is  composed  of  many 
parts  in  the  original,  and  some  of  which  are  not  desig- 
nated exactly  in  the  passage  which  is  translated  ;  but 
let  him  choose  terms,  which  are  as  exactly  equivalent 
to  the  original  as  possible.  Where  doubt  may  hang  over 
the  expression,  he  may  explain  it  by  notes ;  but  he 
should  not  be  blamed  for  not  expressing  definitely  in  a 
translation,  what  is  indefinite  in  the  original ;  and  while 
he  avoids  doing  this,  he  cannot  be  accused  of  obtruding 
his  own  views  upon  the  author  whom  he  translates. 

Thus  far  in  respect  to  translating  ad  sensam  rather 
than  ad  verbnm,  when  single  words  are  to  be  explained 
or  translated.  Let  us  come  now  to  sentences  and  pro- 
positions ;  in  regard  to  which,  when  they  cannot  be  lit- 
erally translated  without  obscuring  instead  of  illustrat- 
ing the  sense,  we  must,  in  like  manner  as  before  describ- 
ed, substitute  the  meaning  of  the  words  instead  of  the 
words  themselves.  In  merely  explaining  a  passage, 
which  contains  the  sign  of  some  particular  thing,  the  in- 
terpreter may  substitute  the  thing  signified  for  the  sign 
of  it.  E.  g.  when  God  is  said  to  come  from  heaven,  an 
interpreter  in  merely  explaining  may  say,  this  means  God 
as  performing  some  ilhstrioiis  work,  or  doing  any  thing  in 
general;  or  God  «.v  taking  cognizance  of  any  t'iinp\  or 
as  prop'.tious  or  unpropitious,  just  as  the  context  requires. 
Or  when  Christ  is  presented  as  sitting  at  the  right  hand 


104  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

of  God,  the  meaning  is,  that  Christ  is  participating  in 
divine  sovereignt}/.  So  when,  in  tlie  oriental  writers,  the 
sun  is  represented  as  darkened,  the  moon  obscured,  and 
the  stars  as  shaken,  these  are  images  of  distressing  times  ; 
and  therefore  when  it  is  said  that  these  things  will  hap- 
pen, the  simple  meaning  is,  that  times  of  great  distress 
will  follow,  in  which  as  it  were  all  nature  seems  to 
threaten  ruin.  To  this  class  of  passages  moreover  be- 
long all  those,  in  which  God  as  future  judge  is  repre- 
sented as  visible  ;  the  forms  of  speech  being  taken  from 
the  customs  of  men.  The  meaning  of  such  passages  is, 
that  God  will  render  to  every  one  according  to  his  deeds, 
as  it  IS  plainly  expressed  in  Matt.  16:  27. 

In  the  mere  explanation  of  these  formulas  of  language, 
every  one  sees  that  the  sense  is  to  be  given  ;  but  our 
translator  has  a  work  of  more  difficulty.  For  where  the 
object  of  enumerating  many  signs  of  the  nature  describ- 
ed above,  is  to  render  the  description  more  vivid  and 
impressive,  (as  in  Matt.  24:  29,  30,  31.  Joel  3:  1.  Dan. 
7:  9),  every  thing  must  be  closely  translated.  The  trans- 
lator would  mutilate  the  diction  of  the  author,  if  he 
should  abridge  the  description  and  give  only  the  gener- 
al meaning  ;  for  it  was  not  the  design  of  the  writer, 
merely  to  present  to  the  mind  the  thing  summarily  and 
literally  declared,  but  as  it  were  to  place  it  before  the 
eyes  in  a  picture  or  painting  of  it.  For  if  the  version, 
by  preserving  these  special  traits,  is  not  liable  to  pro- 
duce an  erroneous  impression  in  the  reader's  mind,  but 
every  one  who  reads  will  easily  understand  that  the 
whole  is  to  be  considered  as  figurative  expression,  (as 
those  things  are  which  are  spoken  of  God  avdgMno- 
naOdig, ;  then  there  is  no  good  reason  why  the  version 
should  be  changed  into  a  paraphrase  or  explanation. 
Who  would  doubt  or  be  at  a  loss  what  was  meant,  if  men 
in  a  state  of  suffering  and  wretchedness  should  be  de- 
scribed as  approaciiing  the  tlirone  of  God  for  the  pur- 
pose of  supplication  ?  But  if  a  translation,  as  it  stands 
in  our  vernacular  tongue  to  be  read   by  the  unlearned, 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 


105 


necessarily  leads  to  wrong  views  of  the  sentiments  of 
the  author  by  being  literal  ;  or  communicates  a  senti- 
ment opposite  to  his ;  or  makes  no  sense  ;  I  see  no  rea- 
son why  we  should  fear  to  substitute  the  sense  instead  of 
the  literal  signification  of  the  words  ;  specially  when  an 
argument  follows  which  does  not  depend  on  the  icords 
but  on  the  scnse^  and  which  no  one  can  understand,  who 
does  not  attend  to  the  sense  rather  than  the  words.  Of 
this  nature  are  such  expressions  as  making  intercession 
for  men  :  sitting  at  the  right  hand  of  the  king  ;  Christ  who 
was  rich  becoming  poor  that  men  might  he  made  rich  ; 
Christ  being  received  into  the  heavens^  S^c ;  which  last 
phrase  clearly  means  to  be  most  exalted^  to  have  supreme 
dominion.  Had  some  critics  understood  this,  they  might 
have  spared  themselves  the  trouble  of  inquiring  wheth- 
er Christ  contains  the  heavens,  or  the  heavens  him  ;  nor 
would  they  have  thought  of  the  majesty  of  Christ  as  suf- 
fering degradation,  by  being  included  in  a  place  ;  nor 
would  Beza  have  written  such  a  note  as  he  has  on  this 
subject.  The  meaning — the  meaning  only — is  to  be  sought 
for  ;  and  not  the  mere  literal  signification  of  the  words. 

In  other  cases,  what  the  sacred  writers  have  applied 
only  to  a  part  or  species,  interpreters  have  sometimes 
applied  to  the  whole  or  the  genus  ;  and  vice  versa.  Con- 
templated in  the  light  where  they  have  placed  it,  the 
thing  appears  obscure,  or  difficult,  or  as  needing  to  be 
softened  down  ;  but  in  the  other  light  it  is  plain,  easy, 
and  accurately  described.  What  David  in  a  certain 
place  imprecates  upon  his  enemies,  (and  therefore  upon 
the  enemies  of  Christ),  viz.  that  their  hahitcdion  might  be  de- 
solate and  deserted,  Peter  applies  to  Judas  the  betrayer  of 
Christ,  and  declares  that  it  happened  to  him,  Acts  1:  20. 
But  if  a  literal  application  of  it  is  to  be  made  to  David's 
enemies,  it  is  not  to  be  applied  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  it  is  to  Judas.  How  will  it  be  shewn  that  the  hab- 
itation of  Judas  became  desolate  and  deserted  ?  Surely 
violence  must  be  done  to  the  passage,  if  any  one  deter- 
mines to  understand  it  literally.     We  may  therefore  see 


106  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

wlietlier  tlie  passage  cannot  be  translated  ad  sensum.  E.  g. 
if  in  uttering  an  imprecation  against  one,  we  say,  Let 
his  house  become  desolate,  our  meaning  is,  in  general, 
that  he, nay  hecxiirpatecl,  that  he  may  utterhj perish.  Many 
imprecations  are  of  such  a  nature,  that  the  object  of 
them  is  evil  in  general  by  which  some  one  is  to  be  over- 
whelmed or  crushed  ;  and  to  the  mere  form  of  the  words 
themselves  we  are  not  scrupulously  to  adhere.  For  the 
language  of  imprecation  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  desig- 
nates, by  its  vehemence  or  moderatpn,  the  more  vehe- 
ment or  moderate  affection  of  the  iiiind,  and  also  the 
weight  or  lightness,  the  abundance  or  fewness,  of  the 
evils  which  are  to  be  inflicted. 

Similar  to  the  imprecations  of  which  I  have  just  been 
speaking,  is  that  of  wishing  that  any  one  may  he  extirpat- 
ed, or,  to  express  it  rhetorically,  that  his  house  may  he 
deserted ;  which  is  the  image  of  destruction  or  extirpa- 
tion. This  expression,  logically  considered,  means  a 
species  of  destruction,  and  in  the  language  of  common 
life  it  would  stand  for  an  example  of  destruction.  If  now 
the  words  above  applied  to  Judas  are  considered  as  sim- 
ply designating  the  idea,  let  him  perish,  and  are  urged 
DO  farther,  all  this  most  truly  happened  to  Judas ;  and 
this  entirely  agrees  with  the  sense  put  upon  the  words 
in  Peter's  discourse.  For,  as  Peter  argues,  if  Judas 
has  perished,  there  is  need  of  a  successor  in  his  of- 
fice. But  if  the  passage  be  literally  understood,  the 
conclusion  is  not  valid  ;  for  it  would  not  follow  that  be- 
cause the /!o?/se  of  Judas  is  deserted,  a  successor  to  his 
office  is  needed.  We  may  conclude  therefore  that  Peter 
cites  one  of  the  many  imprecations  contained  in  a  long- 
poem,  not  because  this  imprecation  only  is  to  be  regard- 
ed literatim  et  syllabatim,  but  merely  to  shew  to  wliom  all 
imprecations  of  that  nature  attach,  and  to  whom  they  may 
be  referred. 

But  still  further  to  confirm  this  exegesis  ;  does  Paul, 
I  would  ask,  when  he  cites  a  part  of  the  imprecations  in 
the  same  poem,  insist  upon   and   urge  the  literal   mean- 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  107 

ing  of  them  ?  (Rom.  11:  9,  10.)  Does  he  apply  the  trop- 
ical language  of  it  to  some  particular  kind  of  suffering, 
as  poverty  for  example,  or  sickness  ?  Not  at  all  ;  but 
he  plainly  teaches  us  that  the  language  of  the  Psalmist 
means  generally  to  express  the  imprecation,  Let  the  en- 
emies of  God  be  icretched! 

But  still,  in  translating  passages  of  this  nature,  it  is  not 
enough  to  give  the  sense  in  general.  We  must  present 
the  same  images  as  the  author  does,  and  of  course  express 
his  words.  If  we  neglect  to  do  this,  our  readers  may  in- 
deed know  in  general  the  meaning  of  the  author;  but 
they  will  remain  ignorant  of  what  language  he  employs, 
and  how  much  force  and  ornament  he  exhibits. 

I  come  next  to  allegory,  or  where  similitudes  are 
employed  for  the  sake  of  illustration.  The  use  which 
we  should  make  of  allegories  in  interpretation,  is  to  de- 
duce from  them  the  general  sentiment,  in  which  is  sum- 
marily and  properly  contained  that  which  the  waiter 
wishes  to  illustrate  by  his  similitudes.  In  explaining 
allegories,  it  is  surely  proper  to  have  respect  to  the  de- 
sign of  the  author  in  writing  them.  But  all  men,  who 
make  use  of  allegories,  expect  their  readers  to  regard 
the  general  sentiment  inculcated  by  them,  rather  than 
the  similitudes  themselves  ;  or,  which  amounts  to  the 
same  thing,  not  to  dwell  upon  the  language  merely, 
but  to  consider  the  design  of  it.  For  example  ;  wiien 
Christ  was  asked  why  he  did  not  enjoin  it  upon  his  dis- 
ciples oftener  to  fast,  according  to  the  usual  custom,  he 
answered  by  allegories,  using  these  three  similitudes, 
viz.  that  while  the  bridegroom  was  present  it  was  not 
proper  for  the  wedding  guests  to  be  sad  ;  that  a  new 
patch  should  not  be  sewed  upon  an  old  garment ;  and 
that  new  wine  should  not  be  put  into  old  bottles.  (Matt. 
9:  14 — 18.)  In  these  similitudes  is  doubtless  contained 
one  general  sentiment,  which  being  understood,  the 
force  of  Jesus'  reply  is  manifest.  That  sentiment,  as  it 
appears  to  me,  is  this  ;  that  no  one  in  common  life  is 
wont  to  do  those  things,  which  are  incongruous  with  the 


108  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

time,  place,  and  occasion.  For  if  any  one  should  be  sad 
at  a  wedding  feast,  or  put  new  wine  into  old  bottles,  or 
sew  a  new  patch  upon  an  old  garment,  would  he  not  act 
foolishly,  and  be  regarded  as  one  destitute  of  a  sense  of 
propriety  1  It  is  as  much  as  to  say,  in  common  life  such 
things  are  incongruous.  Whether  therefore  we  advert  to 
all  these  similitudes,  or  only  to  one  of  them,  the  same 
meaning  is,  and  ought  to  be,  deduced  from  the  passage. 

The  amount  of  the  whole  is,  that  Christ  being  asked 
why  he  permitted  his  disciples  so  much  indulgence  in 
regard  to  fasting,  replied  by  making  use  of  similies  to 
shew  that  no  one  in  common  life  would  do  that  ivliich  is 
incongruous ;  and  therefore  he  would  not  compel  his  dis- 
ciples to  do  that,  which  neither  the  time  nor  the  occa- 
sion required.  For  certainly  it  would  have  been  incon- 
gruous for  the  disciples,  while  Christ  was  with  them  as 
their  guide  and  teacher,  to  spend  their  life  in  sadness, 
and  to  devote  themselves  to  rites  of  this  nature  ;  espe- 
cially when  Christ  was  soon  to  be  taken  from  them,  and 
they  were  to  be  assailed  by  many  calamities  and  dis- 
tresses. Now  if  Christ,  who  knew  this  would  be  their 
lot,  had  forbidden  them  their  present  enjoyments,  and 
prematurely  loaded  them  with  burdensome  rites  which 
were  incongruous  with  their  present  circumstances  and 
with  the  indulgence  of  his  affection  for  them,  he  would 
have  done  that  which  would  be  like  being  sad  at  a  wed- 
ding feast,  or  sewing  a  new  patch  upon  an  old  garment, 
or  putting  new  wine  into  old  bottles,  i.  e.  he  would  have 
done  an  incongruous,  unseemly  thing. 

But  he,  who,  overlooking  the  fact  that  so  many  words 
are  employed  in  the  designation  of  one  general  senti- 
ment, thinks  this  mode  of  explanation  does  not  exhaust 
the  whole  meaning  of  the  similies,  will,  after  the  man- 
ner of  many  ancient  and  modern  expositors,  explain 
every  part  by  itself;  so  that  the  bridegroom  is  made  the 
husband  of  the  church,  the  wine  is  the  gospel,  the  old 
and  the  new  are  Pharisaical  and  Christian  doctrine  &c. 
For  myself,  1  am  wont  to  follow  the  usage  of  common 
life,   in  explaining  similitudes ;  for  this  is  the   voice  of 


MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION.  109 

nature,  and  can  easily  be  distinguished  from  the  usual 
method  of  allegory,  fable,  and  simile.  I  could  wish  that 
the  language,  opinions,  and  customs  of  common  life,  were 
more  frequently  regarded  in  the  interpretation  of  ancient 
authors. 

If  it  be  true  that  whatever  pertains  to  the  art  of  ex- 
pression  is  drawn   from  the  observation  of  nature   and 
common  life,  how  shall  we  judge  that  we  have   learned 
not  the  mere  opinions  and  speculations  of  others  about 
language,  but  the  real   art  of  language,   which   agrees 
with   the   practice  of  common  life,  unless  we  compare 
what  w^e  have  learned  with  the  results  of  common  and 
every  day's  experience  ?     If  it  be  true  that  any  book   is 
simply  the   language  of  the  author  as   it  were  addressed 
10  us,  can  we  persuade  ourselves  that  we  have  attained 
the   sense  of  it,   if  when  we  read  it  we  construe   every 
thing  in  a  different   manner  from   what  we   should  had 
we  heard  it  spoken  ?     If  we  understand  language,  against 
all  the  usages  of  common  life  ?     If  we  seek  in  the  very 
syllables  of  a  writer  mountains  of  sense,  which  no  one  in 
the  language  of  common  life  looks  for  or  suspects  ?     If 
we  deny  to  an  author  the  right  of  being  reasonably  con- 
strued,  and  not  to  have  his  words  urged  beyond   their 
proper  bounds  ;  a  thing  we   always  concede  in  conver- 
sation, and  which  is  indeed  a  fundamental  rule  of  ex- 
plaining language  that  is  spoken?     If  we  suppose  an 
author  to  have  written  merely  to  afford  us  an  occasion 
of  indulging  our  ingenuity,  and  while  he  walks  upon  the 
earth,  to  mount  ourselves  upon  the  clouds  ?     Only  think 
how  many  errors,  phantasies,   and  difficulties  have  been 
introduced  by  those,  for  example,  who  have  comment- 
ed on  the  ancient  poets,  and  setting  nature  at  defiance 
as  exhibited  in  common  life,   have  undertaken  to  inter- 
pret from  their  own  fancy  !     How   much  grave   wisdom 
has  been  obtruded   upon  Homer  against  his  will,  where 
his   words   breathed    simple   nature  and  common  life  ! 
Think   with  what  anxiety  of  mind   many   have  handled 
the  sacred  writings,  while  they   seemed  to  forget  that  al- 
though the  authors  were  inspired,  yet  thev  were  men, 
10 


110  MORUS  ON  TRANSLATION. 

they  used   human  language,  and  so  wrote  it  that  others 
for  whom  it  was  designed  could  understand  it  in  the  usu- 
al  way,  that  is  by  the  application  to  it  of  their  knowl- 
edge of  the   idiom  in  which  it  was  composed.     It  may 
happen,  indeed,  that  purusing  this  plain  beaten  path  we 
may  seem  to  be  unlearned,  because  we  do  not  profess  to 
know  all   which  others  think   they  know  ;  but  we   shall 
be  more  than  compensated   by  the  abundant   satisfaction 
of  having  every  thing  around  us,  all  that  common  life 
comprises,  testifying  in  our   favour,  and  that  the  mean- 
ing of  language  must  be  scanned  by  the  rules  which  we 
have   brought  to  view.     Some  perhaps  may  think,  too, 
that  we  do  not  exhibit  much  modesty  or  diffidence   in 
regard  to  the  sacred   books,  and  that  we  are  too   liberal 
and  studious  of  neology.     Still  our   satisfaction   will   be 
very  great,  if  the  reasons  of  our  interpretation   depend 
on  precepts  drawn  from  common   life  and  usage,  which 
carry  along  with  them  a  convincing  weight  of  evidence 
in  their  favour,  and  are  not  repugnant  to  the  nature  and 
genius  of  all   languages.     Such   incongruous  principles 
Turretine   has  very   ably  refuted,  in  his  book  de  Sac, 
Script,  interpretatione.     I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  acute- 
ness  or  subtilty  in  philology  is  to  be  neglected.     By  no 
means ;  for  without  these   no  doctrine  can  be  well  un- 
derstood.    He  who  heaps  together  much,  is  not  there- 
fore a  learned  man  ;  but  he  who  arranges,  defines,  for- 
tifies with  arguments.     Who  would  be  satisfied  with  be- 
ing deprived  of  all  the  advantages  of  subtilty,  or  nice 
discrimination,  which  enables  us  more  certainly,  briefly, 
clearly,  and  orderly  to  learn  any  thing  ?     But  when  we 
have   so  learned   it,  all  is  to  be   brought  to  the  test  of 
common  life,  so  that  it  may  appear  what  we  have  learn- 
ed  for  ourselves,  what  for  others  ;  what  for  the  schools, 
and  what  for  every  day's  use. 

[As  related  to  the  general  subject  of  translating;,  and  specially 
of  translating  the  New  Testament,  the  reader  will  not  fail  to 
compare  with  the  above  remarks,  Campbell's  excellent. observa- 
tions comprised  in  the  Preliminary  Dissertations  to  his  Transla- 
tion of  the  Gospels,  Diss.  II.  Vlll.  X.] 


<3t:neral  rules  of  criticism.  Ill 


PART  IV. 

GENERAL    RLLES    OF    CRITICISM  IN  RESPECT    TO    THE  NEW 
TESTAMENT. 

[Translated  from  Beckii  Monogram mata  Hermeneutices  Libro- 
rum  Nov.  Testamenti,  edit.  1803,  Lipsiae,  Sectio  III.  pp.  117, 
&c.] 

§  1.  Criticism  is  divided  into  hwer  and  higJier,  terms 
not  altogether  adapted  to  express  a  proper  division  of  it ; 
each  of  which  is  again  subdivided  into  grammaticG-his' 
torical  and  conjecturnL 

§  2.  The  authenticity  of  a  book,  the  genuineness  of  a 
passage,  and  the  goodness  of  a  particular  reading,  are 
established  by  arguments  external  and  internal.  The  lat- 
ter kind  of  arguments  are  deduced  from  the  nature  of 
things  treated  of,  the  sentiments,  and  the  language. 

§  3.  Loicer  or  verbal  criticism  is  regulated  by  the  fol- 
lowing general  principles;  viz,  that  reading  is  prefera- 
ble, respecting  which  it  may  be  prohahhj  shewn  that  it 
bears  the  stamp  of  the  author,  and  from  which  it  may 
appear  that  all  the  varieties  of  readings  have  proceeded. 
Hence  all  the  errors  of  copyists  should  be  noted  ;  as  they 
often  furnish  means  of  finding  out  the  true  reading  and 
the  origin  of  various  readings. 

§  4.  Common  laws  of  lower  criticism  ivhich  opply  to 
hooks  in  general  whether  sacred  or  profane. 

1.  That  reading  is  to  be  regarded  as  true,  which  is 
supported  by  far  the  greater  number  of  copies  and  wit- 
nesses. 

Bat  still,  readings  supported  by  a  few   books  are  not 


112  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

entirely  to  be  disregarded ;     [specially  when  they  har- 
monize with  the  2tsus  loquendi  of  the  author.] 

2.  That  reading  which  the  better  copies  exhibit,  un- 
less special  reasons  prohibit  it,  is  to  be  preferred  to  the 
one  which  the  poorer  copies  exhibit,  although  most  nu- 
merous. What  copies  are  of  the  better  kind,  is  a  ques- 
tion to  be  discussed  in  another  place,  where  inquiry  is 
made  respecting  the  genius  of  the  N.  Test,  writings. 
Neither  the  antiquity  nor  propriety  of  a  reading,  solely 
considered,  always  proves  it  to  be  a  true  one;  [unless 
the  antiquity  should  extend  back  to  the  autograph,  or 
the  propriety  should  be  shewn  to  be  exclusive.] 

3.  That  reading  which  is  more  harsh,  obscure,  difli- 
cult,  unusual,  or  delicately  chosen,  if  supported  by  the 
authority  of  a  proper  v.itness,  is  preferable  to  one  which 
is  plain,  easy,  usual,  and  common.  Difficulty  sometimes 
exists  in  respect  to  a  whole  passage  and  its  connexion  ; 
sometimes  in  regard  to  the  ambiguity  of  particular  words 
and  phrases  ;  sometimes  in  respect  to  the  grammatical 
forms,  historical  and  doctrinal  passages  &c.     But 

4.  That  reading  which  approaches  nearest  to  the  pop- 
ular and  familiar  method  of  speaking,  if  it  be  supported 
by  external  testimonies,  is  preferable  to  one  more  artifi- 
cial and  subtile. 

5.  The  shorter  reading,  when  supported  by  testimony 
of  importance,  and  not  incongruous  with  the  style  and 
design  of  the  writer,  is  preferable  to  a  more  verbose  one. 
Still  there  are  cases  where  the  more  copious  reading  is 
to  be  preferred. 

6.  That  reading  which  gives  the  best  sense  is  pecu- 
liarly preferable.  But  to  determine  this,  the  nature  of 
the  whole  passage,  the  genius  of  the  writer,  and  not  the 
mere  opinions  and  sentiments  of  particular  interpreters, 
are  to  be  consulted. 

7.  The  reading  which  produces  a  worthless  or  an  in- 
congruous sense,  is  to  be  rejected.  Good  care  however 
must  be  taken  not  to  condemn  a  reading  as  worthless  or 
incongruous,   which    a  more  correct    grammatical    and 


IN  RESI'ECT  to  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  113 

historical  investigation  would   prove  to  be  a  true  read- 
ing, or  at  least  a  probable  one. 

8.  A  reading  which  agrees  with  the  nsns  loqiicndi  of 
the  writer,  is  preferable  to  that  which  disagrees  with  it. 
It  must  be  remembered  in  judging  here,  that  the  style 
of  an  author  sometimes  varies  with  increasing  age. 

9.  A  reading  is  to  be  rejected,  in  respect  to  which 
plain  evidence  is  found  that  it  has  undergone  a  designed 
alteration.  Such  alteration  may  have  taken  place,  (1) 
From  doctrinal  reasons.  (2)  From  moral  and  practical 
reasons.  (3)  From  historical  and  geographical  doubts  : 
Matt.  8:  28,  comp.  Mark  5:  1.  (4)  From  the  desire  of 
reconciling  passages  apparently  inconsistent  with  each 
other.  (5)  From  desire  to  make  the  discourse  more  in- 
tensive. Hence  may  emphatic  readings  have  originat- 
ed. (6)  From  the  comparison  of  many  manuscripts  the 
readings  of  which  have  been  amalgamated.  (7)  From  a 
comparison  of  parallel  passages. 

Corrections  of  the  more  celebrated  manuscripts  have 
been  sometimes  detected. 

10.  Various  readings  are  to  be  rejected,  which  spring 
from  the  mere  negligence  of  copyists,  and  from  those 
errors  which  are  very  common  in  all  kinds  of  books. 
To  these  belong,  (l)The  commutation  of  forms  in  the 
Macedonico- Alexandrine  dialect,  and  also  other  unusual 
forms,  for  those  of  the  common  dialect.  The  Alexan- 
drine and  common  form,  however,  have  the  preference 
over  others  in  the  New  Testament ;  and  the  Alexan- 
drine dialect  itself  also  admitted  some  Attic  forms.  (2) 
The  commutation  of  single  letters  and  syllables,  by  an 
error  of  either  the  eye  or  the  ear  ;  the  former  result- 
ing from  obscure  and  compendious  methods  of  writing, 
[the  latter,  from  copying  after  the  reading  of  one  who 
was  misunderstood  or  w^ho  read  erroneously.]  (8)  The 
commutation  of  synonymes.  (4)  From  transferring  into 
the  text  words  written  in  the  margin  of  copies,  and  thus 
uniting  both  readings,  James  5:  2.  (5)  From  the  omis- 
sion of  a  word  or  a  verse,  by  an  error  of  the  sight.  (6) 
From  the  transposition  of  words  and  passages :  whence 

10* 


114  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

it  may  have  happened  that  some  error  has  crept  into 
most  of  our  books.  (7)  From  words  which  ended  with 
the  like  sound,  or  appeared  alike  ;  and  from  proximate 
words,  one  ending  and  the  other  beginning  with  the 
same  syllable.  (8)  From  incorrectly  uniting  or  separat- 
ing words  ;  which  naturally  resulted,  in  some  cases,  from 
the  ancient  method  of  continuous  loriting.  (9)  From  an 
erroneous  interpunction  and  distinction  of  passages. 

11.  A  reading  is  to  be  rejected  which  plainly  betrays 
a  gloss  or  interpretation.  This  may  be  a  word  or  a 
whole  passage.  Sometimes  these  glosses  are  united  to 
the  true  text,  and  sometimes  they  have  thrust  it  out. 
Not  all  interpretations  however  are  spurious  glosses ; 
[for  authors  themselves  sometimes  add  them,  in  order 
to  explain  their  own  language.] 

12.  Readings  deduced  from  versions  or  the  commenta- 
ries of  interpreters  are  to  be  rejected.  In  judging  of 
them  however,  great  prudence  and  much  skill  is  neces? 
sary. 

[The  maxims  thus  far  are  comprised  within  the  province  of  loiV' 
er  crilicism.  But  higher  criticism  may  be  and  ought  to  be  cm- 
ployed,  in  order  to  assist  in  forming  a  judgment  of  the  genuine- 
ness of  many  passages.  Here  follows  from  the  same  writer,  a  sy- 
nopsis of  the] 

§  5.  Latos  of  higher  criticisim  respecting  the  cstablish- 
ment  of  a  pure  text. 

1.  The  sentiment,  declaration,  passage,  book,  or  part 
of  a  book  of  any  author,  which  on  account  of  its  nature, 
form,  method,  subject,  or  arguments,  does  not  appear  to 
have  originated  from  him,  is  either  spurious,  or  at  least 
very  much  to  be  suspected. 

Imitations  of  authors,  made  with  design,  or  for  the 
sake  of  practice  in  writing,  or  from  other  reasons,  may 
easily  be  ascribed  to  the  authors  themselves,  though 
they  are  supposititious. 

2.  A  passage  which  manifestly  disagrees  with  the  na- 
ture and  connexion  of  the  context,  and  interrupts  it,  is 
.to  be  regarded  as  spurious. 

3.  A  passage  which  appears  in  anothej:  place,  either 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  115 

in  the  same  words  or  with  little  variation,  and  seems  to 
be  more  properly  and  commodiously  placed  there,  may 
be  suspected  of  having  been  transferred  to  the  place 
where  it  stands  with  less  propriety,  and  may  be  removed 
from  thence. 

But  here  great  care  is  requisite,  lest  we  judge  rashly 
or  form  our  opinion  rather  from  the  taste  and  style  of  the 
present  day,  than  from  the  genius  of  the  author,  his  de-' 
sign  and  style,  or  the  subject  and  argument  of  the  dis- 
course. As  an  example,  one  might  appeal  to  the  dis- 
putations about  the  Apocalypse,  and  to  the  appendix  of 
John's  Gospel  in  chap.  XXI. 

4.  Passages  which  are  manifestly  interpolated,  by  the 
comments  of  interpreters  or  from  any  other  cause,  are  to 
be  rejected  from  the  text. 

But  great  caution  is  necessary  here  to  judge  rightly. 
In  general,  intemal  arguments  alone  are  not  to  be  relied 
on  as  sufficient  evidence. 

5.  Parts  of  books  which  appear  incoherent,  and  yet 
clearly  exhibit  the  genius  and  style  of  the  author,  may 
be  reduced  to  better  order  by  separation,  and  making  a 
different  arrangement.  [Great  caution  here  too  is  ne- 
cessary.] 

6.  If  numerous  and  very  diverse  readings  of  a  book 
are  found  in  the  best  copies,  we  may  conclude,  either 
that  the  book  has  gradually  received  various  accessions, 
or  has  been  re-published  by  a  later  hand,  or  has  been  ed- 
ited a  second  time  by  the  author  and  corrected,  so  as  to 
give  occasion  for  the  introduction  of  such  various  read- 
ings. 

§  6.  Laws  proper  to  guide  our  judgment  in  respect 
to  the  true  reading  of  passages  in  the  New  Testament, 
spurious  additions,  the  books  themselves,  or  the  authors 
of  them,  may  be  deduced  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  the 
things  described,  and  the  style  of  the  books.  They  may 
also  be  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  sources  whence 
the  various  readings  come,  and  from  the  testimony  of 
witnesses.     Such  are  the  following. 

1.  Passages  are  to  be  regarded  as  spurious,  at  least 


116  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISM 

are  to  be  suspected  (if  any  such  there  are),  which  disa- 
gree with  the  nature  of  the  Christian  religion,  the  his- 
tory of  it,  or  the  mode  of  teaching  and  deciding  appro- 
priate to  any  sacred  writer  ;  or  if  they  appear  trifling, 
inapt,  or  jejune,  when  compared  with  the  force  of  the 
doctrine  exhibited,  or  the  gravity  of  the  author  who  ex- 
hibits it.  Specially  are  they  to  be  suspected,  if  histori- 
cal reasons  concur  to  render  them  suspicious. 

The  importance  of  subjects,  the  force  of  precepts 
and  narrations,  and  other  things  of  this  nature,  are  to  be 
estimated  by  the  manner,  judgment,  and  usage  of  those 
times  in  which  the  books  were  written.  In  judging  of 
doctrines,  special  caution  is  to  be  used. 

We  must  be  watchful  against  the  pious  frauds  (as  they 
are  called^  of  ancient  churches,  committed  in  the  inter- 
polation of  books,  and  in  giving  new  forms  to  passages 
of  them.  The  special  causes  of  interpolations  were  tra- 
dition, apocryphal  writings,  the  desire  of  explaining,  aug- 
menting, correcting,  &c.  On  the  other  hand,  some  pas- 
sages were  ejected  as  spurious,  which  seemed  to  be  un- 
worthy of  the  authors  of  them.  E.  g.  Luke  22:  43.  See 
Paulus'  commentary,  p.  613. 

2.  In  general,  the  reading  which  savours  of  Hebra- 
ism or  Syro-Chaldaism,  is  preferable  to  that  which  sa- 
vours of  classical  Greek.  [Caeteris  paribus,  it  is  always 
preferable.] 

Some  of  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  however, 
as  Paul  aud  Luke,  approach  nearer  to  the  Greek  style. 

The  conjecture  of  some  critics,  that  the  books  of  the 
New  Testament  were  originally  written,  for  the  most 
part,  in  Syro-Chaldaic,  and  afterwards  were  translated 
into  Greek  by  an  interpreter  who  has  committed  many 
errors,  can  at  most   be  extended   to  but  very  few  books. 

3.  Since  the  New  Testament  was  commonly  used  both 
in  public  and  private,  and  certain  parts  of  it  were  selec- 
ted for  ecclesiastical  use,  inquiry  must  be  made  whether 
any  portion  of  it  has  been  interpolated,  either  from  the 
parallel  passages  of  the  Old  Testament,  or  from  the 
Church  Lectionaries. 

4.  As  many  copies,  versions,  and  fathers  of  the  an- 
cient Churches,  are  found  nearly  always  to  have  follow- 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  117 

ed  the  same  text,  those  which  belong  to  the  same  class 
are  not  to  be  separately  numbered,  but  rather  to  be  re- 
garded as  standing  in  the  place  of  one  ivitness.  Still  less 
are  we  to  trust  solely  to  any  07ie  copy,  however  ancient, 
critical,  or  carefully  written.  Nor  is  any  copy,  which 
may  be  erroneously  written,  or  recent,  or  occasionally 
interpolated^  to  be  rejected  as  altogether  useless. 

5.  In  respect  to  any  reading,  the  first  inquiry  is,  To 
Avhat  recension  or  edition  does  it  belong  ? 

The  age  and  country  of  copies  and  readings,  is  to  be 
examined  by  careful  comparison. 

No  copy  extant  is  perfectly  free  from  error  in  all  the 
books,  or  uniformly  follows  any  one  uncorrupted  recen- 
sion. We  must  judge,  therefore,  from  the  consent  of 
many  things  of  the  same  kind,  and  from  internal  evi- 
dence, what  recension  is  followed,  either  generally,  or 
in  particular  passages.  Some  copies  are  thought  to  fol- 
low various  recensions  in  particular  parts.  A  few  cop- 
ies of  the  most  ancient  classes  of  manuscripts  are  extant 
but  the  majority  of  copies  are  more  modern.  If  an  an- 
cient copy  has  been  propagated  through  many  editions, 
it  may  have  been  exposed  to  vary  from  the  ancient  re- 
cension, or  have  been  corrupted  by  new  errors  of  the 
copyist,  more  than  if  a  recent  copy  were  directly  taken 
from  the  ancient  one. 

6.  That  reading  in  which  all  the  recensions  of  the 
best  copies  agree,  is  the  most  correct,  certainly  the  most 
ancient.     Slight  deviations  are  unimportant. 

7.  Readings,  supported  by  the  authority  of  the  most 
ancient  classes  of  manuscripts,  and  of  the  more  credible 
witnesses,  are  to  be  preferred  to  others.  But  a  regard 
must  be  had  to  the  internal  goodness  of  a  copy. 

8.  The  Alexandrine  cla.-s  of  manuscripts  is  sometimes 
preferable  to  the  occidental,  and  sometimes  of  less  au- 
thority. In  the  conflicting  claims  of  various  classes, 
special  regard  must  be  had  to  historical  and  internal 
means  which  enable  us  to  judge  of  a  reading. 

9.  Manuscripts  are  of  the  highest  authority  ;  but  nei- 
ther the  ancient  versions,  nor  the  exegetical  and  other 
books  of  the  fathers  are  to  be  neglected. 


118  GENERAL  RULES  OF  CRITICISlVl 

10.  In  collecting  and  judging  of  the  ancient  versions, 
(1)  Regard  must  be  had  to  those  made  directly  from  the 
Greek.  Among  these,  the  Latin,  Syriac,  and  Gothic  de- 
serve special  mention.  (2^  We  must  use  a  correct  text 
of  these  Versions.  (3\  We  must  inquire  whether  the 
translator  has  rendered  literally  or  ad  scnsum  ;  whether 
the  errors  in  the  version  arise  from  the  fault  of  the 
translator's  copy,  or  from  other  causes  ;  and  finally  wheth- 
er the  version  has  been  corrected  or  not.  (4)  Those 
versions,  which  from  comparison  are  found  to  belong  to 
the  same  family  of  manuscripts,  are  to  be  regarded  as 
standing  in  the  place  of  one  ancient  witness.  (5)  No 
reading  derived  merely  from  versions,  and  destitute  of 
other  support,  can  be  received  ;  but  the  consent  of  all  the 
ancient  versions  and  fathers  in  a  particular  reading, 
which  varies  from  that  of  manuscripts,  renders  the  latter 
suspicious. 

11.  In  regard  to  the  readings  derived  from  the  wri- 
ters of  the  ancient  churches,  we  must  see,  (1)  That  they 
are  drawn  from  a  correct  and  not  a  corrupt  edition  of 
the  fathers.  (2)  We  must  diligently  consider  the  au- 
thors, their  descent,  age,  erudition,  subtilty  of  judging, 
temerity  in  emendation,  the  nature  of  the  copies  which 
they  used,  and  the  creed  of  the  churches  to  which  they 
belonged.  (3)  We  must  consider  in  what  kind  of  book 
or  passage  of  ecclesiastical  writers,  various  readings  are 
found.  (4)  Inquiry  must  be  made,  whether  the  varia- 
tions are  supported  by  real  and  direct  testimony  of  the 
fathers ;  or  whether  changes  were  occasioned  in  the 
text  by  lapse  of  memory,  or  a  designed  accommodation  ; 
or  whether  merely  opinions  or  conjectures  are  propos- 
ed. It  seems  to  be  very  unjust,  to  ascribe  all  the  vari- 
ety found  in  the  ecclesiastic'  1  fathers  either  to  error  of 
the  memory,  or  to  temerity  in  accommodation,  or  a 
fondness  for  emendation.  (5)  The  omission  of  some 
passage  in  the  commentaries  of  the  fathers,  does  not 
always  shew  that  it  was  wanting  in  the  copy  which 
the  writer  had.  Silence  however  concerning  an  import 
taiit  passage,  renders  it  suspicious. 

J 2,  The  fragments  of  heretical  writings  are  not  to  be 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.      119 

overlooked,  in  the  search  for  various  readings  ;  for  the 
supposition  is  rash,  that  they  generally  corrupted  the 
text  of  all  parts  of  the  sacred  writings. 

13.  That  interpunction  and  distinction  of  verses  and 
chapters,  which  is  most  consonant  with  the  argument, 
sentiments,  connexion  of  discourse,  and  nsus  loquendi  of 
the  sacred  writers,  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  best. 

§  6.  In  the  criticism  of  all  ancient  books,  it  is  well 
understood,  that  particular  readings  are  not  required  to 
be  established  by  most  certain  and  irrefragable  argu- 
ments, but  only  that  a  probability  be  shewn  that  they 
approximate,  at  least,  very  near  to  the  original  read- 
ings ;  and  the  judgment  is  to  be  made  up,  in  view  of 
what  appears  to  be  most  probable.  So  in  respect  to  the 
New  Testament ;  no  more  should  be  required  than  can, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  performed.  Every  thing 
on  all  sides  should  be  considered,  before  the  judgment  is 
made  up.  And  if,  in  judging  of  the  text  of  profane  au- 
thors, gravity  and  modesty  are  rightly  commended  ; 
surely  in  judging  of  the  sacred  books,  we  ought  most 
scrupulously  to  abstain  from  all  rashness  and  levity,  as 
well  as  from  all  favoritism  and  superstition. 


PART  V. 

KEIL'S  HERMENEUTICA. 

ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  AN  INTERPRETER. 

[The  following^  chapter  is  extracted  from  KeiPs  Elementa  Her- 
meneutices^  translated  from  the  original  German  into  Latin  by 
C  A.  G.  Emmerling-,  and  published  at  Leipsic  in  1811.  Al- 
though it  contains  several  things  that  seem  to  be  a  repetition  of 
the  ideas  advanced  in  various  places  by  Ernesti,  as  exhibited  in 
the  foregoing  pages,  yet  as  the  object  is  to  describe  the  qualifi- 
cations of  the  interpreter  himself^  in  respect  to  knowledge,  and 
as  it  is  a  very  brief  and  well  digested  summary,  it  appears  desira- 
ble that  the  student,  who  aspires  to  the  place  of  an  interpreter, 
should  have  the  qualifications  of  one  definitely  and  separately 


120  ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS 

described,  as  here,  in  order  that  he  may  direct  his  special  atten- 
tion to  this  subject,  unembarrassed  by  other  considerations.] 

§  1.  He  who  desires  to  understand  and  interpret  the 
books  of  the  New  Testament,  must,  first  of  all,  acquire 
some  historic  knowledge  of  the  author  of  each  book  ; 
of  the  state  of  things  existing  when  it  was  written  ;  of 
the  body  or  collection  of  the  New  Testament  books  ;  of 
the  particular  history  of  its  ancient  versions,  editions, 
and  parts  in  which  it  was  written  ;  and  other  things  of 
this  nature.  To  this  must  be  added  a  knowledge  of  the 
principles  of  criticism,  in  respect  to  the  text  of  the  New 
Testament. 

Books  to  be  read  for  information  on  these  topics  :  INIarsh's  trans- 
lation of  Michaelis'  Introduct.  to  the  N.  Test.;  and  Haenlein, 
Eichhorn,  Bertholdt,  De  Wette,  Hug,  Einleitungen  in  die  Schrif- 
ten  des  N.  Testaments.  Also,  Home's  Introduction  to  the  criti- 
cal Study  of  the  Scriptures. 

§  2.  Of  the  second  kind  of  knowledge,  preparatory  to 
the  understanding  and  interpretation  of  the  N.  Testament. 

(1)  The  interpreter  must  understand  the  language  in 
which  the  hooks  are  ivritten.  As  the  diction  is  not  pure 
classic  Greek,  but  the  Hebrew  idiom  here  and  there  in- 
termixed with  classic  Greek,  and  as  vestiges  of  the  Chal- 
dee,  Syriac,  Rabbinic  and  Latin  languages  occur ;  it  fol- 
lows, of  course,  that  the  interpreter  should  not  only  be 
acquainted  with  pure  Greek,  but  with  its  various  dia- 
lects, specially  the  Alexandrine.  Above  all,  he  ought 
to  be  well  versed  in  the  Hebrew,  Chaldee,  Syriac,  Rab- 
binic, and  Latin  idioms. 

Vorstius  de  liebraismis  N.  Test,  cura  Fischeri  1778.  Leusden 
de  Dialectis  N.  Test.  edit.  Fischeri  1792.  Mattaire  de  Dialec- 
tis  Ling.  Graecae.  Sturtz  de  Dialecto  Macedonica  et  Alexandri- 
na,  1808.  PfannkucheUeber  die  Palaestinische  Landessprache 
in  dem  Zcitalter  Christi,  im  Eichhorn's  allgemeine  Bibliothek  B. 
viii.  s.  363  seq.  Planck,  de  vera  natura  indolis  orat.  Graec.  N. 
Test. 

(2)  The  interpreter  7mtst  possess  a  knotclcdge  of  the 
things  respecting  which  the  books  treat.  These  are  partly 
historical^  and  partly  doctrinal.  The  explanation  of  them 
must  be  sought,  primarily,  from  the  books  themselves  ; 
and  secondarily,  from  those  writings  of  more  recent  au- 
thors, which  may  be  subsidiary  to  the  attainment  of  this 
knowledge. 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER. 


121 


§  3.  As  to  the  historic  matter  of  these  books.  It  is  of 
great  importance  to  the  interpreter  to  be  well  versed 
in  sacred  geography,  chronology,  civil  history,  and  ar- 
chaeology ;  i.  e.  to  understand  those  things  which  re- 
spect the  situation  and  climate  of  the  countries,  where 
the  events  referred  to  happened  ;  as  well  as  those  which 
serve  to  define  the  times  when  they  happened  ;  and  al- 
so the  history  of  the  nation  among  whom  they  took 
place,  and  of  other  nations  mentioned  in  this  history, 
with  their  condition,  manners,  and  customs. 

(!)  Geographical  knowledge.  The  geography  of  Pal- 
estine and  the  neighbouring  countries  should  be  well 
understood,  (a)  as  also  their  natural  productions,  {b) 
To  this  must  be  added  a  knowledge  of  many  countries 
in  Asia,  and  of  some  in  Europe ;  also  the  Roman  em- 
pire, as  it  then  existed,  divided  into  provinces. 

a)  Well's  Sacred  Geography.  Relandi  Palestina.  Bachiene 
histor.  und  geog^raph.  Beschreibung  von  PaUstiria,  Torn.  vii. 
8vo.  1766.  Hamelsfeldt  biblische  Geographie,  3  1  heile,  1796. 
Bellermanu's  biblische  Archaeologia.  Rosenmiiller's  bib.  Alther- 
thumskuride. 

b)  Celsii  Hierobotanicon,  1745.  Bocharti  Hierozoicon,  edit. 
Roseutniiller,  1776.  I'om.  iii.  Supp.  to  Calmet's  Dictionary, 
Vols,  iii — V.     Harmar's  Ohservatious  edited  by  A.  Clarke 

(2)  Chronology.  The  interpreter  should  have  not  only 
a  knowledge  of  technical  chronology,  but  of  the  Roman 
mode  of  reckoning  ab  urbe  condita,  and  of  the  Greek 
Olympiads,  (on  which  subjects  he  may  study  authors 
well  deserving  of  credit- ;  but  in  respect  to  historical 
chronology,  he  should  know  in  what  order  of  tim.e  the 
events  related  in  the  Old  Testament  happened  ;  when 
and  where  the  first  Roman  emperors,  the  various  kings 
and  princes  that  sprung  from  the  house  of  Herod  the 
Great,  the  Roman  Consuls  at  the  beginning  of  the  em- 
pire of  the  Cesars,  the  Jewish  high  priests  (and  the 
number  of  them)  in  our  Saviour's  time,  and  the  Roman 
magistrates,  specially  in  the  provinces  of  Syria  and  Ju- 
dea,  succeeded  each  other. 

P.  tavii  Opus  de  doctrina  temporum,  1703.  Scaliger  de  emen- 
dati'  ne  t*  raporurii,  16!29.  Usherii  Annalt-s  V^et.  et  N.  Test. 
Fraackii  Novum  bystema  <Jhrouol.  fundamentalis,  Goetting.1778. 
11 


122  ON  THE  QUALIFICATIONS 

(3)  History  civil  and  political.  In  regard  to  the  his- 
tory of  events  among  the  nations  mentioned  in  the  sa- 
cred books,  and  also  their  forms  of  government,  it  is 
important  for  tlie  interpreter  to  make  himself  acquaint- 
ed, first,  with  the  ancient  history  of  the  Jews.  In  study- 
ing this,  he  is  not  to  confine  himself  merely  to  the  Old 
Testament ;  he  must  also  consult  the  traditionary  ac- 
counts, which  were  extant  in  the  time  of  Christ  and  the 
apostles,  a)  Secondly,  he  mast  study  the  history  of  the 
Jews  under  the  Herods,  and  that  of  these  princes.  Third- 
ly, the  condition  and  circumstances  of  the  Jews  in  Pal- 
estine, while  under  the  dominion  of  the  Romans  ;  and 
also  of  the  Jews  living  in  other  countries.  Finally,  the 
history  of  the  Roman  emperors  at  that  period,  and  of 
the  Roman  prefects  over  the  Asiatic  provinces. 

a)  Shuckford's  Connexion.  Frideaux'  Connexion.  Krebsius, 
Decreta  Roiuanorum  pro  Judaeis  e  Josepho  coUecta,  1  vol.  {ivo. 
1763.  VVesselingii  Diatribe  de  Judaeoruni  Archontibus,  1  vol. 
8vo.  173H.  Benson's  History  of  the  first  plantings  of  thf' Chris- 
tian relig'ion.  Josephi  Opera,  edit.  Havercarnpii.  Jahn,  Ge- 
schichte  der  .fuden  in  Archaeologie  der  Hebraer,  Band  I.  i.  e. 
History  of  the  Jews  ;  now  in  a  course  of  translution,  by  one  of 
the  students  of  this  Seminary. 

(4)  Manners  and  customs.  In  regard  to  these,  («)  A 
knowledge  of  Hebrew  antiquities  in  general  is  necessa- 
ry, {b)  A  considerable  knowledge  of  the  Greek  and  Ro- 
man antiquities,  (c  A  knowledge  of  the  ecclesiastical 
rites  and  customs  of  the  primitive  churches ;  both  those 
which  they  received  from  the  Hebrews,  and  others 
which  were  introduced  by  Christians  themselves. 

Opera  Fhilonis  Alex,  et  Josephi.  Warneknos  Entwurtd^r  Heb. 
Alterthuemer,  1  vol.  8vo.  Jahi.'s  Archaeology  translated  by  the 
Rev.  T.  C.  Upham  ;  a  work,  which  combines  brevity  with  per- 
spicuity and  g-ood  order,  and  comprizes  the  substance  of  preced- 
ing publications  on  this  interesting  subject. 

Of  Roman  antiquities,  Adams'  work  is  a  very  useful  compend  ; 
and  of  the  Greek,  Potter  remains  not  only  the  best,  but  almost 
the  only  respectable  one.  Of  F.ccles.  antiquities,  Bingham's 
Orig.  t  cc.    Also  Roesler,  Bibliothek  der  Kirchenvaetern. 

§  4.  Doctrinal  contents  of  the  sacred  books.  That  part 
of  the  New  Testament,  which  is  directly  concerned  with 
faith  and  practice,  will  be  rightly  understood,  when  the 


OF  AN  INTERPRETER.  12U 

interpreter  rightly  understands  what  each  particular 
writer  has  inculcated.  As  there  are  many  passages 
which  relate  to  the  Jews;  and  as  the  writers  of  the  New 
Testament  and  their  first  readers  were  of  Jewish  extrac- 
tion ;  it  will  be  important, 

(1)  To  know  the  sentiments  of  the  Jews  of  that  peri- 
od, in  regard  to  religion  ;  specially  of  those  who  used 
the  Hebrew-Greek  dialect,  and  of  the  three  great  sects 
among  which  the  Jews  were  divided,  viz.  the  Pharisees, 
Sadducees,  and  Essenes. 

Josephi  et  Philonis  Scripla.  An  admirable  view  of  Philo's  sen- 
timents has  been  published  by  Schreiter,  in  Analekten  der  exe- 
get.  Tlieolog-ie,  Band,  i.  ii.  Fabricii  Codex  Pseudepigraphus 
Vet.  Tes.  et  Codex  Apocryphus  Nov.  Test.  Grabii  Spiciiegium 
Sauctt.  Patium,  saec.  i.  ii.  iii.  2  vols.  iivo.  On  the  right  use  of 
these  sources,  see  Mori  Hermeneut.  Vol.  ii.  p.  172  &c.  Brett- 
schneider,  systemat.  Darstellung  der  Dogmal.  und  Moral  der 
Apocryph.  Schriften  des  A.  Tes.  1H05.  Staeudlin,  Theoiogiae 
Moralis  Ebraeorum  ante  Christum  Historia,  1794.  De  tribus  Ju- 
daeoruoi  sectis,  Delph.  1703,  4to.  comprising  the  works  of  Serra- 
rius,  Drusius,  and  Scaliger,  on  this  subject. 

(2)  The  precepts  of  the  Christian  religion.  What  was 
adopted  from  the  Jewish  religion,  what  rejected,  and 
what  was  added  anew  to  Christianity,  must  be  under- 
stood in  order  to  explain  the  New  Testament  properly. 
But  knowledge  of  this  nature,  that  is  certain,  C3in  be  drawn 
only  from  the  sacred  writings  themselves. 

The  Biblical  Theology  of  Storr,  Reinhard,  Doederlein,  Zach- 
aria,  Leun,  Vluntinghe,  (and  for  some  purposes,  of  Ammon  and 
Bauer,)  may  be  used  with  profit.  But  the  student  is  not  to  be 
guided  by  any  system,  except  so  far  as  the  author  shows  it  to 
b.  built  upon  a  satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  word  of  God. 
Flait's  edition  of  Storr,  translated  into  German,  and  accompani- 
ed by  the  notes  of  the  editor,  is  a  fundamental  book  in  the  study 
of  Biblical  Theology.* 

(3)  The  doctrines  of  heretical  sects.  It  is  important  to 
know  the  opinions  of  early  heretics,  because,  it  is  prob- 
able, some  passages  of  the  New  Testament  have  a  spe- 
cial reference  to  them. 


*  Now  translated  into  English  and  published  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  -'chmucker,  a 
Prof,  in  the  Lutheran  Theol.  Seminary,  at  Gettysburgh,  in  Pennsylvania. 


124  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  AN  INTERPRETER. 

By  far  the  best  book  is  VValch's  Entwurleiuer  voUstaend.  Ges- 
chichte  der  Ketzereien  &:c.  1 1  vols.  8vo.  Vol.  i.  contains  an  ac- 
count of  the  earliest  heresies.  Tittnianni  de  vesti^iis  Gnostico- 
rurn  in  Nov.  Test,  frustra  quaesitis,  will  well  repay  the  labour  of 
perusal. 

§  5.  In  enumerating  the  qualifications  of  an  interpre- 
ter, we  must  not  omit  a  knowledge  of  grammar,  rhetoric, 
and  philosophy. 

(1)  Grammar.  Not  only  a  general  knowledge  of  its 
principles  is  necessary,  but  also  a  special  technical  knowl- 
edge of  both  etymology  and  syntax.  The  interpreter 
must  be  acquainted  with  the  various  forms  of  words,  and 
understand  how  the  significations  are  connected  with  the 
forms ;  he  must  understand  the  manner  in  which  words 
are  connected  in  a  sentence  ;  the  use  of  the  particles  ; 
and  also  of  the  grammatical  figures,  as  they  are  called, 
such  as  ellipsis  and  pleonasm. 

Vi2;erus  de  idiotismis  Lin^.  Graecae,  edit.  Hermann,  18l5. 
Hoogeveen  Doctrina  partic.  Graec.  edit.  Schutz,  18(»f).  Bos 
Ellipsis  Graecae  edit.  Schaefer,  1808.  Weiskii  Pleouasmi  Grae- 
ci  1807.      Winer's  Gram,  of  N.  Test.  Greek. 

(2)  Rhetoric.  A  knowledge  of  this  is  necessary,  not  so 
much  to  judge  of  rhetorical  figures,  as  to  find  out  the 
meanhnj  of  them,  or  the  sentiment  which  they  are  de- 
signed to  convey. 

i3  A  kmnchdge  of  p^iilosophy.  Not  that  of  some  par- 
ticular school  or  sect  merely,  but  that  which  pertains  to 
the  cultivation  of  the  mental  powers,  and  to  nice  psy- 
chological discrimination.  Such  a  knowledge  is  requi- 
site, in  order  to  form  clear  conceptions  in  the  mind,  and 
accurately  to  define  our  ideas ;  to  discern  what  is  simi- 
lar in  different  things,  and  what  is  distinct ;  to  judge  of 
the  connexion  of  thought  and  argument ;  and  finally,  to 
qualify  one  perspicuously  to  represent  the  opinions  of 
an  author  to  others.  Great  caution  however  is  neces- 
sary here,  lest  the  interpreter  intrude  upon  his  author 
his  own  particular  philosophy. 

Ernesti  Opuscula  i'hilol.  dt-  vauitate  Philosophantium  «Sz;c. 
translated  into  English,  and  published  in  the  Biblical  llepertory, 
No.  for  Jan.  1827. 


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